REGIONAL HEGEMONY

Eligah Barrett (not sure if a pseudonym or actual) uses sources to put together a profile of Iran’s agenda. As the title suggests, Iran is seeking to be a military power at least regionally. I suspect an even greater agenda with Iran’s pursuit of nukes.

This yet another reason to NOT TRUST Iran about any nuclear deal WHATSOEVER! Especially as negotiated by former President Barack Hussein Obama, the most corrupt President in American history.

JRH 10/30/17

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REGIONAL HEGEMONY

By Eligah Barrett

Oct 28, 2017

Posted on G+ Crush Jihad

Back in 1992, the New York Times wrote, “Becoming second to Saudi Arabia as a world oil power, IRAN EXPECTS TO FURTHER ITS GREATER AMBITION OF BEING THE MOST IMPORTANT REGIONAL POWER IN THE PERSIAN GULF, A LONG-HELD FOREIGN-POLICY OBJECTIVE” (NOV. 7, 1992).

The article examined how Iran planned to achieve this objective: More troubling to other countries in the area and to the west is the other side of Iran's plan to achieve this objective: A HUGE REARMAMENT PROGRAM, financed largely by the New oil money.

“The Islamic Affairs Analyst of Gloucester, England, printed an article in August 1994 that said, ‘Iran is pursuing a parallel policy of surrounding Israel with implacable enemies. Turkey is moving closer to Iran. To Israel's North, IRAN has deluged Hezbollah in Lebanon with money and weapons. With Hamas in control of Gaza, Tehran could ignite another conflict on Israel's western and northern borders at any moment. Iran is also' opening another front in the West Bank, which crawls with zealots sympathetic to if not in the pay of Iran. And Egypt, since the ouster of President Mubarak, is moving rapidly toward discarding its peace treaty with Israel as it moves into Iran's camp.’” [Found at the Trumpet]

Of course, the Shiites controls Iran and are a majority 60 percent in Iraq. The U.S.'s removal of Saddam Hussein in 2003 opened the way for Iran to heavily infiltrate Iraq, providing armaments, financing and training to Shiites militias, sending thousands of operatives into the country and establishing economic ties with it. Moreover, the most powerful political party in Iraq is allied with Tehran. This could be a decisive factor causing Iraq to fall under Iran's control.

“That 1994 Islamic Affairs Analyst article said further, starting at the foot of the Red Sea, ‘IRAN is set to increase its influence considerably in both Somalia and Yemen. ... Further up the Red Sea coast, Sudan is already firmly in pro-Iranian hands with [Omar Hassan] al-Bashir's military regime no more than a front for Hassan al-Bashir's Islamists. And it is from bases in Sudan that Islamist fundamentalists are beginning to undermine the stability of the newly independent Eritrea, which, it should be noted, now controls all of what was formerly Ethiopia's Red Sea coastline.’” [ibid.]

These trends continue today. Iran has continued to send arms shipments to Islamists in Somalia. In March 2008, Iran signed a military agreement with Sudan. In May 2008, it further boosted its ties with Eritrea, signing trade and investment agreements. Again, the following year, in April 2009, IRAN and Eritrea, together with Algeria, agreed to expand their bilateral cooperation. Iran has a frightening influence and control in North Africa, which greatly intensified with the unrest that began erupting in Arab states in early 2011. The Tunisian government fell in January into the hands of the radical Muslims. The Ennahda party, the Islamist party banned under the dictatorship of Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali, quickly emerged as probably the most powerful political force in the country. In October 2011, the Islamists party won the nation's first free elections since independence in 1956. That is almost exactly what happened in Egypt when its first-ever free elections ushered in the Muslim Brotherhood in 2012. However, it didn't take long before discontent surged against the hard-liner Ennahda. Assassinations of two prominent opposition figures in 2013 threatened another revolution in Tunisia. It was only averted when rival factions negotiated a peaceful abdication of the elected Islamist government. Tunisia then elected the secular-nationalist Nidaa Tounes Party. Its candidate, Beji Caid Essebsi, became president. Essebsi, however, is a former official of the ousted Ben Ali regime. He has come under fire for Tunisia's failing economy and for terrorist attacks that have crippled Tunisia's tourism industry. Again, it is a scenario not much different from Egypt's.

