While Dems are crying about the unproven collusion between
President Trump and the Russians to win Election-2016 AND ignoring Dem
collusion with the Russians (which is better documented), Russia is
quietly changing the balance of power in the Middle East by colluding with Iran
for geopolitical regional power.
The Dems are either saps or more than willing to stealthily cooperate
with the former Soviet Union whose President is a former uber-spy Vladimir
Putin.
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s primary objective in
Syria is to constrain U.S. freedom of action – not fight ISIS and al Qaeda.
Russia’s military deployments at current levels will not enable the
Iranian-penetrated Assad regime to secure Syria. Moscow’s deepening footprint
in Syria threatens America’s ability to defend its interests across the Middle
East and in the Mediterranean Sea. The next U.S. step in Syria must help regain
leverage over Russia rather than further encourage Putin’s expansionism.
The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) produced this report with the
Critical Threats Project (CTP).
The insights are part of an intensive multi-month exercise to frame, design,
and evaluate potential courses of action that the United States could pursue to
destroy the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and al Qaeda in Syria. The
ISW-CTP team recently released “America’s
Way Ahead in Syria,” which details the flaws in the current
U.S. approach in Iraq and Syria and proposes the first phase of a strategic
reset in the Middle East.
Russia’s intervention in Syria in September 2015 fundamentally
altered the balance of the Syrian Civil War.1 Russia re-established momentum
behind Syrian President Bashar al Assad and his Iranian allies at a moment when
major victories by ISIS and Syrian rebels threatened to force the regime to
contract into Syria’s central corridor.2 The capabilities Russia deployed were
not limited to the airframes, artillery, and personnel needed to conduct a
counter-terrorism or counterinsurgency mission, however. Russia deployed
advanced air defense and ballistic missile systems, naval units, air
superiority aircraft, and other capabilities in a display of major Russian
force projection in the region. Russian President Vladimir Putin is altering
the balance of power in Syria and the Eastern Mediterranean through sustained
Russian military operations and additional deployments of high-end
capabilities.
Russian Force Projection
Russia ultimately seeks to expand its permanent naval and
air bases on the Syrian coast in order to further project force into the
Mediterranean and Middle East. Russia’s establishment of an anti-access and
area denial (A2/AD) exclusion zone from its bases at Latakia and Tartous allows
Russia to create de-facto no fly zones in the Eastern Mediterranean as well as
over most of Syria. These A2/AD zones constrain U.S. freedom of movement and
ultimately raise the cost of U.S. involvement in Syria.3 Russia deployed the
naval version of the S-300 to protect the airspace over Latakia airbase in
Syria in November 2015.4 Russia also deployed the S-400 in late November 2015
shortly after the Turkish downing of a Russian jet.5 Russia has since deployed
an additional seven S-300 systems in an effort to build in redundancies,
advance the integration of its air defenses, and provide more comprehensive
coverage.6 The S-300 and S-400 systems are road mobile and interoperable,
increasing the difficulty of neutralizing the systems. [See Appendix I]
Putin wants to challenge the U.S. and its allies by
increasing Russian military and political influence in the Middle East. Russia
has rotated a wide range of naval vessels to participate in the conflict in
order to demonstrate the capabilities of these units and Russia’s willingness
to deploy them in the Mediterranean. Russia has deployed some of its most
advanced non-nuclear naval capabilities to the Eastern Mediterranean.7 Russian
subsurface and surface vessels successfully engaged ground targets in Syria
after launching Kalibr cruise missiles from the Mediterranean and Caspian
Seas.8 Russia has shown it can undertake precision strikes with the
nuclear-capable Kalibr cruise missile at significant distance.
Russia also maintains anti-ship capabilities in the
Mediterranean, including the Bastion-P coastal defense system. Russia
demonstrated the land attack capabilities of the Bastion in November 2016.9
Russia has also deployed battle cruisers that bring advanced anti-ship and air
defense capabilities off the Syrian coast. Russia’s deployment of its
much-ridiculed aircraft carrier the Admiral Kuznetsov nevertheless showcased
its force projection capabilities and intent to exhibit its naval presence in
the Mediterranean.10 [See Appendix II]
Putin has deployed air defense and anti-ship systems to
Syria in order to threaten the United States. Russia does not need these
systems to support the counter-terrorism campaign it claims it is waging against
anti-Assad opposition groups in Syria. Those groups do not operate aircraft or
naval vessels. Russia also deployed the nuclear capable SS-26 ‘Iskander’
ballistic missiles to Syria and used the systems to attack opposition held
terrain.11 The Iskander missiles provide no meaningful additional advantage
against the opposition. The only conceivable target for these advanced systems
is the U.S. and its allies. [See Appendix III]
Constrain U.S. Freedom of Action
Russia has used its deployment to constrain U.S. freedom of
action and limit American policy options in Syria. Russia deployed the S-300
and S-400 air defense systems to deter the U.S. from direct military action
against the Assad regime through the unilateral establishment of a no-fly zone.
Russia has also forward deployed assets beyond its air and naval bases on the
coast in order to further complicate the personnel are primarily concentrated
in Latakia, Aleppo, and Tartous Provinces, but are also active in Hama, Homs,
Damascus, and Hasakah and include a wide range of units including air assault,
tank, medical, naval infantry, and special operations forces. [See Appendix IV]
Russia has intentionally removed potential U.S. partners
within the armed opposition from the battlefield in Syria. Russian airstrikes
from October 2015 to March 2017 have primarily targeted the mainstream Syrian
opposition – not ISIS – in order to ensure the opposition’s defeat through its
submission, destruction, or transformation. The Russian air campaign has driven
what remains of the mainstream opposition closer to Salafi-jihadi groups, which
are stronger and better able to defend against intensified pro-regime military
operations. Russia is also exacerbating radicalization through its deliberate,
illegal targeting of civilians. Russia has consistently targeted hospitals,
schools, and other critical civilian infrastructure throughout the sixteen
months of its air campaign.
Russian Testing Grounds
Russia has also used sustained use of transport aircraft in
Syria to exercise the Russian military’s overall combat readiness and force
projection capabilities. Expeditionary logistics and force projection is
difficult for militaries to exercise, in general. Russia is exercising expeditionary
logistics by air and sea in Syria.13 Russia is refining its ability to deploy
its military personnel and equipment rapidly at a large scale in order to
message its ability to threaten the U.S. and its NATO and European allies.
Russia announced its intent to prioritize the development of naval equipment
for troop transport on March 8 in order to increase the Russian Navy’s ability
to provide logistical support in Syria and in other coastal zones.14 Russia
also re-supplies and provides combat support for prospect of direct U.S.
strikes against the Syrian regime for fear of inadvertently hitting Russian
troops. Sources estimated that Russia maintains between 1,500 and 4,000
military personnel in Syria.12 These forces in Syria through frequent
deliveries from Russian Il-76 and An-124 transport aircraft. As of October
2016, these transport aircraft were making multiple trips to Syria each month
and it is likely that these aircraft continue to make regular trips to Syria.
