Libya: Cyrenaica vs. Tripolitania?

John R. Houk
© March 21, 2011

The civil war in Libya looked promising in its beginning to force the dictator Moamar Qaddafi out as leader. Then Qaddafi began his counter-offensive making serious dents of the rebel holdings in the east while cause vicious casualties among rebel soldiers and Libyan civilians. Then a coalition that is initially headed by the U.S. Military instituted a No-Fly zone which in effect has stalled at least momentarily Qaddafi’s counter-offensive.

If President Obama had acted earlier more damage may have hampered Qaddafi that would have indeed forced to him to flee; however President Obama is exactly known for his foreign policy guts that would protect American National Interests and benefit potential future allies from Libya. Nonetheless, when the President gave the go the combined coalition forces of America, France and the UK began an operation of pin-point accuracy rattling Qaddafi’s Air Force and anti-aircraft capabilities. That has to be good for the Libyan rebels to regroup and perhaps receive some military aid that could enhance a rebel counter-offensive.

I have been alerted to a STRATFOR article that offers a glimpse into the inner workings of the Libyan rebel leadership and governing apparatus. In this article I discovered that Libya like many Muslim nations is basically divided by tribal influences. In Libya those tribes seem to be divided into two regions. The western region, of which Qaddafi is from, has been known as Tripolitania and the eastern region of Libya, which most of the rebels are from, has been roughly known as Cyrenaica.

Apart from the STRATFOR emphasis on Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, there is a third region in Libya called the Fezzan. I suspect STRATFOR focuses on Tripolitania and Cyrenaica is because those regions are the most populous. The Fezzan is really a backward area of mostly the Sahara Desert. Really western part of Libya is divided into Tripolitania in the Northwest and the Fezzan in the Southwest with the Eastern half of Libya as the region of Cyrenaica. Also you should know that Cyrenaica was the dominant tribal region after Libyan independence. Moammar Qaddafi became the leader of a group of low level Officers that executed a coup against the Western installed King Idris who was deposed. A good short summary explaining the regions of Tripolitania, the Fezzan and Cyrenaica can be found at Middle East News Wire.

The picture then is somewhat of a traditional looking civil war between two sides: Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. The Cyrenaica-Libyan rebels have denied the civil war is a regional civil war but is a war to rid all Libyans of the despotism of Moammar Qaddafi.

The reality is though that there are undoubtedly some tribal elites of Tripolitania that have had a favored status that probably support their native son loony Moammar Qaddafi. If the rebels launch an effective counter-offensive to retake lost rebel territory and it is successful it will be interesting how many Tripolitania-Libyans will get behind the Cyrenaica-Libyan rebels.

JRH 3/21/11

Saudi Gulf Nations Preparing to Send Militaries to Bahrain

John R. Houk

© March 14, 2011

Bahrain is a near microscopic dot on the map that otherwise might be thought of as Saudi territory. Bahrain is a micro-Sheikdom with oil wealth and the port of the U.S. Navy 5^th Fleet.

 

PERSIAN GULF NATION MAP

Little tiny Bahrain has been besieged by Shi’ites in their tiny island nation who have revolted over the absolute monarchy (officially constitutional but you know…) that controls the government and which is a Sunni royal family. The unrest in Bahrain is not new but the recent intensity is undoubtedly a manifestation of Muslim unrest that began in Tunisia and spread across the Maghreb and the Muslim Middle East to change the old regimes to a more Ummah (Islamic Community) oriented government for the people.

The difference in the unrest in Bahrain than in other grassroots Islamic revolts is that it has more to do with the majority Shi’ite have-nots unhappy with their existence as opposed to the privileged Sunni minority haves that are well off. Since this is a Shia vs. Sunni thing in Bahrain, who do you think might possibly use the unrest as a platform to flex muscles against its Sunni competitor? Yep, that would be Iran. This is especially the case since Arab Peninsula nations are preparing to send military assistance to tiny Bahrain in the form of troops with the big dog being Saudi Arabia.

