DONATE

Showing posts with label Bashar al Assad. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Bashar al Assad. Show all posts

Friday, April 21, 2017

Disagreement on Conspiracy Theory Pt 1


John R. Houk
© April 21, 2017

One of my favorite Internet pals is a fellow that frequents my WordPress blog NCCR. His moniker is Yurki1000. When I refer to him I usually his moniker because I am unsure of how much anonymity he wishes to maintain. He does sign many of his comments with his first name, but for the most part I’ll stick with Yurki1000 or Yurki.

That being said, Yurki has sent a lengthy comment that demonstrates agreement with another NCCR commenter using the moniker Futuret. Futuret leans more on the validity of some of the Conspiracy Theories than I do.

There are many Conspiracy Theories I concur with, yet many are simply beyond the believability scale especially when I know some facts that contradict a Conspiracy Theory accepted by way too many people.

I am preambling with this information primarily because I do not want to get involved in a rift with these two guys in whom typically I enjoy reading.

With another, ‘’that being said,” I am disagreeing much of Yurki’s comment to Futuret by answering the premises of the links and comments he has produced demonstrating agreement to the Political Vel Craft link that pushes the theory that the Chemical attack on Khan Shaykhun perpetrated by Bashar al-Assad that killed or injured hundreds of civilian men, women and children was a false flag perpetrated by Trump Administration.

Frankly, the more logical evidence I have read indicates this was not a false flag. If the attack was a false flag, then the fingering pointing source would be to the Trump Administration. I can’t accept that the guy promising to make America great again had anything to do with perpetrating an attack on men, women and children.

The other possibility is that Syrian Rebels gassed their own supporters. THAT IS LUDICROUS!

And the last possibility is there was no chemical attack whatsoever. There is simply too much evidence that a chemical attack occurred.

So, a false flag travels back to, It’s Trump’s fault. Again, I cannot accept that.

I have run into a bit of a difficulty in sharing my thoughts link by link and comment by comment. I got through Yurki’s first four links and have out that I have the equivalent of eleven pages of a Word Document. I am going to have to consider this post Part One of I have no idea of how many parts.

Futuret



Evidence suggests a false flag chemical weapons attack on the Syrian people was initiated by Syrian rebels with the help of the United States in order to justify Thursday night’s U.S. Military attack on a Syrian base.

pResident Trump approved the bombing of the Syrian military base controlled by Bashir al-Assad supposedly to destroy the Syrian government’s ability to launch further chemical attacks on civilians.

… READ ENTIRETY (Syrian False Flag: CIA Mossad Armed ISIS Rebels Set Up Desperate Excuse For Trump; By VOLUBRJOTR; Political Vel Craft; 4/9/17)

+++
Oneway2day [That’s me – John R. Houk]

Much of Political Vel Craft’s thoughts are developed on data that occurred under Obama and not Trump’s very brief tenure as President. For Example Obama’s exist from Iraq enabled ISIS in the first place. Obama wanted to get rid of Assad (which was commendable yet I mistrust the Obama motive), his huge mistake was in not vetting which Syrian rebels got the Libyan secret weapons cache sent suspiciously in a clandestine manner. My feeling Obama armed ISIS just as much as any Rebels he considered moderate.

Thus the declassified evidence criticized at Political Vel Craft has credence in accuracy than as a false flag.

Accusing Mossad/Israel of allying with ISIS is like criticizing Jews criticizing Hitler for turning on Stalin in WWII. Both WWII dictators were Antisemitic, but by 1939 Hitler was already targeting Jews in Germany. In Russia 1939 Jews were joining the Red Army as Russians rather than as Jews. It makes no sense to make a deal with the devil ISIS to get rid of the devil Assad.

+++
Yurki1000


Premise of the link: Osama bin Laden worked for the CIA and also died in 2001.

‘Who was Osama Bin Laden?
Osama bin Laden, A.K.A. CIA Asset "Tim Osman
"’

There is a striking resemblance in the comparison photo of Tim Osman and Osama bin Laden. Nevertheless, the facts speak for themselves. Undoubtedly the CIA was involved with arming and perhaps even training bin Laden. BUT that was the days of former Soviet Russia trying to convert Afghanistan into an atheistic Communist satellite. The CIA & Saudi money aided Afghan freedom fighters (mujahideen) to drive the Red Army crazy.

I have no idea what happened to this Osman fellow, but bin Laden went to be disillusioned with U.S. aid because of an infidel status. The infidel status sent bin Laden over the edge when Saudis allowed Bush I to set up military bases in Muslim holy land Saudi Arabia to take down Saddam Hussein in the First Gulf War.