[See Appendix V]
Limitations of Russian Capabilities
Putin faces a number of economic and military constraints
that limit the resources Russia can bring to bear in Syria. Russia’s economic
crisis has forced Russia to balance limited resources across key theaters like
Ukraine, the Baltics, the Middle East, and domestically in Russia. Putin has
opted to pursue multiple, mutually reinforcing lines of effort using a diverse
set of naval, air, missile, and ground capabilities in Syria. The overlap
allows Russia to extract significant benefits with minimal cost. The Russian
military has demonstrated its many shortcomings during its deployment to Syria,
including frequent friendly fire incidents, losses of Russian aircraft, a poor
performance by Russia’s aging aircraft carrier the Admiral Kuznetsov, and
reports of mechanical failure of Russian equipment.15
The Russian deployment, at current levels, will be
insufficient to grant Assad victory over the opposition, al Qaeda, or ISIS.
Russia, Iran, and the regime have been unable to sustain significant
simultaneous operations against ISIS and the Syrian opposition, despite
Russia’s considerable airframe deployments. Russian airframes were unable to
prevent ISIS’s recapture of Palmyra in December 2016 alongside a final
pro-regime push to defeat the opposition in Aleppo, for example.16 Russia has
instead used ‘cessation of hostilities’ agreements to drawdown its airstrikes
against the opposition and surge its air campaign against ISIS for limited
periods of time.17 Salafi-Jihadi groups have meanwhile begun to consolidate the
opposition under more effective command-and-control structures, increasing
rebels’ capabilities and resiliency.18 This dynamic will not only lead to a
protracted and bloody civil war for the foreseeable future, but it ultimately
raises the requirements for the U.S. to deal with the conflict.
Implications
Russia is both an unacceptable and ineffective partner
against jihadists in Syria. The Russian deployment is inconsistent with Putin’s
narrative that Russia intervened in Syria in order to combat terrorists. Many
of its capabilities have no utility in the anti-ISIS fight. Putin instead seeks
to use Russia’s deployment to subordinate U.S. military action and policies to
Russian objectives in Syria. Russia’s aggressive deployment to Syria intends to
deter the U.S. from intervening for fear of incurring significant costs. Russia
has largely pursued its objectives in Syria with impunity. It has deprived the
U.S. of freedom of maneuver, disrupted U.S. partnerships with key allies in the
region, and facilitated Russia’s emergence as a geopolitical force in the
region. Any potential partnership with Russia in Syria will further strengthen
jihadists and force the U.S. to capitulate to a Russian vision for the broader
Middle East that endangers America’s security interests.
Genevieve Casagrande is a Syria
Analyst at the Institute for the Study of War. Kathleen Weinberger is a
Russia and Ukraine Analyst at the Institute for the Study of War. Institute
for the Study of War Twitter: @TheStudyofWar Critical Threats Twitter:
@criticalthreats
[Blog Editor: From this point forward the rest of the
report are the Appendices (i.e. charts) and Notes. The last section is actually
longer than the report itself. To view the Appendices and Notes go to the PDF.]
The Institute for the Study
of War advances an informed understanding of military affairs through reliable
research, trusted analysis, and innovative education. We are committed to
improving the nation’s ability to execute military operations and respond to
emerging threats in order to achieve U.S. strategic objectives. ISW is a
non-partisan, non-profit, public policy research organization.
Our History
Dr. Kimberly Kagan founded
ISW in May 2007, as U.S. forces undertook a daring new counterinsurgency
strategy to reverse the grim security situation on the ground in Iraq.
Frustrated with the prevailing lack of accurate information documenting
developments on the ground in Iraq and the detrimental effect of biased
reporting on policymakers, Dr. Kagan established ISW to provide real-time,
independent, and open-source analysis of ongoing military operations and …READ THE REST
An email sent by ACT for America highlights the reality that ISIS (ISIL, IS or Daesh) uses oil fields they have captured to finance their terrorist war machine that targets non-Muslims (primarily Christians and Yazidis) for slaughter, rape, pillaging and dhimmitude. The email links to a very informative article entitled, “Isis Inc: How Oil Fuels the Jihadi Terrorists” co-written by Erika Solomon, Guy Chazan and Sam Jones originally sourced at the FinancialTimes but cross posted on the ACT for America website.
The ACT for America email introduction to the entitled article is a pitch for Americans to support the House Bill Fuel Choice for American Prosperity and Security Act of 2015 (HR 2418). After reading HR 2418 that Bill actually has little to do with targeting ISIS’ oil financing of their terrorism agenda to establish an Islamic Caliphate. The Bill focuses on providing incentives to power vehicles with alternative resources other than fossil fuels that would reduce the emissions of greenhouse gases that pollutes the air we breathe.
ACT for America’s support for HR 2418 as a tool that would lessen the marketability of ISIS oil misses a short term targeting of ISIS. The thing for me is that it seems any actual effect on ISIS oil production would occur way down the road on any timeline hurting an ISIS oil economy. Apparently if the Bill became law the standards would not go into effect until 2018. HOWEVER on a long term basis in time, the design of HR 2418 would affect America’s dependence on foreign oil from nations that might have a contrary agenda to the USA’s National Security and national economy.
The FT article suggests the best way to slow down ISIS terrorism is to demolish any ISIS infrastructure – especially oil production – that provides material support for the existence of ISIS. I don’t have a problem with a long term plan to stifle American dependence on foreign oil in our economy; however to begin placing nails in ISIS’s coffin in a quicker time frame, it would be more advisable to attack any infrastructure controlled by ISIS.
America should provide air support to the Syrian rebels that do not have an immediate Radical Islamic agenda (I’m no friend of Islam in any form because of its antichrist/anti-Jew emphasis in the religion’s Quran and other revered writings [Hadith & Sira]) AND begin destroying the ISIS infrastructure and the Jew-hating Assad’s Syrian infrastructure.
Thanks to Obama Foreign Policy fecklessness the Russians have entered the Syria-Iraq-ISIS conflict to the favor of Assad’s Syrian dictatorship who is an ally of Iran, Hezbollah terrorists and probably Hamas terrorists. This means providing direct air support to protect the non-Islamist Syrian rebels will undoubtedly place America and Russia in a crisis that could be a situation comparable to the Kennedy-Khrushchev Cuban Missile Crisis that placed the USA and Russia on the brink of nuclear war in the early 1960s.
We all know who would blink in an Obama-Putin faceoff. Thus if such a crisis of supporting diverging allies in the conflict in Syria-Iraq-ISIS under Obama’s watch I am fairly confident that Russia will turn that region over to a cabal of Hezbollah, Assad and Iran. Guess which ally of America this affects the most in the Middle East? That would be Israel!
So if or when Obama a Middle Eastern chunk of land to Putin’s Russian designs, what do you think Obama will do to protect our ally Israel?
I think Obama will do his best to sell out Israel before he leaves Office in January 2017 making difficult for a new President to set things aright to reestablish American military superiority in the region without probable occurrence of a global war igniting. God help America and our exceptionalism that makes the world a safer place for Americans and our allies.