JRH 3/14/11

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Saudi Intervention in Bahrain

By STRATFOR

March 14, 2011 1051 GMT

Forces from Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries will enter Bahrain to help the Bahraini regime quell unrest, according to a number of media reports, including by Bahrain’s Alyam newspaper, known for its close links with the ruling al-Khalifa family. The reports come one day after clashes occurred between Shiite protesters and police in the capital, Manama. Meanwhile, Bahraini state media reported that the Independent Bloc, a parliamentary bloc of the Bahraini parliament, asked Bahraini King Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa to enforce martial law to contain the unrest.

These reports suggest that foreign intervention in Bahrain, or at least the possibility that the Bahraini military is taking over the security reins, is imminent. Such a move would mean the regime is getting increasingly concerned with Shiite unrest, which does not appear to be subsiding despite calls for dialogue from Bahraini Crown Prince Sheikh Salman bin Hamad al-Khalifa.

Troops from the United Arab Emirates are reportedly expected to arrive March 14. Al Arabiya reported that Saudi forces have already entered Bahrain, but these claims have yet to be officially confirmed by the Bahraini regime. The only announcement thus far has come from Nabil al-Hamar, the former information minister and adviser to the royal family, who wrote on Twitter that the Arab forces arrived in Bahrain. An unnamed Saudi official also said March 14 that more than 1,000 Saudi troops from the GCC’s Peninsula Shield Force entered Bahrain late March 13, AFP reported.

The ongoing tensions are exacerbated by the split between Bahrain’s Shiite movement, which became clearer during protests on March 11. The more hard-line faction of the Shiite movement, led by the Wafa and Haq blocs, has been increasing the unrest on the streets in the hopes of stalling the talks between the Shiite Al Wefaq-led coalition’s negotiations with the regime. Military intervention by the GCC countries would mean the situation is increasingly untenable for the regime. The paradox the Bahraini regime faces is that it cannot contain the unrest while trying to kick off talks with Al Wefaq. Al Wefaq finds itself in a difficult position, since it risks losing ground against hard-liners if it appears too close to the regime while Shiite protesters are beaten by the police.

The Bahraini regime has used the military option before. On Feb. 17, the military deployed immediately after a police crackdown in Manama’s Pearl Square and was able to calm down the situation for a while by encircling the area with tanks. If Bahrain indeed has requested Saudi intervention this time, the implication is that the Bahraini military is not confident in its ability to contain the unrest now. Riyadh’s decision to send forces to Manama could be taken for this reason, since wider spread of Shiite unrest from Bahrain to Saudi Arabia would aggravate the already existing protests among Saudi Arabia’s own Shiite population. Saudi military intervention in Bahrain is also not unprecedented; Saudi Arabia sent troops to Bahrain in 1994 when Riyadh determined that Shiite unrest threatened the al-Khalifa regime.

The regional implications of the unrest in Bahrain were underscored when U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates visited Manama on March 12 and urged the Bahraini regime to implement bold reforms. Gates said Iranian interference would become a greater possibility if Bahrain fails to do so. While Bahrain and Saudi Arabia seem to be coordinating to avoid that possibility, it is not without risks. Leader of the hard-line Haq movement Hassan Mushaima, who is believed to be increasing the Shiite unrest in Bahrain with Iranian support, said Feb. 28 that Saudi intervention in Bahrain would give Iran the same right to intervene as well. A scenario of regional Sunni Arab forces cracking down on Shia would apply pressure on Iran to respond more overtly, but its military ability is limited and it is a very risky option given the U.S. 5th Fleet is stationed in Bahrain. As of this writing, there is no sign that the Iranian military is taking steps toward that end, however, the situation on the ground could escalate if Shia in Bahrain ramp-up demonstrations.