Shazam! Al Qaeda is born to inflict pain on the USA. Then is a multitude of year following the 911 attack, bin Laden makes numerous recruiting and/or fatwa videos for his minions and against the USA.


The essence of the above link is that ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is a Jew undercover for Mossad. This conspiracy theory’s biggest problem is two-fold.

1. The source of the theory Shi’ite Iran. Sunnis and Shia hate each other. ISIS claims itself as Sunni. ISIS victims are largely Christians, Yazidis and Shia Muslims. 

2. The pro-Iranian use a photo comparison much like the above link uses a photo to claim that Tim Osman and Osama bin Laden are one and the same. The theory states that Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is really actor Simon Elliot (or Elliot Shimon to add a more Jewish pedigree).

I answer premise one within the numbered premise.

Premise number two again uses photo comparisons that have an uncanny resemblance. The problem: al-Baghdadi has a public history even known to be a one-time prisoner of the USA in Iraq that was released. The Brookings Institution has a quite lengthy biography of al-Baghdadi that includes a family lineage and his birth name – which is not Elliot Simon. You should read the whole thing, but for my purposes here are some excerpts:

IBRAHIM AWWAD IBRAHIM AL-BADRI was born in 1971 in Samarra, an ancient Iraqi city on the eastern edge of the Sunni Triangle north of Baghdad. The son of a pious man who taught Quranic recitation in a local mosque, Ibrahim himself was withdrawn, taciturn, and, when he spoke, barely audible. Neighbors who knew him as a teenager remember him as shy and retiring. Even when people crashed into him during friendly soccer matches, his favorite sport, he remained stoic. But photos of him from those years capture another quality: a glowering intensity in the dark eyes beneath his thick, furrowed brow.

Early on, Ibrahim’s nickname was “The Believer.” When he wasn’t in school, he spent much of his time at the local mosque, immersed in his religious studies; and when he came home at the end of the day, according to one of his brothers, Shamsi, he was quick to admonish anyone who strayed from the strictures of Islamic law.

Now Ibrahim al-Badri is known to the world as Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the ruler of the Islamic State or ISIS, and he has the power not just to admonish but to punish and even execute anyone within his territories whose faith is not absolute. His followers call him “Commander of the Believers,” a title reserved for caliphs, the supreme spiritual and temporal rulers of the vast Muslim empire of the Middle Ages. Though his own realm is much smaller, he rules millions of subjects. Some are fanatically loyal to him; many others cower in fear of the bloody consequences for defying his brutal version of Islam.

…

Two of Baghdadi’s uncles served in Saddam’s security services, and one of his brothers became an officer in the army. Another brother who served in the military died during the grueling eight-year war that Iraq fought against Iran in the 1980s with tacit U.S. support. Baghdadi might well have shared that fate had the war continued a little longer and his near-sightedness not disqualified him from military service.

…

When Baghdadi graduated from the University of Baghdad in 1996, he enrolled in the recently-established Saddam University for Islamic Studies where he studied for a master’s in Quranic recitation, his favorite subject. His family’s Baathist connections undoubtedly helped him get into the highly-selective graduate program. Baghdadi’s master’s thesis was a commentary on an obscure medieval text on Quranic recitation. His task was to reconcile various versions of the manuscript. While tedious, it involved little imagination and no questioning of the content—a perfect project for a dogmatist. He received his master’s degree in 1999 and immediately enrolled in Saddam University’s doctoral program in Quranic studies.

During Baghdadi’s time in graduate school, his paternal uncle, Ismail al-Badri, persuaded him to join the Muslim Brotherhood, a transnational movement dedicated to establishing states governed by Islamic law. … But Baghdadi quickly gravitated toward those few Salafis whose strict creed led them to call for the overthrow of rulers they considered betrayers of the faith. They called themselves jihadist Salafis. Baghdadi’s older brother, Jum`a, was part of this movement. So was Baghdadi’s mentor, Muhammad Hardan, a one-time member of the Brotherhood who had fought in the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s.

Baghdadi threw himself into the writings of those Muslim Brothers who had embraced jihadism. Under their tutelage he grew increasingly impatient with the Brotherhood mainstream, which he felt was made up of “people of words, not action.”