There is a “silver bullet” when it comes to stopping jihadi terror around the world: cut off their money supply.
See the important article below to learn more about how “oil is the black gold that funds Isis’ black flag — it fuels its war machine, provides electricity and gives the fanatical jihadis critical leverage against their neighbors.”
Then help do something about it, by taking action today.
H.R. 2418 will help reduce the strategic importance of oil worldwide — while at the same time using an “all of the above” approach to transportation fuel that will provide consumer choice and create jobs. No preferred fuels, no mandates, no tax dollars.
It’s a win win — for our security, for our nation, and for the world.
+++
Isis Inc: How Oil Fuels the Jihadi Terrorists
By Erika Solomon in Beirut, Guy Chazan and Sam Jones in London
On the outskirts of al-Omar oilfield in eastern Syria, with warplanes flying overhead, a line of trucks stretches for 6km. Some drivers wait for a month to fill up with crude.
Falafel stalls and tea shops have sprung up to cater to the drivers, such is the demand for oil. Traders sometimes leave their trucks unguarded for weeks, waiting for their turn.
This is the land of Isis, the jihadi organisation in control of swaths of Syrian and Iraqi territory. The trade in oil has been declared a prime target by the international military coalition fighting the group. And yet it goes on, undisturbed.
Oil is the black gold that funds Isis’ black flag — it fuels its war machine, provides electricity and gives the fanatical jihadis critical leverage against their neighbours.
But more than a year after US President Barack Obama launched an international coalition to fight Isis, the bustling trade at al-Omar and at least eight other fields has come to symbolise the dilemma the campaign faces: how to bring down the “caliphate” without destabilising the life of the estimated 10m civilians in areas under Isis control, and punishing the west’s allies?
The resilience of Isis, and the weakness of the US-led campaign, have given Russia a pretext to launch its own, bold intervention in Syria.
Despite all these efforts, dozens of interviews with Syrian traders and oil engineers as well as western intelligence officials and oil experts reveal a sprawling operation almost akin to a state oil company that has grown in size and expertise despite international attempts to destroy it.
Minutely managed, Isis’ oil company actively recruits skilled workers, from engineers to trainers and managers.
Estimates by local traders and engineers put crude production in Isis-held territory at about 34,000-40,000 bpd. The oil is sold at the wellhead for between $20 and $45 a barrel, earning the militants an average of $1.5m a day.
“It’s a situation that makes you laugh and cry,” said one Syrian rebel commander in Aleppo, who buys diesel from Isis areas even as his forces fight the group on the front lines. “But we have no other choice, and we are a poor man’s revolution. Is anyone else offering to give us fuel?”
Oil as a strategic weapon
Isis’ oil strategy has been long in the making. Since the group emerged on the scene in Syria in 2013, long before they reached Mosul in Iraq, the jihadis saw oil as a crutch for their vision for an Islamic state. The group’s shura council identified it as fundamental for the survival of the insurgency and, more importantly, to finance their ambition to create a caliphate.
Most of the oil Isis controls is in Syria’s oil-rich east, where it created a foothold in 2013, shortly after withdrawing from the north-west — an area of strategic importance but with no oil. These bridgeheads were then used to consolidate control over the whole of eastern Syria after the fall of Mosul in 2014.
When it pushed through northern Iraq and took over Mosul, Isis also seized the Ajil and Allas fields in north-eastern Iraq’s Kirkuk province. The very day of its takeover, locals say, militants secured the fields and engineers were sent in to begin operations and ship the oil to market.
“They were ready, they had people there in charge of the financial side, they had technicians that adjusted the filling and storage process,” said a local sheikh from the town of Hawija, near Kirkuk. “They brought hundreds of trucks in from Kirkuk and Mosul and they started to extract the oil and export it.” An average of 150 trucks, he added, were filled daily, with each containing about $10,000-worth of oil. Isis lost the fields to the Iraqi army in April but made an estimated $450m from them in the 10 months it controlled the area.
While al-Qaeda, the global terrorist network, depended on donations from wealthy foreign sponsors, Isis has derived its financial strength from its status as monopoly producer of an essential commodity consumed in vast quantities throughout the area it controls. Even without being able to export, it can thrive because it has a huge captive market in Syria and Iraq.
Indeed, diesel and petrol produced in Isis areas are not only consumed in territory the group controls but in areas that are technically at war with it, such as Syria’s rebel-held north: the region is dependent on the jihadis’ fuel for its survival. Hospitals, shops, tractors and machinery used to pull victims out of rubble run on generators that are powered by Isis oil.
“At any moment, the diesel can be cut. No diesel — Isis knows our life is completely dead,” says one oil trader who comes from rebel-held Aleppo each week to buy fuel and spoke to the Financial Times by telephone.
A national oil company
Isis’ strategy has rested on projecting the image of a state in the making, and it is attempting to run its oil industry by mimicking the ways of national oil corporations. According to Syrians who say Isis tried to recruit them, the group headhunts engineers, offering competitive salaries to those with the requisite experience, and encourages prospective employees to apply to its human resources department.
A roving committee of its specialists checks up on fields, monitors production and interviews workers about operations. It also appoints Isis members who have worked at oil companies in Saudi Arabia or elsewhere in the Middle East as “emirs”, or princes, to run its most important facilities, say traders who buy Isis oil and engineers who have worked at Isis-controlled fields.
Some technicians have been actively courted by Isis recruiters. Rami — not his real name — used to work in oil in Syria’s Deir Ezzor province before becoming a rebel commander. He was later contacted by an Isis military emir in Iraq via WhatsApp.
“I could choose whatever position I wanted, he promised me,” he said. “He said: ‘You can name your salary’.” Sceptical of the Isis project, Rami ultimately turned down the offer and fled to Turkey.
Isis also recruits from among its supporters abroad. In the speech he gave after the fall of Mosul, Isis leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi called not only for fighters but engineers, doctors and other skilled labour. The group recently appointed an Egyptian engineer who used to live in Sweden as the new manager of its Qayyara refinery in northern Iraq, according to an Iraqi petroleum engineer from Mosul, who declined to be named.
The central role of oil is also reflected in the status it is given in Isis’ power structures.
The group’s approach to government across the territories it controls is highly decentralised. For the most part, it relies on regional walis — governors — to administer territories according to the precepts laid down by the central shura.
However, oil — alongside Isis’ military and security operations and its sophisticated media output — is centrally controlled by the top leadership. “They are organised in their approach to oil,” said a senior western intelligence official. “That’s a key centrally controlled and documented area. It’s a central shura matter,” he added, referring to Isis’ ruling “cabinet”.
Until recently, Isis’ emir for oil was Abu Sayyaf, a Tunisian whose real name, according to the Pentagon, was Fathi Ben Awn Ben Jildi Murad al-Tunisi, and who was killed by US special forces in a raid in May this year. According to US and European intelligence officials, a treasure trove of documentation relating to Isis’ oil operations was found with him. The documents laid bare a meticulously run operation, with revenues from wells and costs carefully accounted for. They showed a pragmatic approach to pricing too, with Isis carefully exploiting differences in demand across its territories to maximise profitability.
