There are a lot of voices on both the Left and Right side of
aisle calling for Obama to declassify the infamous 28 pages of a report that
may link Saudi Arabia in some fashion or another to the al Qaeda attack on
American soil on September 11, 2001. The Saudis are now saying they either don’t want the declassification or at the very least not allow the Justice
Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA) Bill to become law.
JASTA would allow surviving victims of the 9/11 attack
to sue Saudi Arabia in civil court for any culpability in financing
the al Qaeda attack.
Authors Millard Burr and Rachel Ehrenfeld of the American Center for Democracy
(ACD) have posed further incrimination against Saudi Arabia that beyond the 28
pages. Evidently a Bosnian police raid on a Muslim charity group in Sarajevo
turned up some evidence of fund raising for Usama (or Osama – depending who you read) bin Laden’s al Qaeda. That Burr
and Ehrenfeld suggest that evidence points to numerous Saudi families of wealth
that were sugar-daddies to al Qaeda. Al Qaeda called these sugar-daddies the Golden Chain. The problem: The U.S.
Government has made much of that evidence classified just as the 28 pages.
Here is a teaser paragraph from the Burr-Ehrenfeld essay:
How much of the Sarajevo material
remains classified and unpublished is debatable. However, like the missing
Congressional report, substantial material that covers the genesis and
expansion of al Qaeda in the 1990s has never been released. What we do know is
that one note taken from the Sarajevo hoard that surfaced at the trial is
a bin Laden note saying: “we took very huge gains from the country’s people in
Saudi. We were able to give political power to the Mujahideen, gathering
donations in very large amounts…”
Just think if there are some names on the 28 classified
pages that are also on the Golden Chain. That could finally reveal just how
involved the Saudi government or policies that can be associated with wealthy
Saudis that are today considered legitimate global business partners. A civil
trial could then open some cans of worms that the Intelligence communities of
both the USA and Saudi Arabia that might lead to some criminal investigations.
AND there you have it – My guess is neither the U.S. Government nor the Saudis
want those cans of worms opened. What do you think?
Just a brief aside: I heard on Fox News that Obama might declassify some of those 28 pages today. However,
Google is fairly silent on the today thing. Google searches do point to former
Senator Bob Graham reporting that a partial declassification of the 28 pages (e.g.
AP, Fox News and Esquire) Hmm … Do you think
the U.S. Intelligence community might be pressing Obama on what the public can
see?
JRH 4/24/16
*********************
Saudi Arabia: The Golden Chain and The Missing 28 Pages
April 23, 2016 6:32PM
The American media, which continues to concentrate on a bill
making its way through Congress that would allow American citizens to sue the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for losses suffered as a result of the 9/11
attacks, paid no attention to the Golden Chain.
The victims claim that the release of the 28 pages missing
from the 9/11 Commission Report is of crucial importance to their case. Those
pages, they say, would show the interrelationship that ties the hijackers to
the Saudi regime itself and therefore would offer a damning
indictment of the Kingdom. But President Obama, like President Bush before him,
refuses to make it public. And the Saudi Royal Family that vehemently denies
funding al Qaeda threatened that if the 28 pages are released, they would sell
more than $750 billion of Saudi investments in the U.S.
Of equal if not of greater importance than the missing 28
pages, is the forgotten investigation of the Bosnia-BIF office.
Crucially, among the boxes and files was found a
note ostensibly written by Osama Bin Laden that lists a
“Golden Chain” of twenty Arab plutocrats who were and
remain suspected of financing international terrorism, including the
funding of al Qaeda.
—-
The Golden Chain was established about the time of al
Qaeda’s founding in 1988. Bin Laden’s notes on efforts to recruit
wealthy Saudi Arabian families who could fund his group were also found at
Sarajevo. Much of the information derived from the Sarajevo came to light
during the 2003 trial of an al Qaeda financier, Enaam Arnaout, in Chicago.
In March 2002, a search of the Benevolence International
Foundation (the BBosanska Idealna Futura, or BIF) in Sarajevo, Bosnia, would
provide the West with the most significant trove of information ever to be
found on the Genesis and growth of the al Qaeda organization.
In fact, Bosnian investigators unearthed an intelligence
mother lode: Not only did they seize weapons, false passports, plans for making
bombs, jihadist videos and literature, their search also yielded material of
great historic value. On a computer file titled “Tareekh Osama” (Osama’s
History), there were found documents, letters, and photos relating to the birth
and early days of al Qaeda, some of it in bin Laden’s handwriting. Included in
the haul was an organizational chart, and notes on al Qaeda activity reportedly
prepared by bin Laden, and his mentor Sheikh Abdallah Azzam. The file had been
kept by Bin Ladin confidant Enaam Arnaout, who clearly obviously thought the
BIF office in Bosnia was safe from intrusion. Ironically, before 9/11 Arnaout
and the BIF were under investigation in the United States for operating the
charity as a racketeering enterprise. One that provided material support to al
Qaeda. Following 9/11, it seemed only a matter of time before Arnaout would be
indicted.