…

THE PRISONER

LATE IN 2003, after the Americans had defeated and disbanded Saddam’s army, Baghdadi helped found Jaysh Ahl al-Sunna wa-l-Jamaah (Army of the People of the Sunna and Communal Solidarity), an insurgent group that fought U.S. troops and their local allies in northern and central Iraq.

Soon after, in February 2004, Baghdadi was arrested in Fallujah while visiting a friend who was on the American wanted list. He was transferred to a detention facility at Camp Bucca, a sprawling complex in southern Iraq. Prison files classified him as a “civilian detainee,” which meant his captors didn’t know he was a jihadist.

…

By the time Baghdadi was released on December 8, 2004, he had a virtual Rolodex for reconnecting with his co-conspirators and protégés: they had written one another’s phone numbers in the elastic of their underwear.

THE CONFIDANT

JUST TWO MONTHS BEFORE BAGHDADI’S RELEASE, al-Qaida established a branch of its terror network in Iraq by absorbing a jihadist militia run by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and putting him in charge of it. Zarqawi, a Jordanian who wanted to create an Islamic state, thought he could use al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI) to provoke a sectarian civil war between Iraq’s minority Sunnis and the majority Shiites, which would force the Sunnis to turn to his group for protection.

… Baghdadi set about his assigned task of ensuring that AQI’s online propaganda was in line with its brand of ultraconservative Islam. Baghdadi’s tribal connections in Iraq and his ties with other jihadist groups there must have also come in handy, because on several occasions he was able to help foreign jihadists cross Syria’s border into his native land. At the time, Syria’s President, Bashar al-Assad, was turning a blind eye to the foreign fighter pipeline into Iraq in order to punish the United States for invading the country; that same pipeline …

In 2006, al-Qaida in Iraq formed an umbrella organization for jihadist groups resisting the American occupation. Baghdadi’s group was one of the first to join. Soon after, Zarqawi declared his intent to establish an Islamic state, directly countermanding al-Qaida’s instructions to wait until after the Americans had withdrawn and AQI secured popular support for establishing the state. When Zarqawi was killed in a U.S. airstrike in June, his successor, Abu Ayyub al-Masri, an Egyptian jihadist, went ahead with the plan. …

Because of his scholarly credentials, Baghdadi was put in charge of the Islamic State’s religious affairs in some of its Iraqi “provinces.” Because the group did not yet actually control any territory, this largely meant that Baghdadi continued to be responsible for ensuring that the Islamic State’s propaganda reflected its creed, and that its foot soldiers abided by its strictures and implemented the harsh punishments prescribed by Islamic scripture wherever and whenever they could. Accused adulterers whom they managed to capture were stoned, alcohol drinkers were whipped, thieves had their hands amputated, and “apostates”—anyone who defied the Islamic State’s program—were executed.

…

… Whatever the case, the captured courier led the Iraqi authorities to al-Rawi, who, under interrogation, gave his captors information that enabled a U.S.-Iraqi force in April 2010 to surround the mud house outside Tikrit where Abu Umar and Masri were hiding. The two blew themselves up rather than surrender. 

With their deaths, the Islamic State faced its first leadership succession. The Consultative Council couldn’t meet in conclave to choose a new emir since that might have ended with another American-led raid and another multiple suicide. Bin Laden, who still had the allegiance of the Islamic State, issued instructions to the Consultative Council to appoint an interim leader [Blog Editor: NOTE that was 2010! A full 9-yrs after the above Conspiracy Theory that Osama bin Laden died in 2001.] and to send him a list of candidates for emir and their qualifications.

THE EMIR

WITH THE DEATH OF THE ISLAMIC STATE’S COMMANDERS, the head of the Islamic State’s military council, Hajji Bakr, was suddenly in a position to manipulate the succession. A former officer in Saddam’s army who had served time in Camp Bucca after Baghdadi’s release, Bakr was tainted as the former servant of an impious regime and therefore not a contender for supreme leadership himself, so he set about to be the kingmaker and the power behind the throne. Ignoring bin Laden’s instructions, Hajji Bakr polled the 11 members of the Consultative Council on their preferences. But he reportedly rigged the outcome by writing a letter to each saying that all of the others were in favor of Baghdadi. …

The council elected the new emir of the Islamic State by a vote of 9 to 2. It was then that Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, at the age of 39, took his now-famous nom de guerre, a double homage to his faith and his native land. Abu Bakr was Muhammad’s father-in-law and, after the Prophet’s death, the first caliph; Baghdad was the capital of the grandest caliphate in early Islam, the Abbasid dynasty. The Abbasids had swept to power in the eighth century using clever apocalyptic propaganda and clandestine networks to mobilize popular anger against the ruling regime in Damascus. Baghdadi was clearly hoping to repeat the performance on the same stage.