Oversight of the oil wells is carefully controlled by the Amniyat, Isis’ secret police, who ensure revenues go where they should — and mete out brutal punishments when they do not. Guards patrol the perimeter of pumping stations, while far-flung individual wells are surrounded by protective sand berms and each trader is carefully checked as he drives in to fill up.
At the al-Jibssa field in Hassakeh province, north-eastern Syria, which produces 2,500-3,000 bpd, “about 30-40 big trucks a day, each with 75 barrels of capacity, would fill up”, according to one Hassakeh oil trader.
Isis’ distribution network
But the biggest draw is al-Omar. According to one trader who regularly buys oil there, the system, with its 6km queue, is slow but market players have adapted to it. Drivers present a document with their licence plate number and tanker capacity to Isis officials, who enter them into a database and assign them a number.
Most then return to their villages, shuttling back to the site every two or three days to check up on their vehicles. Traders say that towards the end of the month, some people come back and set up tents to stay close to their trucks while they wait their turn.
Once in possession of al-Omar’s oil, the traders either take it to local refineries or sell it on at a mark-up to middlemen with smaller vehicles who transport it to cities further west such as Aleppo and Idlib.
Isis’ luck with oil may not last. Coalition bombs, the Russian intervention and low oil prices could put pressure on revenues. The biggest threat to Isis’ production so far, however, has been the depletion of Syria’s ageing oilfields. It does not have the technology of major foreign companies to counteract what locals describe as a slow drop in production. Isis’ need for fuel for its military operations means there is also less oil to sell in the market.
For now, though, in Isis-controlled territory, the jihadis control the supply and there is no shortage of demand. “Everyone here needs diesel: for water, for farming, for hospitals, for offices. If diesel is cut off, there is no life here,” says a businessman who works near Aleppo. “Isis knows this [oil] is a winning card.”
Engage is ACT! for America’s new and improved grassroots advocacy platform. Through Engage, ACT! for America members can:
• receive time-sensitive action alerts on important national security-related legislation
• become informed about critical national security-related public policy issues
• easily access information about their individual legislators
• easily and effectively make their voice heard on Capitol Hill and in their state legislatures.
Why should I use Engage?
Your right to express your views and opinions to your legislators is explicitly protected in the U.S. Constitution. It is a critical component of our nation’s democratic form of government. Each day, issues are discussed in the federal and state legislatures that affect our national security. ACT! for America’s goal is to make it as easy as possible for you to be involved in the legislative process, so that good policies are enacted and bad policies are blocked. Through Engage you will be provided with all the tools possible to make you a better and more effective advocate.
How do I use Engage?
There are several ways to use Engage. ACT! for America members may be driven to Engage by action alerts emails. In addition, they may access national security-related legislation that ACT! for America has placed on its “High Priority List.” ACT! for America members are encouraged to review these bills at any time by logging on to their Engage account. Further, at any time they may register support for these bills with their legislators via e-mail, phone call, or social media (Facebook, Twitter, etc.). When timely, ACT! for America’s members will … READ THE REST
Pertaining to Israel, I have to be upfront. My view of the Jewish State is through the lens of the Holy Bible. As a Christian that means I am labelled a Christian Zionist. The kind of guy that Orthodox Jews mistrust due to history and the viewpoint that Christian evangelism is a threat to Judaism. I am also the kind of guy Left Wing (sometimes called Liberal and sometimes called Progressive) Jews loathe due to a non-secular pigeon-holing Israel in Biblical terms rather than a secular homeland for Jews to escape centuries of global antisemitism. Frankly I’m not claiming to know an Israeli/Jewish middle ground of the acceptance Christian Zionist friendship. I just pray a growing trust for Christians supporting Israel grows. At the same time I advise Jews – particularly Israeli Jews – to be wary of Western Leftists and of Progressive (Leftist) Christians who have disowned Biblical essentials and the reality of God Almighty.
NIV Quotes:
Ezek 39:27-29 "When I have brought them back from the nations and have gathered them from the countries of their enemies, I will show myself holy through them in the sight of many nations." 28 "Then they will know that I am the LORD their God, for though I sent them into exile among the nations, I will gather them to their own land, not leaving any behind." 29 "I will no longer hide my face from them, for I will pour out my Spirit on the house of Israel, declares the Sovereign LORD."
Amos 9:13-15 "The days are coming, declares the LORD, when the reaper will be overtaken by the plowman and the planter by the one treading grapes. New wine will drip from the mountains and flow from all the hills. 14 I will bring back my exiled people Israel; they will rebuild the ruined cities and live in them. They will plant vineyards and drink their wine; they will make gardens and eat their fruit. 15 I will plant Israel in their own land, never again to be uprooted from the land I have given them, says the LORD your God."
Jer 30:2 "This is what the LORD, the God of Israel, says: 'Write in a book all the words I have spoken to you. 3 The days are coming,' declares the LORD, 'when I will bring my people Israel and Judah back from captivity and restore them to the land I gave their forefathers to possess,' says the LORD."
Jer 31:10 "Hear the word of the LORD, O nations; proclaim it in distant coastlands: 'He who scattered Israel will gather them and will watch over his flock like a shepherd."
Jer 33:7 "I will bring Judah and Israel back from captivity and will rebuild them as they were before."
Ezek 37:21-27 ....."I will take the Israelites out of the nations where they have gone. I will gather them from all around and bring them back into their own land. 22 I will make them one nation in the land, on the mountains of Israel. There will be one king over all of them and they will never again be two nations or be divided into two kingdoms." (Quotes taken from: Israel: The Greatest Sign; By Ken Marineau; Bible Probe for Christians and Messianic Jews)
Stratfor bills itself as a geopolitical intelligence firm and as such does not look geopolitically through a Biblical lens. From Stratfor I have learned the strategic importance of Israel from history to the present. A Stratfor email was sent out that I believe is no coincidence of the timing of Putin’s Russia demanding the USA to stop bombing inside Syria. Russia is deploying troops to Syria AND so far its own strafing is occurring where ISIS is not in control. Could it be that Russia is engaging the Syrian rebels trying to topple Bashar al-Assad – the same rebels not connected to the brutal Islamic terrorists of ISIS and al Nusra?
Does Secretary of State John Kerry (representing Obama Administration) sound clueless to Russian intentions or what?
Secretary of State John Kerry announced that the United States is prepared to welcome Russia's actions in Syria if they are directed at the Islamic State group and al-Qaeda. (Sept. 30)
The Associated Press is the essential global news network, delivering fast, unbiased [cough] news from every corner of the world to all media platforms and formats.