Iran has also heavily infiltrated Yemen and Bahrain, and it is deeply entrenched in Afghanistan. Many moderate Arab nations fear, and are afraid to offend, IRAN.

 
Here is what the Islamic Affairs Analyst of May 13, 1992, said: “The main strategic aim of Iran is to dominate the Persian Gulf and environs. An important step in achieving this goal is to GAIN UNDISPUTED LEADERSHIP OF THE RADICAL ISLAMIC CAMP.” Many of the good intelligence reports about Iran have proven true. Do we see just how powerful Iran is becoming militarily? Prof. Barry Rubin wrote in 2007, “IRAN tries to extend its influence in THREE ways: propaganda and incitement; the promotion of client groups, and projecting the state's own power. Today, IRAN sponsors radical Islamist groups in Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, and among in Palestinians as well as in other countries. Its two most important clients are Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Palestinian Hamas group (Global Politician, July 25, 2007).” [the Trumpet]

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Edited by John R. Houk

All source links and any text embraced by brackets are by the Editor.

© Eligah Barrett

Special Report: Iran and the Saudis' Countermove on Bahrain

Here is a STRATFOR update on Bahrain that examines the possibility of some sort of destabilizing influence from Iran.

JRH 3/15/11

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Special Report: Iran and the Saudis' Countermove on Bahrain

By George Friedman

March 14, 2011

STRATFOR

Saudi Arabia is leading a coalition force into Bahrain to help the government calm the unrest there. This move puts Iran in a difficult position, as Tehran had hoped to use the uprising in Bahrain to promote instability in the Persian Gulf region. Iran could refrain from acting and lose an opportunity to destabilize the region, or it could choose from several other options that do not seem particularly effective.

The Bahrain uprising consists of two parts, as all revolutions do. The first is genuine grievances by the majority Shiite population — the local issues and divisions. The second is the interests of foreign powers in Bahrain. It is not one or the other. It is both.

The Iranians clearly benefit from an uprising in Bahrain. It places the U.S. 5th Fleet’s basing in jeopardy, puts the United States in a difficult position and threatens the stability of other Persian Gulf Arab states. For the Iranians, the uprisings in North Africa and their spread to the Arabian Peninsula represent a golden opportunity for pursuing their long-standing interest (going back to the Shah and beyond) of dominating the Gulf.

The Iranians are accustomed to being able to use their covert capabilities to shape the political realities in countries. They did this effectively in Iraq and are doing it in Afghanistan. They regarded this as low risk and high reward. The Saudis, recognizing that this posed a fundamental risk to their regime and consulting with the Americans, have led a coalition force into Bahrain to halt the uprising and save the regime. Pressed by covert forces, they were forced into an overt action they were clearly reluctant to take.

We are now off the map, so to speak. The question is how the Iranians respond, and there is every reason to think that they do not know. They probably did not expect a direct military move by the Saudis, given that the Saudis prefer to act more quietly themselves. The Iranians wanted to destabilize without triggering a strong response, but they were sufficiently successful in using local issues that the Saudis felt they had no choice in the matter. It is Iran’s move.

If Iran simply does nothing, then the wave that has been moving in its favor might be stopped and reversed. They could lose a historic opportunity. At the same time, the door remains open in Iraq, and that is the main prize here. They might simply accept the reversal and pursue their main line. But even there things are murky. There are rumors in Washington that U.S. President Barack Obama has decided to slow down, halt or even reverse the withdrawal from Iraq. Rumors are merely rumors, but these make sense. Completing the withdrawal now would tilt the balance in Iraq to Iran, a strategic disaster.

Therefore, the Iranians are facing a counter-offensive that threatens the project they have been pursuing for years just when it appeared to be coming to fruition. Of course, it is just before a project succeeds that opposition mobilizes, so they should not be surprised that resistance has grown so strong. But surprised or not, they now have a strategic decision to make and not very long to make it.

They can up the ante by increasing resistance in Bahrain and forcing fighting on the ground. It is not clear that the Bahraini opposition is prepared to take that risk on behalf of Iran, but it is a potential option. They have the option of trying to increase unrest elsewhere in order to spread the Saudi and Gulf Cooperation Council forces, weakening their impact. It is not clear how much leverage the Iranians have in other countries. The Iranians could try to create problems in Saudi Arabia, but given the Saudis’ actions in Bahrain, this becomes more difficult.