With the new emir’s blessing, not to mention gratitude, Hajji Bakr set about purging the ranks of the Islamic State of anyone who could challenge Baghdadi’s authority. Dubbed by Islamic State insiders as the “prince of shadows” and the emir’s “private minister,” Hajji Bakr settled scores and eliminated rivals through intimidation and assassination, much as Saddam had done.

The power had now shifted from the foreign fighters to the Iraqi members of the Islamic State. As American and Iraqi forces killed or captured the previous emir’s commanders, their replacements were often, like Baghdadi and Hajji Bakr, former prisoners from Camp Bucca. … READ ENTIRETY (THE BELIEVER: How an Introvert with a Passion for Religion and Soccer Became Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi Leader of the Islamic State; By William McCants; Brookings Institution; 9/1/15)

A bit lengthy of an excerpt, right? It does prove that Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi IS NOT an Israeli Mossad agent whose name is Simon Elliot. Not only is it ridiculous, the Conspiracy Theory smacks of the Antisemitic concept that Jews are behind are the evils of the world. That is a bit infuriating for me.

The next link on Yurki’s list:


The link is to a WordPress blog called “the real Syrian Free Press”. A brief examination of the website shows it is probably is not as free as it claims or real Syrian as it claims. The blog is a rubberstamp for Bashar al-Assad the dictator that rules as a Shia-Alawite in the Sunni majority Syria. That means its support of Assad there is also support for the crazy Mullahs of Shia-Twelver Iran. Iran is currently the biggest state sponsor of Islamic terrorism. And Iran calls the shots for its terrorist client Hezbollah – Jew-hating Shias in Lebanon which is west of Syria.

The next on the list:


The title of this webpage is “LIBYA AGAINST SUPER POWER MEDIA: LIBYA RESISTING AGAINST THE WEST.org site”. There is a subsection on the website called “Videos of Al Jazeera, CNN, ABC, ALArabia and other Western Media Lying”. It lumps Qatar owned al Jazeera and Saudi owned but United Arab Emirates - Dubai (UAE) located al Arabiya with two Left leaning American news outlets. Saudi Arabia and Qatar propagates the Sunni extremely Radical Islamic theology of Wahhabism. The same line of reasoning used by most Islamic terrorists such as al Qaeda and ISIS.

Well, that is Part One. Look for Part Two (not necessarily in sequential posts).

JRH 4/21/17



Monday, March 20, 2017

PUTIN'S REAL SYRIA AGENDA

While Dems are crying about the unproven collusion between President Trump and the Russians to win Election-2016 AND ignoring Dem collusion with the Russians (which is better documented), Russia is quietly changing the balance of power in the Middle East by colluding with Iran for geopolitical regional power.


 The Dems are either saps or more than willing to stealthily cooperate with the former Soviet Union whose President is a former uber-spy Vladimir Putin.

JRH 3/20/17
************
PUTIN'S REAL SYRIA AGENDA [Summary/Intro]

Mar 20, 2017

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s primary objective in Syria is to constrain U.S. freedom of action – not fight ISIS and al Qaeda. Russia’s military deployments at current levels will not enable the Iranian-penetrated Assad regime to secure Syria. Moscow’s deepening footprint in Syria threatens America’s ability to defend its interests across the Middle East and in the Mediterranean Sea. The next U.S. step in Syria must help regain leverage over Russia rather than further encourage Putin’s expansionism.

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) produced this report with the Critical Threats Project (CTP). The insights are part of an intensive multi-month exercise to frame, design, and evaluate potential courses of action that the United States could pursue to destroy the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and al Qaeda in Syria. The ISW-CTP team recently released “America’s Way Ahead in Syria,” which details the flaws in the current U.S. approach in Iraq and Syria and proposes the first phase of a strategic reset in the Middle East.

+++
Putin’s Real Syria Agenda
By Genevieve Casagrande and Kathleen Weinberger
March 2017
ISW – PDF

Russia’s intervention in Syria in September 2015 fundamentally altered the balance of the Syrian Civil War.1 Russia re-established momentum behind Syrian President Bashar al Assad and his Iranian allies at a moment when major victories by ISIS and Syrian rebels threatened to force the regime to contract into Syria’s central corridor.2 The capabilities Russia deployed were not limited to the airframes, artillery, and personnel needed to conduct a counter-terrorism or counterinsurgency mission, however. Russia deployed advanced air defense and ballistic missile systems, naval units, air superiority aircraft, and other capabilities in a display of major Russian force projection in the region. Russian President Vladimir Putin is altering the balance of power in Syria and the Eastern Mediterranean through sustained Russian military operations and additional deployments of high-end capabilities.