Why the raid took place when it did, and who sponsored the
raid (in Sarajevo and Washington), remains something of a mystery. As a result
of the Dayton Accords, Bosnia-Herzegovina had been governed by a unique
tripartite power-sharing arrangement since 1996; a rotating presidency allowed
Muslim Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats to share power. Importantly, in 2002 Alija
Izetbegović, the powerful Islamist Muslim Brother, was no longer
first among equals. The West’s bete-noire had stepped down after serving as
Chairman of the Presidency from October 1996 through October 2000. Thus,
given the power structure that existed in Sarajevo in early 2002 (and in the
aftermath of 9/11 2001), it is posited that the CIA either took
part in or at least was instrumental in, the raid on the BIF
location.
Incredibly, the trove of information discovered in that raid
was given publicity in Bosnia itself. No effort was made by the Bosnia
intelligence agency to tailor, redact, or eliminate information found in the
Bosanska, and thus, the information itself proved to be a bombshell both inside
and out of Bosnia. Unlike Washington where the most astounding intelligence is
immediately classified secret and squirreled down some intelligence rat hole,
the Bosnian services shared their find with the world. And in an order issued
on 6 March 2003 by the Supreme Court of Bosnia, the computer files that
had been seized were delivered to the U.S. Embassy. The documents were then
translated into English. Later, some appeared in a trial of a BIF
official Enaam Arnaout.
Included in the files were “scanned letters” between
Arnaout and bin Laden (using their nom de guerre) and letters concerning
other al Qaeda principals. The letters revealed that al Qaeda leaders were
paid, and weapons for the group were purchased from funds provided by Muslim
charities. There were also letters authorizing the purchase, and
purchase orders for rifles, RPGs, mortars, and other weaponry, with
instructions to distribute the weapons to camps operated by al Qaeda.
Other memoranda provided a chronology of events from the
founding of al Qaeda in Khost to the movement’s activity in Peshawar, Pakistan,
during its first months of existence. There were reports on al Qaeda
activity in the various jihad on-going in Bosnia, the Sudan, and Chechnya. An
article published in 1988 in Arab News outlined bin Laden’s activity and
included a photo of Arnaout and Bin Laden walking together at “Masada”, an
Arab-Afghan camp for mujahideen.
In the search of the BIF’s Sarajevo offices, “law
enforcement authorities” discovered conclusive evidence that tied the BIF Chief
Executive Officer Enaam Arnaout to al Qaeda, and to its leader Osama Bin
Laden. One letter even allowed Arnaout to sign an authorization on bin Laden’s
behalf. Though the Sarajevo documents remained secret for
months, they included the minutes of an 11 August 1988 meeting during which bin
Laden discussed the creation of what would then be known as the al Qaeda. It is
recalled that in the decade following the founding of al
Qaeda 1988 only a few hundred jihadists had been permitted to take the
oath of allegiance (the baya’t) to Osama bin Laden. Arnaout was thus
a member of a very select body of mujahideen.
The evidence unearthed in Sarajevo was sufficient
to charge Arnaout with conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists.
Arnaout, who was born and raised in Syria and was a member of a Saudi family of
Albanian heritage, was also an American citizen and had been a resident of the
U.S. since 1992. Thus, in the end, there would be no escaping U.S.
justice.
Concerning the BIF, a “charity” incorporated in the State of
Illinois in March 1992, the arrest of Arnaout was soon followed by the closure
of BIF operation in Canada and Bosnia, and then by most of its offices located
overseas; namely, in Pakistan, Bosnia, Yemen, Sudan, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan,
Bangladesh, Turkey, Dagestan, Soviet Georgia, China, and Ingushetia (moved from
Chechnya).
In December 2001, and shortly after 9/11 but before the
indictment of Arnaout himself, BIF funds had been blocked in the USA, Canada,
and Bosnia. At that time, it was reported that the US government had in its
possession substantial evidence proving that the Arnaout-bin Laden intimate
relationship dated from the mid-1980s. The relationship was in fact fixed well
before the creation of the al-Qaeda organization in August 1988 in Khost,
Afghanistan.
Given the evidence uncovered at the BIF office in Sarajevo
(and, reportedly additional evidence of BIF’s terrorist ties discovered by
Bosnian police in a later raid on local charities on 3 June), it was not
surprising that Arnaout was soon indicated in the United States.
See UNITED STATES of America v. Enaam M. ARNAOUT, a/k/a “Abu
Mahmoud”, a/k/a “Abu Mahmoud al Suri”, a/k/a “Abu Mahmoud al Hamawi”,
a/k/a “Abdel Samia”, U.S. v. ARNAOUT, No. 02 CR 892, 231 F.Supp.2d 797 (2002),
U.S. District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division. November 22, 2002,
Patrick J. Fitzgerald, et.al.,
United States Attorneys.