Is Russia jockeying itself to be the prophetic invaders from the north of Israel that ironically lines up with the Stratfor analysis of the geopolitical importance of Israel? Here is the Stratfor tease from the PDF:
Israel exists in three conditions. First, it can be a completely independent state. This condition occurs when there are no major imperial powers external to the region. We might call this the David model.Second, it can live as part of an imperial system — either as a subordinate ally, as a moderately autonomous entity or as a satrapy. In any case, it maintains its identity but loses room for independent maneuvering in foreign policy and potentially in domestic policy. We might call this the Persian model in its most beneficent form.Finally, Israel can be completely crushed — with mass deportations and migrations, with a complete loss of autonomy and minimal residual autonomy. We might call this the Babylonian model.
Below is the Stratfor PDF reformatted for blogging:
This study was originally published by Stratfor in 2008 as the first in a series of monographs on the geopolitics of globally important countries.
Introduction
The founding principle of geopolitics is that place — geography — plays a significant role in determining how nations will behave. If that theory is true, then there ought to be a deep continuity in a nation's foreign policy. Israel is a laboratory for this theory, since it has existed in three different manifestations in roughly the same place, twice in antiquity and once in modernity. If geopolitics is correct, then Israeli foreign policy, independent of policymakers, technology or the identity of neighbors, ought to have important common features. This is, therefore, a discussion of common principles in Israeli foreign policy over nearly 3,000 years.
For convenience, we will use the term "Israel" to connote all of the Hebrew and Jewish entities that have existed in the Levant since the invasion of the region as chronicled in the Book of Joshua. As always, geopolitics requires a consideration of three dimensions: the internal geopolitics of Israel, the interaction of Israel and the immediate neighbors who share borders with it, and Israel's interaction with what we will call great powers, beyond Israel's borderlands.
Israel has manifested itself three times in history. The first manifestation began with the invasion led by Joshua and lasted through its division into two kingdoms, the Babylonian conquest of the Kingdom of Judah and the deportation to Babylon early in the sixth century B.C.
FIRST MANIFESTATION (1200 BCE)
The second manifestation began when Israel was recreated in 540 B.C. by the Persians, who had defeated the Babylonians. The nature of this second manifestation changed in the fourth century B.C., when Greece overran the Persian Empire and Israel, and again in the first century B.C., when the Romans conquered the region.
SECOND MANIFESTATION
The second manifestation saw Israel as a small actor within the framework of larger imperial powers, a situation that lasted until the destruction of the Jewish vassal state by the Romans.
Israel's third manifestation began in 1948, following (as in the other cases) an ingathering of at least some of the Jews who had been dispersed after conquests. Israel's founding takes place in the context of the decline and fall of the British Empire and must, at least in part, be understood as part of British imperial history.
THIRD MANIFESTATION (1948)
Israeli Geography and Borderlands
At its height, under King David, Israel extended from the Sinai to the Euphrates, encompassing Damascus. It occupied some, but relatively little, of the coastal region, an area beginning at what today is Haifa and running south to Jaffa, just north of today's Tel Aviv. The coastal area to the north was held by Phoenicia, the area to the south by Philistines. It is essential to understand that Israel's size and shape shifted over time. For example, Judah under the Hasmoneans did not include the Negev but did include the Golan. The general locale of Israel is fixed. Its precise borders have never been.
Thus, it is perhaps better to begin with what never was part of Israel. Israel never included the Sinai Peninsula. Along the coast, it never stretched much farther north than the Litani River in today's Lebanon. Apart from David's extreme extension (and fairly tenuous control) to the north, Israel's territory never stretched as far as Damascus, although it frequently held the Golan Heights. Israel extended many times to both sides of the Jordan but never deep into the Jordanian Desert. It never extended southeast into the Arabian Peninsula.
Israel consists generally of three parts. First, it always has had the northern hill region, stretching from the foothills of Mount Hermon south to Jerusalem. Second, it always contains some of the coastal plain from today's Tel Aviv north to Haifa. Third, it occupies area between Jerusalem and the Jordan River — today's West Bank. At times, it controls all or part of the Negev, including the coastal region between the Sinai to the Tel Aviv area. It may be larger than this at various times in history, and sometimes smaller, but it normally holds all or part of these three regions.
Israel is well-buffered in three directions. The Sinai Desert protects it against the Egyptians. In general, the Sinai has held little attraction for the Egyptians. The difficulty of deploying forces in the eastern Sinai poses severe logistical problems for them, particularly during a prolonged presence. Unless Egypt can rapidly move through the Sinai north into the coastal plain, where it can sustain its forces more readily, deploying in the Sinai is difficult and unrewarding. Therefore, so long as Israel is not so weak as to make an attack on the coastal plain a viable option, or unless Egypt is motivated by an outside imperial power, Israel does not face a threat from the southwest.
Israel is similarly protected from the southeast. The deserts southeast of Eilat-Aqaba are virtually impassable. No large force could approach from that direction, although smaller raiding parties could. The tribes of the Arabian Peninsula lack the reach or the size to pose a threat to Israel, unless massed and aligned with other forces. Even then, the approach from the southeast is not one that they are likely to take. The Negev is secure from that direction.
The eastern approaches are similarly secured by desert, which begins about 20 to 30 miles east of the Jordan River. While indigenous forces exist in the borderland east of the Jordan, they lack the numbers to be able to penetrate decisively west of the Jordan. Indeed, the normal model is that, so long as Israel controls Judea and Samaria (the modern-day West Bank), then the East Bank of the Jordan River is under the political and sometimes military domination of Israel — sometimes directly through settlement, sometimes indirectly through political influence, or economic or security leverage.
Israel's vulnerability is in the north. There is no natural buffer between Phoenicia and its successor entities (today's Lebanon) to the direct north. The best defense line for Israel in the north is the Litani River, but this is not an insurmountable boundary under any circumstance. However, the area along the coast north of Israel does not present a serious threat. The coastal area prospers through trade in the Mediterranean basin. It is oriented toward the sea and to the trade routes to the east, not to the south. If it does anything, this area protects those trade routes and has no appetite for a conflict that might disrupt trade. It stays out of Israel's way, for the most part.
Moreover, as a commercial area, this region is generally wealthy, a factor that increases predators around it and social conflict within. It is an area prone to instability. Israel frequently tries to extend its influence northward for commercial reasons, as one of the predators, and this can entangle Israel in its regional politics. But barring this self-induced problem, the threat to Israel from the north is minimal, despite the absence of natural boundaries and the large population. On occasion, there is spillover of conflicts from the north, but not to a degree that might threaten regime survival in Israel.
The neighbor that is always a threat lies to the northeast. Syria — or, more precisely, the area governed by Damascus at any time — is populous and frequently has no direct outlet to the sea. It is, therefore, generally poor. The area to its north, Asia Minor, is heavily mountainous. Syria cannot project power to the north except with great difficulty, but powers in Asia Minor can move south. Syria's eastern flank is buffered by a desert that stretches to the Euphrates.
Therefore, when there is no threat from the north, Syria's interest — after securing itself internally — is to gain access to the coast. Its primary channel is directly westward, toward the rich cities of the northern Levantine coast, with which it trades heavily. An alternative interest is southwestward, toward the southern Levantine coast controlled by Israel.