Russian Force Projection

Russia ultimately seeks to expand its permanent naval and air bases on the Syrian coast in order to further project force into the Mediterranean and Middle East. Russia’s establishment of an anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) exclusion zone from its bases at Latakia and Tartous allows Russia to create de-facto no fly zones in the Eastern Mediterranean as well as over most of Syria. These A2/AD zones constrain U.S. freedom of movement and ultimately raise the cost of U.S. involvement in Syria.3 Russia deployed the naval version of the S-300 to protect the airspace over Latakia airbase in Syria in November 2015.4 Russia also deployed the S-400 in late November 2015 shortly after the Turkish downing of a Russian jet.5 Russia has since deployed an additional seven S-300 systems in an effort to build in redundancies, advance the integration of its air defenses, and provide more comprehensive coverage.6 The S-300 and S-400 systems are road mobile and interoperable, increasing the difficulty of neutralizing the systems. [See Appendix I]

Putin wants to challenge the U.S. and its allies by increasing Russian military and political influence in the Middle East. Russia has rotated a wide range of naval vessels to participate in the conflict in order to demonstrate the capabilities of these units and Russia’s willingness to deploy them in the Mediterranean. Russia has deployed some of its most advanced non-nuclear naval capabilities to the Eastern Mediterranean.7 Russian subsurface and surface vessels successfully engaged ground targets in Syria after launching Kalibr cruise missiles from the Mediterranean and Caspian Seas.8 Russia has shown it can undertake precision strikes with the nuclear-capable Kalibr cruise missile at significant distance.

Russia also maintains anti-ship capabilities in the Mediterranean, including the Bastion-P coastal defense system. Russia demonstrated the land attack capabilities of the Bastion in November 2016.9 Russia has also deployed battle cruisers that bring advanced anti-ship and air defense capabilities off the Syrian coast. Russia’s deployment of its much-ridiculed aircraft carrier the Admiral Kuznetsov nevertheless showcased its force projection capabilities and intent to exhibit its naval presence in the Mediterranean.10 [See Appendix II]

Putin has deployed air defense and anti-ship systems to Syria in order to threaten the United States. Russia does not need these systems to support the counter-terrorism campaign it claims it is waging against anti-Assad opposition groups in Syria. Those groups do not operate aircraft or naval vessels. Russia also deployed the nuclear capable SS-26 ‘Iskander’ ballistic missiles to Syria and used the systems to attack opposition held terrain.11 The Iskander missiles provide no meaningful additional advantage against the opposition. The only conceivable target for these advanced systems is the U.S. and its allies. [See Appendix III]

Constrain U.S. Freedom of Action

Russia has used its deployment to constrain U.S. freedom of action and limit American policy options in Syria. Russia deployed the S-300 and S-400 air defense systems to deter the U.S. from direct military action against the Assad regime through the unilateral establishment of a no-fly zone. Russia has also forward deployed assets beyond its air and naval bases on the coast in order to further complicate the personnel are primarily concentrated in Latakia, Aleppo, and Tartous Provinces, but are also active in Hama, Homs, Damascus, and Hasakah and include a wide range of units including air assault, tank, medical, naval infantry, and special operations forces. [See Appendix IV]

Russia has intentionally removed potential U.S. partners within the armed opposition from the battlefield in Syria. Russian airstrikes from October 2015 to March 2017 have primarily targeted the mainstream Syrian opposition – not ISIS – in order to ensure the opposition’s defeat through its submission, destruction, or transformation. The Russian air campaign has driven what remains of the mainstream opposition closer to Salafi-jihadi groups, which are stronger and better able to defend against intensified pro-regime military operations. Russia is also exacerbating radicalization through its deliberate, illegal targeting of civilians. Russia has consistently targeted hospitals, schools, and other critical civilian infrastructure throughout the sixteen months of its air campaign.