The Trial
On March 2003 the Chicago trail [sic] of Enaam Arnaout was
truncated just before it began == much to the dissatisfaction of most
observers. Arnaout had been charged with racketeering conspiracy, providing
material support to organizations engaged in violent activities, money
laundering, mail fraud and wire fraud. He faced a possible 90-year sentence.
However, before the charges could be tried Arnaout pleaded guilty in federal
court to a single count of illegally funding and supplying military assistance
to mujahideen in Bosnia and Chechnya.
The federal case, which focused on the Arnaout-Bin Laden
relationship, was blown to smithereens when a federal judge ruled that evidence
was spotty at best. Prosecutors dropped all charges after Arnaout pled guilty
to a single felony count. For reasons still not clear, the government settled
for a penalty less than the twenty years that Arnaout could have
received. As an editorial in the New York Sun put it, “The government’s
decision to accept a plea to a single, and relatively minor, count [transpired]
so as to avoid a risky trial.” Nonetheless, federal prosecutors were “unwilling
to credit [Arnaout] for cooperating.”
True or false, and despite the congressional testimony of
then-FBI Director Robert Mueller before a U.S. House Appropriations
Subcommittee on 14 September 2006, the Arnaout imbroglio was not one
of the FBI’s finest hours.
Indeed, in February 2006, a federal judge had reduced the
Enaam Arnaout sentence from 11 years and four months to 10
years, after the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that his original
sentence was improperly enhanced.
The Golden Chain
The Golden Chain was established about the time of al
Qaeda’s founding in 1988. Bin Laden’s notes on efforts to recruit
wealthy Saudi Arabian families who could fund his group were also found at
Sarajevo. Much of the information derived from the Sarajevo came to light
during the 2003 trial of an al Qaeda financier, Enaam Arnaout, in Chicago.
How much of the Sarajevo material remains classified and
unpublished is debatable. However, like the missing Congressional report,
substantial material that covers the genesis and expansion of al Qaeda in the
1990s has never been released. What we do know is that one note taken from the
Sarajevo hoard that surfaced at the trial is a bin Laden note saying: “we
took very huge gains from the country’s people in Saudi. We were able to give
political power to the Mujahideen, gathering donations in very large amounts…”
Within the Sarajevo trove, there was found
the essential minutes of a meeting held on 11 August
1988 during which Bin Laden initiated actions that established a
jihadist movement loyal to himself. A week later the organization was
officially established, and a copy of the oath of allegiance taken by some
40 participants was included in the file. The minutes of that seminal
conclave end on 20 August.
Also recorded were bin Laden’s “own statements on the
efforts to recruit members from Saudi Arabia for his network and to raise
money.” Also included in the Bosnia find was a letter on Saudi Red
Crescent/Peshawar letterhead and with it a note added by Osama Bin Laden to his
money-manager Wael Jalaidan citing “an extreme need for weapons.” (John
Solomon, “Bosnia Raid Yields al-Qaida Donor List,” Miami Herald via AP, Feb.
19, 2003.)
Many questioned why bin Laden, a member of one of Saudi
Arabia’s wealthiest family, searched for funds outside his fortune to fund
al Qaeda. But Osama was not rich enough to fund the expensive jihad he had
in mind. Though the bin Laden family was wealthy, Osama could
not easily access the $300 million that some analysts felt he had
squirreled away. His accounts were blocked in the United States and Saudi
Arabia, and his family was watched closely and warned not to assist
him financially. Still, during his stay in the Sudan (1991-1996) he probably
invested more than $50 million (including $30 million deposited in the
al-Shamal Bank). But when bin Laden departed the Sudan in 1996, he had little
to show for his investments. By the admission of those al Qaeda members who
knew him best, his personal wealth had been squandered. To carry out his jihadist
agenda he had to continue to call on wealthy Gulf plutocrats, viz., the Golden
Chain, to finance al Qaeda.
Included in the US government indictment of Enaam Arnaout on
9 October 2002 (02 CR 892) was an interesting memorandum, “Clarifying the
Mujahideen’s situation to the world and keeping the spirit of Jihad alive.”
(Exhibit 17, Department of Justice, “Government’s Evidentiary Proffer
Supporting the Admissibility of Coconspirator Statements” in the case of USA v.
Arnaout, USDC, Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, filed 29
January 2003.) Of even more explosive power, however, was a memorandum that
appeared as Exhibit 5: With regard to that piece of evidence the Justice
Department noted: “Among the recovered files was a copy of a 1988 handwritten
draft listing wealthy financiers of UBL’s mujahideen operation in Afghanistan,
referred to within al Qaeda as the ‘Golden Chain.'” The information presented
on lined paper and translated from the Arabic by the U.S. Department of Justice
was headed by a verse in Arabic from the Koran: “And spend for God’s cause.”