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Saudi Gulf Nations Preparing to Send Militaries to Bahrain

John R. Houk

© March 14, 2011

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Saudi Intervention in Bahrain

Copyright 2011

This report may be forwarded or republished on your website with attribution to www.stratfor.com

Mubarak is Leaving One Way or the Other

John R. Houk

© January 29, 2011

A crazy “throw the bums out” grassroots move has begun to spread across Muslim North Africa thanks to mob intimidation began in Tunisia. Although economics is undoubtedly the cause of regime change among despotic Muslim nations, the Muslims who wish to reform Islam to hearken back to the blood thirsty days of their Prophet Mohammed and the Prophet’s idea of converting the world to Islam are exploiting the unrest to become the leadership of the mob desiring change.

Egypt is succumbing big time to the Muslim mob unrest. Couple this that the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) is the largest political opposition to Egyptian President Mubarak’s regime, there is a fuse lit that is searching for the bomb that will ignite the Egyptian support of the Muslim Brotherhood to depose Mubarak and rule Egypt.

The MB is the Sunni version of Iran’s lunatic Shia Twelvers that gave the Shah of Iran the boot to replace him with the repressive theopolitical dictatorship of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. An MB success in wresting control of political control of Egypt would mean that the Salafist style of Islam would make the rules of governance in Egypt. This means hearkening back to strict observance of Sharia Law and possible establishment of a Caliphate. Egypt is the most populous Muslim nation in Africa (Nigeria is the most populous nation in Africa and Indonesia is the most population Muslim nation). Egypt’s population would make the nation a prime candidate to enthrone a Caliph especially since the most learned Islamic University known as Al Azhar is located in Cairo Egypt. The existence of a Caliphate undoubtedly will awaken Muslim courage to invade Israel to attempt to execute another Jewish Holocaust.

Check this out: STRATFOR has sent out an alert that the MB and the Palestinian terrorists known as Hamas are crossing the Gaza-Egyptian border to aid in destabilizing Egypt:

The following is a report from a STRATFOR source in Hamas. Hamas, which formed in Gaza as an outgrowth of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (MB), has an interest in exaggerating its role and coordination with the MB in this crisis. The following information has not been confirmed. Nonetheless, there is a great deal of concern building in Israel and the United States in particular over the role of the MB in the demonstrations and whether a political opening will be made for the Islamist organization in Egypt.

The Egyptian police are no longer patrolling the Rafah border crossing into Gaza. Hamas armed men are entering into Egypt and are closely collaborating with the MB. The MB has fully engaged itself in the demonstrations, and they are unsatisfied with the dismissal of the Cabinet. They are insisting on a new Cabinet that does not include members of the ruling National Democratic Party.

Security forces in plainclothes are engaged in destroying public property in order to give the impression that many protesters represent a public menace. The MB is meanwhile forming people’s committees to protect public property and also to coordinate demonstrators’ activities, including supplying them with food, beverages and first aid.

The MB enjoys telling the West the propaganda taqiyya that it is no longer a militant Islamist organization, but rather a disseminator of peaceful da’wa to convince Muslims to reform and hearken back to the days of Mohammed. Hamas is definitely militant and it is a terrorist organization AND Hamas is directly a subset of the MB among Arabs that call themselves Palestinians.

The one ironic element that might deliver Egypt from the Islamist MB is the Egyptian Army which might accomplish a coup against Mubarak which will bring in a rule of Generals rather than radical Muslim political entities. Egyptian Generals are not Islamist; rather the Generals are self-interested in maintaining a stable Egypt that excludes the Muslim Brotherhood. The unknown variable is that the rank and file Officers in the Egyptian Army is a bunch of MB sympathizers.

This hearkens back to the days just after WWII when a Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser in the Egyptian Army with the aid of the Muslim Brotherhood exacted a mid-level Army coup against the British installed Egyptian Monarchy. The scary thing was the Muslim Brotherhood was highly connected to defeated Nazi regime of Adolf Hitler in the sense of European support against British suzerainty and a mutual hatred of Jews.