Russian Testing Grounds

Russia has also used sustained use of transport aircraft in Syria to exercise the Russian military’s overall combat readiness and force projection capabilities. Expeditionary logistics and force projection is difficult for militaries to exercise, in general. Russia is exercising expeditionary logistics by air and sea in Syria.13 Russia is refining its ability to deploy its military personnel and equipment rapidly at a large scale in order to message its ability to threaten the U.S. and its NATO and European allies. Russia announced its intent to prioritize the development of naval equipment for troop transport on March 8 in order to increase the Russian Navy’s ability to provide logistical support in Syria and in other coastal zones.14 Russia also re-supplies and provides combat support for prospect of direct U.S. strikes against the Syrian regime for fear of inadvertently hitting Russian troops. Sources estimated that Russia maintains between 1,500 and 4,000 military personnel in Syria.12 These forces in Syria through frequent deliveries from Russian Il-76 and An-124 transport aircraft. As of October 2016, these transport aircraft were making multiple trips to Syria each month and it is likely that these aircraft continue to make regular trips to Syria. [See Appendix V]

Limitations of Russian Capabilities

Putin faces a number of economic and military constraints that limit the resources Russia can bring to bear in Syria. Russia’s economic crisis has forced Russia to balance limited resources across key theaters like Ukraine, the Baltics, the Middle East, and domestically in Russia. Putin has opted to pursue multiple, mutually reinforcing lines of effort using a diverse set of naval, air, missile, and ground capabilities in Syria. The overlap allows Russia to extract significant benefits with minimal cost. The Russian military has demonstrated its many shortcomings during its deployment to Syria, including frequent friendly fire incidents, losses of Russian aircraft, a poor performance by Russia’s aging aircraft carrier the Admiral Kuznetsov, and reports of mechanical failure of Russian equipment.15

The Russian deployment, at current levels, will be insufficient to grant Assad victory over the opposition, al Qaeda, or ISIS. Russia, Iran, and the regime have been unable to sustain significant simultaneous operations against ISIS and the Syrian opposition, despite Russia’s considerable airframe deployments. Russian airframes were unable to prevent ISIS’s recapture of Palmyra in December 2016 alongside a final pro-regime push to defeat the opposition in Aleppo, for example.16 Russia has instead used ‘cessation of hostilities’ agreements to drawdown its airstrikes against the opposition and surge its air campaign against ISIS for limited periods of time.17 Salafi-Jihadi groups have meanwhile begun to consolidate the opposition under more effective command-and-control structures, increasing rebels’ capabilities and resiliency.18 This dynamic will not only lead to a protracted and bloody civil war for the foreseeable future, but it ultimately raises the requirements for the U.S. to deal with the conflict.

Implications

Russia is both an unacceptable and ineffective partner against jihadists in Syria. The Russian deployment is inconsistent with Putin’s narrative that Russia intervened in Syria in order to combat terrorists. Many of its capabilities have no utility in the anti-ISIS fight. Putin instead seeks to use Russia’s deployment to subordinate U.S. military action and policies to Russian objectives in Syria. Russia’s aggressive deployment to Syria intends to deter the U.S. from intervening for fear of incurring significant costs. Russia has largely pursued its objectives in Syria with impunity. It has deprived the U.S. of freedom of maneuver, disrupted U.S. partnerships with key allies in the region, and facilitated Russia’s emergence as a geopolitical force in the region. Any potential partnership with Russia in Syria will further strengthen jihadists and force the U.S. to capitulate to a Russian vision for the broader Middle East that endangers America’s security interests.

Genevieve Casagrande is a Syria Analyst at the Institute for the Study of War. Kathleen Weinberger is a Russia and Ukraine Analyst at the Institute for the Study of War. Institute for the Study of War Twitter: @TheStudyofWar Critical Threats Twitter: @criticalthreats

[Blog Editor: From this point forward the rest of the report are the Appendices (i.e. charts) and Notes. The last section is actually longer than the report itself. To view the Appendices and Notes go to the PDF.]

____________________
©2007 – 2017 THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF WAR

Who is ISW

We are on the front lines of military thinking.

Our Mission
The Institute for the Study of War advances an informed understanding of military affairs through reliable research, trusted analysis, and innovative education. We are committed to improving the nation’s ability to execute military operations and respond to emerging threats in order to achieve U.S. strategic objectives. ISW is a non-partisan, non-profit, public policy research organization.

Our History
Dr. Kimberly Kagan founded ISW in May 2007, as U.S. forces undertook a daring new counterinsurgency strategy to reverse the grim security situation on the ground in Iraq. Frustrated with the prevailing lack of accurate information documenting developments on the ground in Iraq and the detrimental effect of biased reporting on policymakers, Dr. Kagan established ISW to provide real-time, independent, and open-source analysis of ongoing military operations and … READ THE REST