THE GOLAN HEIGHTS
As can be seen, Syria can be interested in Israel only selectively. When it is interested, it has a serious battle problem. To attack Israel, it would have to strike between Mount Hermon and the Sea of Galilee, an area about 25 miles wide. The Syrians potentially can attack south of the sea, but only if they are prepared to fight through this region and then attack on extended supply lines. If an attack is mounted along the main route, Syrian forces must descend the Golan Heights and then fight through the hilly Galilee before reaching the coastal plain — sometimes with guerrillas holding out in the Galilean hills. The Galilee is an area that is relatively easy to defend and difficult to attack. Therefore, it is only once Syria takes the Galilee, and can control its lines of supply against guerrilla attack, that its real battle begins.
To reach the coast or move toward Jerusalem, Syria must fight through a plain in front of a line of low hills. This is the decisive battleground where massed Israeli forces, close to lines of supply, can defend against dispersed Syrian forces on extended lines of supply. It is no accident that Megiddo — or Armageddon, as the plain is sometimes referred to — has apocalyptic meaning. This is the point at which any move from Syria would be decided. But a Syrian offensive would have a tough fight to reach Megiddo, and a tougher one as it deploys on the plain.
On the surface, Israel lacks strategic depth, but this is true only on the surface. It faces limited threats from southern neighbors. To its east, it faces only a narrow strip of populated area east of the Jordan. To the north, there is a maritime commercial entity. Syria operating alone, forced through the narrow gap of the Mount Hermon-Galilee line and operating on extended supply lines, can be dealt with readily.
There is a risk of simultaneous attacks from multiple directions. Depending on the forces deployed and the degree of coordination between them, this can pose a problem for Israel. However, even here the Israelis have the tremendous advantage of fighting on interior lines. Egypt and Syria, fighting on external lines (and widely separated fronts), would have enormous difficulty transferring forces from one front to another. Israel, on interior lines (fronts close to each other with good transportation), would be able to move its forces from front to front rapidly, allowing for sequential engagement and thereby the defeat of enemies.
Unless enemies are carefully coordinated and initiate war simultaneously — and deploy substantially superior force on at least one front — Israel can initiate war at a time of its choosing or else move its forces rapidly between fronts, negating much of the advantage of size that the attackers might have.
There is another aspect to the problem of multifront war. Egypt usually has minimal interests along the Levant, having its own coast and an orientation to the south toward the headwaters of the Nile. On the rare occasions when Egypt does move through the Sinai and attacks to the north and northeast, it is in an expansionary mode. By the time it consolidates and exploits the coastal plain, it would be powerful enough to threaten Syria. From Syria's point of view, the only thing more dangerous than Israel is an Egypt in control of Israel. Therefore, the probability of a coordinated north-south strike at Israel is rare, is rarely coordinated and usually is not designed to be a mortal blow. It is defeated by Israel's strategic advantage of interior lines.
Therefore, it is not surprising that Israel's first incarnation lasted as long as it did — some five centuries. What is interesting and what must be considered is why Israel (now considered as the northern kingdom) was defeated by the Assyrians and Judea, then defeated by Babylon. To understand this, we need to consider the broader geography of Israel's location.
Israel is located on the eastern shore of the Mediterranean Sea, on the Levant. As we have seen, when Israel is intact, it will tend to be the dominant power in the Levant. Therefore, Israeli resources must generally be dedicated for land warfare, leaving little over for naval warfare. In general, although Israel had excellent harbors and access to wood for shipbuilding, it never was a major Mediterranean naval power. It never projected power into the sea. The area to the north of Israel has always been a maritime power, but Israel, the area south of Mount Hermon, was always forced to be a land power.
The Levant in general and Israel in particular has always been a magnet for great powers. No Mediterranean empire could be fully secure unless it controlled the Levant. Whether it was Rome or Carthage, a Mediterranean empire that wanted to control both the northern and southern littorals needed to anchor its eastern flank on the Levant. For one thing, without the Levant, a Mediterranean power would be entirely dependent on sea lanes for controlling the other shore. Moving troops solely by sea creates transport limitations and logistical problems.
It also leaves imperial lines vulnerable to interdiction — sometimes merely from pirates, a problem that plagued Rome's sea transport. A land bridge, or a land bridge with minimal water crossings that can be easily defended, is a vital supplement to the sea for the movement of large numbers of troops. Once the Hellespont (now known as the Dardanelles) is crossed, the coastal route through southern Turkey, down the Levant and along the Mediterranean's southern shore, provides such an alternative.
There is an additional consideration. If a Mediterranean empire leaves the Levant unoccupied, it opens the door to the possibility of a great power originating to the east seizing the ports of the Levant and challenging the Mediterranean power for maritime domination. In short, control of the Levant binds a Mediterranean empire together while denying a challenger from the east the opportunity to enter the Mediterranean. Holding the Levant, and controlling Israel, is a necessary preventive measure for a Mediterranean empire.
Israel is also important to any empire originating to the east of Israel, either in the Tigris- Euphrates basin or in Persia. For either, security could be assured only once it had an anchor on the Levant. Macedonian expansion under Alexander demonstrated that a power controlling Levantine and Turkish ports could support aggressive operations far to the east, to the Hindu Kush and beyond. While Turkish ports might have sufficed for offensive operations, simply securing the Bosporus still left the southern flank exposed. Therefore, by holding the Levant, an eastern power protected itself against attacks from Mediterranean powers.
CONVERGENCE ZONE
The Levant was also important to any empire originating to the north or south of Israel. If Egypt decided to move beyond the Nile Basin and North Africa eastward, it would move first through the Sinai and then northward along the coastal plain, securing sea lanes to Egypt. When Asia Minor powers such as the Ottoman Empire developed, there was a natural tendency to move southward to control the eastern Mediterranean. The Levant is the crossroads of continents, and Israel lies in the path of many imperial ambitions.
Israel therefore occupies what might be called the convergence zone of the Eastern Hemisphere. A European power trying to dominate the Mediterranean or expand eastward, an eastern power trying to dominate the space between the Hindu Kush and the Mediterranean, a North African power moving toward the east, or a northern power moving south — all must converge on the eastern coast of the Mediterranean and therefore on Israel. Of these, the European power and the eastern power must be the most concerned with Israel. For either, there is no choice but to secure it as an anchor.
Israel is geographically divided into three regions, which traditionally have produced three different types of people. Its coastal plain facilitates commerce, serving as the interface between eastern trade routes and the sea. It is the home of merchants and manufacturers, cosmopolitans — not as cosmopolitan as Phoenicia or Lebanon, but cosmopolitan for Israel. The northeast is hill country, closest to the unruliness north of the Litani River and to the Syrian threat. It breeds farmers and warriors. The area south of Jerusalem is hard desert country, more conducive to herdsman and warriors than anything else. Jerusalem is where these three regions are balanced and governed.