Nasser’s alliance did not stick long. Nasser eventually turned against the MB to aggrandize his political power to become a military dictator in Egypt. Nasser illegalized the MB and assassinated its early ideological leaders. This forced the MB to become a militant underground movement inside of Egypt. Over the years the MB still managed to gain Egyptian Muslim popularity and today runs candidates under other political auspices in Egypt’s legislature.

Although an Egyptian Army coup led by the Generals might solve the immediate concerns of the Egyptian populace and assuage fears of nations such as America and Israel, the Generals may fear another mid-level rank and file Officer coup similar to Nasser’s rise to power. The MB has infiltrated the rank and file of the Egyptian Army.

STRATFOR has a better elaboration of the possibilities that might arise with Mubarak receiving the boot as the dictator of Egypt.

JRH 1/29/11

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The Egyptian Unrest: A Special Report

By STRAFOR Global Intelligence

January 29, 2011 2207 GMT

Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak remains the lifeblood of the demonstrators, who still number in the tens of thousands in downtown Cairo and in other major cities, albeit on a lesser scale. After being overwhelmed in the Jan. 28 Day of Rage protests, Egypt’s internal security forces — with the anti-riot paramilitaries of the Central Security Forces (CSF) at the forefront — were glaringly absent from the streets Jan. 29. They were replaced with rows of tanks and armored personnel carriers carrying regular army soldiers. Unlike their CSF counterparts, the demonstrators demanding Mubarak’s exit from the political scene largely welcomed the soldiers. Despite Mubarak’s refusal to step down Jan. 28, the public’s positive perception of the military, seen as the only real gateway to a post-Mubarak Egypt, remained. It is unclear how long this perception will hold, especially as Egyptians are growing frustrated with the rising level of insecurity in the country and the army’s limits in patrolling the streets.

There is more to these demonstrations than meets the eye. The media will focus on the concept of reformers staging a revolution in the name of democracy and human rights. These may well have brought numerous demonstrators into the streets, but revolutions, including this one, are made up of many more actors than the liberal voices on Facebook and Twitter.

After three decades of Mubarak rule, a window of opportunity has opened for various political forces — from the moderate to the extreme — that preferred to keep the spotlight on the liberal face of the demonstrations while they maneuver from behind. As the Iranian Revolution of 1979 taught, the ideology and composition of protesters can wind up having very little to do with the political forces that end up in power. Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood (MB) understands well the concerns the United States, Israel and others share over a political vacuum in Cairo being filled by Islamists. The MB so far is proceeding cautiously, taking care to help sustain the demonstrations by relying on the MB’s well-established social services to provide food and aid to the protesters. It simultaneously is calling for elections that would politically enable the MB. With Egypt in a state of crisis and the armed forces stepping in to manage that crisis, however, elections are nowhere near assured. What is now in question is what groups like the Muslim Brotherhood and others are considering should they fear that their historic opportunity could be slipping.

One thing that has become clear in the past several hours is a trend that STRATFOR has been following for some time in Egypt, namely, the military’s growing clout in the political affairs of the state. Former air force chief and outgoing civil aviation minister Ahmed Shafiq, who worked under Mubarak’s command in the air force (the most privileged military branch in Egypt), has been appointed prime minister and tasked with forming the new government. Outgoing Intelligence Chief Omar Suleiman, who has long stood by Mubarak, is now vice president, a spot that has been vacant for the past 30 years. Meanwhile, Defense Minister Field Marshal Mohammed Hussein Tantawi (who oversees the Republican Guard) and Egypt’s chief of staff of the armed forces, Lt. Gen. Sami Annan — who returned to Cairo Jan. 29 after a week of intense discussions with senior U.S. officials — are likely managing the political process behind the scenes. More political shuffles are expected, and the military appears willing for now to give Mubarak the time to arrange his political exit. Until Mubarak finally does leave, the unrest in the streets is unlikely to subside, raising the question of just how much more delay from Mubarak the armed forces will tolerate.