Finally, they can attempt an overt intervention, either in Bahrain or elsewhere, such as Iraq or Afghanistan. A naval movement against Bahrain is not impossible, but if the U.S. Navy intervenes, which it likely would, it would be a disaster for the Iranians. Operations in Iraq or Afghanistan might be more fruitful. It is possible that Shiite insurgents will operate in Iraq, but that would guarantee a halt of the U.S. withdrawal without clearly increasing the Iranians’ advantage there. They want U.S. forces to leave, not give them a reason to stay.

There is then the indirect option, which is to trigger a war with Israel. The killings in the West Bank and Israeli concerns about Hezbollah might be some of Iran’s doing, with the emphasis on “might.” But it is not clear how a Hezbollah confrontation with Israel would help Iran’s position relative to Saudi Arabia in the Persian Gulf. It diverts attention, but the Saudis know the stakes and they will not be easily diverted.

The logic, therefore, is that Iran retreats and waits. But the Saudi move shifts the flow of events, and time is not on Iran’s side.

There is also the domestic Iranian political situation to consider. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has been strong in part because of his successful handling of foreign policy. The massive failure of a destabilization plan would give his political opponents the ammunition needed to weaken him domestically. We do not mean a democratic revolution in Iran, but his enemies among the clergy who see him as a threat to their position, and hard-liners in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps who want an even more aggressive stand.

Ahmadinejad finds himself in a difficult position. The Saudis have moved decisively. If he does nothing, his position can unravel and with it his domestic political strength. Yet none of the counters he might use seem effective or workable. In the end, his best option is to create a crisis in Iraq, forcing the United States to consider how deeply it wants to be drawn back into Iraq. He might find weakness there that he can translate into some sort of political deal.

At the moment we suspect the Iranians do not know how they will respond. The first issue will have to be determining whether they can create violent resistance to the Saudis in Bahrain, to both tie them down and increase the cost of occupation. It is simply unclear whether the Bahrainis are prepared to pay the price. The opposition does seem to want fundamental change in Bahrain, but it is not clear that they have reached the point where they are prepared to resist and die en masse.

That is undoubtedly what the Iranians are exploring now. If they find that this is not an option, then none of their other options are particularly good. All of them involve risk and difficulty. It also requires that Iran commit itself to confrontations that it has tried to avoid. It prefers covert action that is deniable to overt action that is not.

As we move into the evening, we expect the Iranians are in intense discussions of their next move. Domestic politics are affecting regional strategy, as would be the case in any country. But the clear roadmap the Iranians were working from has now collapsed. The Saudis have called their hand, and they are trying to find out if they have a real or a busted flush. They will have to act quickly before the Saudi action simply becomes a solid reality. But it is not clear what they can do quickly. For the moment, the Saudis have the upper hand. But the Iranians are clever and tenacious. There are no predictions possible. We doubt even the Iranians know what they will do.

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Copyright 2011

This report may be forwarded or republished on your website with attribution to www.stratfor.com

Saudi Gulf Nations Preparing to Send Militaries to Bahrain

John R. Houk

© March 14, 2011

Bahrain is a near microscopic dot on the map that otherwise might be thought of as Saudi territory. Bahrain is a micro-Sheikdom with oil wealth and the port of the U.S. Navy 5^th Fleet.

 

PERSIAN GULF NATION MAP

Little tiny Bahrain has been besieged by Shi’ites in their tiny island nation who have revolted over the absolute monarchy (officially constitutional but you know…) that controls the government and which is a Sunni royal family. The unrest in Bahrain is not new but the recent intensity is undoubtedly a manifestation of Muslim unrest that began in Tunisia and spread across the Maghreb and the Muslim Middle East to change the old regimes to a more Ummah (Islamic Community) oriented government for the people.

The difference in the unrest in Bahrain than in other grassroots Islamic revolts is that it has more to do with the majority Shi’ite have-nots unhappy with their existence as opposed to the privileged Sunni minority haves that are well off. Since this is a Shia vs. Sunni thing in Bahrain, who do you think might possibly use the unrest as a platform to flex muscles against its Sunni competitor? Yep, that would be Iran. This is especially the case since Arab Peninsula nations are preparing to send military assistance to tiny Bahrain in the form of troops with the big dog being Saudi Arabia.