Photos: Source: Lehava Taybe via Israeli Pikiwiki project* - Source: Israel Defense Force** - Source: Avishai Teicher via Israeli Pikiwiki project*
[*Images provided under the Creative Commons Attribution 2.5 license. These images have not been altered in any way other than cropped to fit available space. Terms of the license can be viewed here: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.5/deed.en
There are obviously deep differences built into Israel's geography and inhabitants, particularly between the herdsmen of the southern deserts and the northern hill dwellers. The coastal dwellers, rich but less warlike than the others, hold the balance or are the prize to be pursued. In the division of the original kingdom between Israel and Judea, we saw the alliance of the coast with the Galilee, while Jerusalem was held by the desert dwellers. The consequence of the division was that Israel in the north ultimately was conquered by Assyrians from the northeast, while Babylon was able to swallow Judea.
Social divisions in Israel obviously do not have to follow geographical lines. However, over time, these divisions must manifest themselves. For example, the coastal plain is inherently more cosmopolitan than the rest of the country. The interests of its inhabitants lie more with trading partners in the Mediterranean and the rest of the world than with their countrymen. Their standard of living is higher, and their commitment to traditions is lower. Therefore, there is an inherent tension between their immediate interests and those of the Galileans, who live more precarious, warlike lives. Countries can be divided over lesser issues — and when Israel is divided, it is vulnerable even to regional threats.
We say "even" because geography dictates that regional threats are less menacing than might be expected. The fact that Israel would be outnumbered demographically should all its neighbors turn on it is less important than the fact that it has adequate buffers in most directions, that the ability of neighbors to coordinate an attack is minimal and that their appetite for such an attack is even less. The single threat that Israel faces from the northeast can readily be managed if the Israelis create a united front there. When Israel was overrun by a Damascus-based power, it was deeply divided internally.
It is important to add one consideration to our discussion of buffers, which is diplomacy. The main neighbors of Israel are Egyptians, Syrians and those who live on the east bank of Jordan. This last group is a negligible force demographically, and the interests of the Syrians and Egyptians are widely divergent. Egypt's interests are to the south and west of its territory; the Sinai holds no attraction. Syria is always threatened from multiple directions, and alliance with Egypt adds little to its security. Therefore, under the worst of circumstances, Egypt and Syria have difficulty supporting each other. Under the best of circumstances, from Israel's point of view, it can reach a political accommodation with Egypt, securing its southwestern frontier politically as well as by geography, thus freeing Israel to concentrate on the northern threats and opportunities.
The threat to Israel rarely comes from the region, except when the Israelis are divided internally. The conquests of Israel occur when powers not adjacent to it begin forming empires. Babylon, Persia, Macedonia, Rome, Turkey and Britain all controlled Israel politically, sometimes for worse and sometimes for better. Each dominated it militarily, but none was a neighbor of Israel. This is a consistent pattern. Israel can resist its neighbors; danger arises when more distant powers begin playing imperial games. Empires can bring force to bear that Israel cannot resist.
Israel therefore has this problem: It would be secure if it could confine itself to protecting its interests from neighbors, but it cannot confine itself because its geographic location invariably draws larger, more distant powers toward Israel. Therefore, while Israel's military can focus only on immediate interests, its diplomatic interests must look much further. Israel is constantly entangled with global interests (as the globe is defined at any point), seeking to deflect and align with broader global powers. When it fails in this diplomacy, the consequences can be catastrophic.
Israel exists in three conditions. First, it can be a completely independent state. This condition occurs when there are no major imperial powers external to the region. We might call this the David model.
Second, it can live as part of an imperial system — either as a subordinate ally, as a moderately autonomous entity or as a satrapy. In any case, it maintains its identity but loses room for independent maneuvering in foreign policy and potentially in domestic policy. We might call this the Persian model in its most beneficent form.
Finally, Israel can be completely crushed — with mass deportations and migrations, with a complete loss of autonomy and minimal residual autonomy. We might call this the Babylonian model.
The Davidic model exists primarily when there is no external imperial power needing control of the Levant that is in a position either to send direct force or to support surrogates in the immediate region. The Persian model exists when Israel aligns itself with the foreign policy interests of such an imperial power, to its own benefit. The Babylonian model exists when Israel miscalculates on the broader balance of power and attempts to resist an emerging hegemon. When we look at Israeli behavior over time, the periods when Israel does not confront hegemonic powers outside the region are not rare, but are far less common than when it is confronting them.
Given the period of the first iteration of Israel, it would be too much to say that the Davidic model rarely comes into play, but certainly since that time, variations of the Persian and Babylonian models have dominated. The reason is geographic. Israel is normally of interest to outside powers because of its strategic position. While Israel can deal with local challenges effectively, it cannot deal with broader challenges. It lacks the economic or military weight to resist. Therefore, it is normally in the process of managing broader threats or collapsing because of them.
Let us then turn to the contemporary manifestation of Israel. Israel was recreated because of the interaction between a regional great power, the Ottoman Empire, and a global power, Great Britain. During its expansionary phase, the Ottoman Empire sought to dominate the eastern Mediterranean as well as both its northern and southern coasts. One thrust went through the Balkans toward central Europe. The other was toward Egypt. Inevitably, this required that the Ottomans secure the Levant.
For the British, the focus on the eastern Mediterranean was as the primary sea lane to India. As such, Gibraltar and the Suez were crucial. The importance of the Suez was such that the presence of a hostile, major naval force in the eastern Mediterranean represented a direct threat to British interests. It followed that defeating the Ottoman Empire during World War I and breaking its residual naval power was critical. The British, as was shown at Gallipoli, lacked the resources to break the Ottoman Empire by main force. They resorted to a series of alliances with local forces to undermine the Ottomans. One was an alliance with Bedouin tribes in the Arabian Peninsula; others involved covert agreements with anti-Turkish, Arab interests from the Levant to the Persian Gulf. A third, minor thrust was aligning with Jewish interests globally, particularly those interested in the refounding of Israel. Britain had little interest in this goal, but saw such discussions as part of the process of destabilizing the Ottomans.
The strategy worked. Under an agreement with France, the Ottoman province of Syria was divided into two parts on a line roughly running east-west between the sea and Mount Hermon. The northern part was given to France and divided into Lebanon and a rump Syria entity. The southern part was given to Britain and was called Palestine, after the Ottoman administrative district Filistina. Given the complex politics of the Arabian Peninsula, the British had to find a home for a group of Hashemites, which they located on the east bank of the Jordan River and designated, for want of a better name, the Trans-Jordan — the other side of the Jordan. Palestine looked very much like traditional Israel.
The ideological foundations of Zionism are not our concern here, nor are the pre- and post- World War II migrations of Jews, although those are certainly critical. What is important for purposes of this analysis are two things: First, the British emerged economically and militarily crippled from World War II and unable to retain their global empire, Palestine included. Second, the two global powers that emerged after World War II — the United States and the Soviet Union — were engaged in an intense struggle for the eastern Mediterranean after World War II, as can be seen in the Greek and Turkish issues at that time. Neither wanted to see the British Empire survive, each wanted the Levant, and neither was prepared to make a decisive move to take it.