(“Government’s Evidentiary Proffer Supporting the Admissibility of
Coconspirator Statements” in the case of USA v. Arnaout, USDC, Northern
District of Illinois, Eastern Division) filed on January 29, 2003.)
The Golden Chain memorandum, it included
twenty-five names, including twenty very wealthy Saudis. (N.B: at the time of
the discovery only two names on the list remained unidentified.) Of the twenty
Saudis, six were bankers, and they were tied to the big three of Saudi
banking: the National Commerical [sic] Bank of Saudi Arabia, Riyadh Bank, and
Al Rajhi Banking and Investment Corp. Ther[e] twelve Saudi businessmen on the
list, and the bankers owned or controlled sixteen of the top 100 Saudi
companies. The list included eight individuals charged by the families of
victims of 9/11 with being complicit in aiding and assisting al Qaeda. Also
included were the names of two former government Ministers.
After each name, there was a second name, in parenthesis, of
the al Qaeda operative who received money from the donor. “Osama” appeared
after seven entries. The donors [sic] names included Saudi Arabia’s most
prominent citizens including the bin Laden family, the al Rajhi, Sharbatly, al
Naghi, bin Mahfouz, and Adel Faqih. The corporate net worth of the Golden
Chain, as calculated more than a decade later accounted for more than $85
billion, or approximately 42% of Saudi Arabia’s GDP.
Whether or not bin Laden personally wrote the
Golden Chaim memo, it is indisputable that he was in a position to know the
family fortunes of the individuals named. In some cases, they were allied
directly or tangentially with his family. They included Saleh Kamel, head of
third largest Saudi company, and Suleiman Abdulaziz al Rajhi, head of 4th
largest Saudi commercial bank. The “bin Mahfouz” family was in charge of Saudi
Arabia’s most important bank. Also on the list, Abdel Qader Faqeeh
(Adel Faqh) head of Savola Group, the 13th largest Saudi company. Mohammed
al-Issa was head of the powerful al-Issa group, itself
the 20th largest Saudi Company. Issa himself was a board member
of the Saudi Research & Marketing Company (along with Mohammed Hussein
al-Amoudi, Saleh Abdullah Kamel, Abdullah Bin Khaled bin Mahfouz, among
others.) He was also Deputy Chairman of the Arab Cement Company whose
shareholders included the Binladin Group, the bin Mahfouz and the al Rajhi, and
whose chairman was Turki Bin Abdulaziz al Saud. That the individuals
listed would be asked to assist Osama bin Laden in his jihadist mission
is not surprising. It was all one big happy family.
Wael Julaidan, the al Qaeda moneyman and former
Secretary-General of the Muslim World League, and of the well-funded
Rabita Trust of Pakistan, was charged with collecting donations from four wealthy
individuals. Mohammad al-Amin Khalifa, Osama’s wealthy brother-in-law, was
another collection agent, who was known to have close ties to bin Laden’s two
money men, Julaidan, and Yasin al-Qadi.
As could be imagined, the list which included such luminaries
as “bin Mahfouz,” created a furor in Saudi Arabia, where the memorandum
appeared to implicate a score of the Kingdom’s wealthiest citizens. Nearly all
were either indirectly or directly involved in the Royal
Family’s charity organizations as founders or board members.
Years later, following the September 2001 attacks on the
U.S., the “9/11 Commission” issued a report in which a chapter devoted to “The
Foundation of the New Terrorism, acknowledged that Osama bin Laden sought
financial assistance from wealthy Muslims in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states,
and that “the eventual success of the jihad in Afghanistan depended on an
increasingly complex, almost worldwide organization.” Unfortunately, the report
was long on implication and short on names.
The Golden Chain list included names of persons who were
friendly to the Afghan-Arab movement and later to bin Laden himself. The
Golden Chain gained importance after 1990 — when Osama bin
Laden escaped house arrest in Saudi Arabia and a year later emerged in the Sudan.
Indeed, the name al Qaeda came into vogue and the need for funding
expanded after Osama move to the Sudan and al Qaeda’s expanding activities
first in Somalia, and later in the Balkans.
Why then should anyone believe that any individual whose
name appears on the Golden Chain memorandum, and who, like Khalid bin Mahfouz,
claims he “never knowingly made any donation to al Qaeda or any organization or
person acting on al Qaeda’s behalf or to any other terrorist organization,” is
telling the truth?
It is unknown if any of those whose names appeared on the
Golden Chain memo has ever been interrogated, charged with a crime, or
chastised by the Saudis. It is safe to assume that In the Dessert Kingdom,
where jihad is paramount and ‘silence is golden,” the Golden Chain members have
little to worry about.
________________________
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