JRH 3/14/11

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Saudi Intervention in Bahrain

By STRATFOR

March 14, 2011 1051 GMT

Forces from Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries will enter Bahrain to help the Bahraini regime quell unrest, according to a number of media reports, including by Bahrain’s Alyam newspaper, known for its close links with the ruling al-Khalifa family. The reports come one day after clashes occurred between Shiite protesters and police in the capital, Manama. Meanwhile, Bahraini state media reported that the Independent Bloc, a parliamentary bloc of the Bahraini parliament, asked Bahraini King Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa to enforce martial law to contain the unrest.

These reports suggest that foreign intervention in Bahrain, or at least the possibility that the Bahraini military is taking over the security reins, is imminent. Such a move would mean the regime is getting increasingly concerned with Shiite unrest, which does not appear to be subsiding despite calls for dialogue from Bahraini Crown Prince Sheikh Salman bin Hamad al-Khalifa.

Troops from the United Arab Emirates are reportedly expected to arrive March 14. Al Arabiya reported that Saudi forces have already entered Bahrain, but these claims have yet to be officially confirmed by the Bahraini regime. The only announcement thus far has come from Nabil al-Hamar, the former information minister and adviser to the royal family, who wrote on Twitter that the Arab forces arrived in Bahrain. An unnamed Saudi official also said March 14 that more than 1,000 Saudi troops from the GCC’s Peninsula Shield Force entered Bahrain late March 13, AFP reported.

The ongoing tensions are exacerbated by the split between Bahrain’s Shiite movement, which became clearer during protests on March 11. The more hard-line faction of the Shiite movement, led by the Wafa and Haq blocs, has been increasing the unrest on the streets in the hopes of stalling the talks between the Shiite Al Wefaq-led coalition’s negotiations with the regime. Military intervention by the GCC countries would mean the situation is increasingly untenable for the regime. The paradox the Bahraini regime faces is that it cannot contain the unrest while trying to kick off talks with Al Wefaq. Al Wefaq finds itself in a difficult position, since it risks losing ground against hard-liners if it appears too close to the regime while Shiite protesters are beaten by the police.

The Bahraini regime has used the military option before. On Feb. 17, the military deployed immediately after a police crackdown in Manama’s Pearl Square and was able to calm down the situation for a while by encircling the area with tanks. If Bahrain indeed has requested Saudi intervention this time, the implication is that the Bahraini military is not confident in its ability to contain the unrest now. Riyadh’s decision to send forces to Manama could be taken for this reason, since wider spread of Shiite unrest from Bahrain to Saudi Arabia would aggravate the already existing protests among Saudi Arabia’s own Shiite population. Saudi military intervention in Bahrain is also not unprecedented; Saudi Arabia sent troops to Bahrain in 1994 when Riyadh determined that Shiite unrest threatened the al-Khalifa regime.

The regional implications of the unrest in Bahrain were underscored when U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates visited Manama on March 12 and urged the Bahraini regime to implement bold reforms. Gates said Iranian interference would become a greater possibility if Bahrain fails to do so. While Bahrain and Saudi Arabia seem to be coordinating to avoid that possibility, it is not without risks. Leader of the hard-line Haq movement Hassan Mushaima, who is believed to be increasing the Shiite unrest in Bahrain with Iranian support, said Feb. 28 that Saudi intervention in Bahrain would give Iran the same right to intervene as well. A scenario of regional Sunni Arab forces cracking down on Shia would apply pressure on Iran to respond more overtly, but its military ability is limited and it is a very risky option given the U.S. 5th Fleet is stationed in Bahrain. As of this writing, there is no sign that the Iranian military is taking steps toward that end, however, the situation on the ground could escalate if Shia in Bahrain ramp-up demonstrations.

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Saudi Gulf Nations Preparing to Send Militaries to Bahrain

John R. Houk

© March 14, 2011

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Saudi Intervention in Bahrain

Copyright 2011

This report may be forwarded or republished on your website with attribution to www.stratfor.com