Both the United States and the Soviet Union saw the re-creation of Israel as an opportunity to introduce their power to the Levant. The Soviets thought they might have some influence over Israel due to ideology. The Americans thought they might have some influence given the role of American Jews in the founding. Neither was thinking particularly clearly about the matter, because neither had truly found its balance after World War II. Both knew the Levant was important, but neither saw the Levant as a central battleground at that moment. Israel slipped through the cracks.
Once the question of Jewish unity was settled through ruthless action by David Ben Gurion's government, Israel faced a simultaneous threat from all of its immediate neighbors. However, as we have seen, the threat in 1948 was more apparent than real. The northern Levant, Lebanon, was fundamentally disunited — far more interested in regional maritime trade and concerned about control from Damascus. It posed no real threat to Israel. Jordan, settling the eastern bank of the Jordan River, was an outside power that had been transplanted into the region and was more concerned about native Arabs — the Palestinians — than about Israel. The Jordanians secretly collaborated with Israel. Egypt did pose a threat, but its ability to maintain lines of supply across the Sinai was severely limited and its genuine interest in engaging and destroying Israel was more rhetorical than real. As usual, the Egyptians could not afford the level of effort needed to move into the Levant. Syria by itself had a very real interest in Israel's defeat, but by itself was incapable of decisive action.
The exterior lines of Israel's neighbors prevented effective, concerted action. Israel's interior lines permitted efficient deployment and redeployment of force. It was not obvious at the time, but in retrospect we can see that once Israel existed, was united and had even limited military force, its survival was guaranteed. That is, so long as no great power was opposed to its existence.
From its founding until the Camp David Accords re-established the Sinai as a buffer with Egypt, Israel's strategic problem was this: So long as Egypt was in the Sinai, Israel's national security requirements outstripped its military capabilities. It could not simultaneously field an army, maintain its civilian economy and produce all the weapons and supplies needed for war. Israel had to align itself with great powers who saw an opportunity to pursue other interests by arming Israel.
David Ben Gurion, Israel’s first prime minister (Public domain)
Josef Stalin, first Secretary-General of the Soviet Union (Public domain) - Robert Schuman, French prime minister, 1948 (Public domain)
Israel's first patron was the Soviet Union — through Czechoslovakia — which supplied weapons before and after 1948 in the hopes of using Israel to gain a foothold in the eastern Mediterranean. Israel, aware of the risks of losing autonomy, also moved into a relationship with a declining great power that was fighting to retain its empire: France. Struggling to hold onto Algeria and in constant tension with Arabs, France saw Israel as a natural ally. And apart from the operation against Suez in 1956, Israel saw in France a patron that was not in a position to reduce Israeli autonomy. However, with the end of the Algerian war and the realignment of France in the Arab world, Israel became a liability to France and, after 1967, Israel lost French patronage.
Israel did not become a serious ally of the Americans until after 1967. Such an alliance was in the American interest. The United States had, as a strategic imperative, the goal of keeping the Soviet navy out of the Mediterranean or, at least, blocking its unfettered access. That meant that Turkey, controlling the Bosporus, had to be kept in the American bloc. Syria and Iraq shifted policies in the late 1950s and by the mid-1960s had been armed by the Soviets. This made Turkey's position precarious: If the Soviets pressed from the north while Syria and Iraq pressed from the south, the outcome would be uncertain, to say the least, and the global balance of power was at stake.
The United States used Iran to divert Iraq's attention. Israel was equally useful in diverting Syria's attention. So long as Israel threatened Syria from the south, it could not divert its forces to the north. That helped secure Turkey at a relatively low cost in aid and risk. By aligning itself with the interests of a great power, Israel lost some of its room for maneuver: For example, in 1973, it was limited by the United States in what it could do to Egypt. But those limitations aside, it remained autonomous internally and generally free to pursue its strategic interests.
Celebrating the Camp David Accords, September 1978: Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, U.S. President Jimmy Carter, Egyptian President Anwar El-Sadat (Source: Bill Fitz-Patrick, public domain)
The end of hostilities with Egypt, guaranteed by the Sinai buffer zone, created a new era for Israel. Egypt was restored to its traditional position, Jordan was a marginal power on the east bank, Lebanon was in its normal, unstable mode, and only Syria was a threat. However, it was a threat that Israel could easily deal with. Syria by itself could not threaten the survival of Israel.
Following Camp David (an ironic name), Israel was in its Davidic model, in a somewhat modified sense. Its survival was not at stake. Its problems — the domination of a large, hostile population and managing events in the northern Levant — were subcritical (meaning that, though these were not easy tasks, they did not represent fundamental threats to national survival, so long as Israel retained national unity). When unified, Israel has never been threatened by its neighbors. Geography dictates against it.
Israel's danger will come only if a great power seeks to dominate the Mediterranean Basin or to occupy the region between Afghanistan and the Mediterranean. In the short period since the fall of the Soviet Union, this has been impossible. There has been no great power with the appetite and the will for such an adventure. But 15 years is not even a generation, and Israel must measure its history in centuries.
It is the nature of the international system to seek balance. The primary reality of the world today is the overwhelming power of the United States. The United States makes few demands on Israel that matter. However, it is the nature of things that the United States threatens the interests of other great powers who, individually weak, will try to form coalitions against it. Inevitably, such coalitions will arise. That will be the next point of danger for Israel.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu addresses a joint session of the U.S. Congress in March 2015 — warning of dangers to Israel if Washington reaches an accord with Iran. (Public domain)
In the event of a global rivalry, the United States might place onerous requirements on Israel. Alternatively, great powers might move into the Jordan River valley or ally with Syria, move into Lebanon or ally with Israel. The historical attraction of the eastern shore of the Mediterranean would focus the attention of such a power and lead to attempts to assert control over the Mediterranean or create a secure Middle Eastern empire. In either event, or some of the others discussed, it would create a circumstance in which Israel might face a Babylonian catastrophe or be forced into some variation of Persian or Roman subjugation.
Israel's danger is not a Palestinian rising. Palestinian agitation is an irritant that Israel can manage so long as it does not undermine Israeli unity. Whether it is managed by domination or by granting the Palestinians a vassal state matters little. Nor can Israel be threatened by its neighbors. Even a unified attack by Syria and Egypt would fail, for the reasons discussed.
Israel's real threat, as can be seen in history, lies in the event of internal division and/or a great power, coveting Israel's geographical position, marshaling force that is beyond its capacity to resist. Even that can be managed if Israel has a patron whose interests involve denying the coast to another power.
Israel's reality is this. It is a small country, yet must manage threats arising far outside of its region. It can survive only if it maneuvers with great powers commanding enormously greater resources. Israel cannot match the resources and, therefore, it must be constantly clever. There are periods when it is relatively safe because of great power alignments, but its normal condition is one of global unease. No nation can be clever forever, and Israel's history shows that some form of subordination is inevitable. Indeed, it is to a very limited extent subordinate to the United States now.
For Israel, the retention of a Davidic independence is difficult. Israel's strategy must be to manage its subordination effectively by dealing with its patron cleverly, as it did with Persia. But cleverness is not a geopolitical concept. It is not permanent, and it is not assured. And that is the perpetual crisis of Jerusalem.
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