The important thing to remember is that the Egyptian military, since the founding of the modern republic in 1952, has been the guarantor of regime stability. Over the past several decades, the military has allowed former military commanders to form civilian institutions to take the lead in matters of political governance but never has relinquished its rights to the state.

Now that the political structure of the state is crumbling, the army must directly shoulder the responsibility of security and contain the unrest on the streets. This will not be easy, especially given the historical animosity between the military and the police in Egypt. For now, the demonstrators view the military as an ally, and therefore (whether consciously or not) are facilitating a de facto military takeover of the state. But one misfire in the demonstrations, and a bloodbath in the streets could quickly foil the military’s plans and give way to a scenario that groups like the MB quickly could exploit. Here again, we question the military’s tolerance for Mubarak as long as he is the source fueling the demonstrations.

Considerable strain is building on the only force within the country that stands between order and chaos as radical forces rise. The standing theory is that the military, as the guarantor of the state, will manage the current crisis. But the military is not a monolithic entity. It cannot shake its history, and thus cannot dismiss the threat of a colonel’s coup in this shaky transition.

The current regime is a continuation of the political order, which was established when midranking officers and commanders under the leadership of Gamal Abdel Nasser, a mere colonel in the armed forces, overthrew the British-backed monarchy in 1952. Islamist sympathizers in the junior ranks of the military assassinated his successor, Anwar Sadat, in 1981, an event that led to Mubarak’s presidency.

The history of the modern Egyptian republic haunts Egypt’s generals today. Though long suppressed, an Islamist strand exists amongst the junior ranks of Egypt’s modern military. The Egyptian military is, after all, a subset of the wider society, where there is a significant cross- section that is religiously conservative and/or Islamist. These elements are not politically active, otherwise those at the top would have purged them.

But there remains a deep-seated fear among the military elite that the historic opening could well include a cabal of colonels looking to address a long-subdued grievance against the state, particularly its foreign policy vis-à-vis the United States and Israel. The midranking officers have the benefit of having the most direct interaction — and thus the strongest links — with their military subordinates, unlike the generals who command and observe from a politically dangerous distance. With enough support behind them, midranking officers could see their superiors as one and the same as Mubarak and his regime, and could use the current state of turmoil to steer Egypt’s future.

Signs of such a coup scenario have not yet surfaced. The army is still a disciplined institution with chain of command, and many likely fear the utter chaos that would ensue should the military establishment rupture. Still, those trying to manage the crisis from the top cannot forget that they are presiding over a country with a strong precedent of junior officers leading successful coups. That precedent becomes all the more worrying when the regime itself is in a state of collapse following three decades of iron-fisted rule.

The United States, Israel and others will thus be doing what they can behind the scenes to shape the new order in Cairo, but they face limitations in trying to preserve a regional stability that has existed since 1978. The fate of Egypt lies in the ability of the military to not only manage the streets and the politicians, but also itself.

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Mubarak is Leaving One Way or the Other

John R. Houk

© January 29, 2011

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The Egyptian Unrest: A Special Report

This report may be forwarded or republished on your website with attribution to www.stratfor.com

Copyright 2011

The Jihadist CBRN Threat

Here is the new acronym you should learn to go along with WMD and IED. CBRN weaponry apparently is the next threat level for Islamic terrorists will use in America and Western nations. CBRN stands for Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear.

After reading a STRATFOR report CBRN weaponry is the next level sought by Islamic terrorists to wreak havoc among civilians. STRATFOR believes Islamic terrorists have been hampered by American efforts so much that it is a difficult goal to achieve by al-Qaeda and its sympathizers. However, the goal is not unattainable and there is some belief that components of CBRN are possessed by Islamic terrorists but not enough to deploy with a significant amount of destruction to limb and life of the innocent.

Here are the STRATFOR details.

JRH 2/11/10