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Showing posts with label ITIC. Show all posts
Showing posts with label ITIC. Show all posts

Monday, August 21, 2017

Analysis of ISIS’s Claims of Responsibility for Terrorist Attacks Carried Out Abroad


The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center (ITIC) has put together an analysis of Islamic terrorist attacks that ISIS has taken credit.

The ITIC divides ISIS claims into a “short form” and a “long form”. The short form claims are classed as ISIS inspired. The long form claims are classed as ISIS directed.

The short form claims occur primarily in Western nations such as the recent Islamic terrorist attacks in Spain. The long form claims are located primarily in Muslim dominated nations.

The differentiation is interesting yet in my opinion, whether inspired or directed, the operation is a horrendous evil that must be dealt with in a brutal manner. A brutal response is standard procedure in Middle Eastern and Maghreb (North African Muslim) nations. Due to the influence of Leftist Multicultural politics, a brutal response is politically incorrect.

Unless Western nations can eschew political correctness, Islamic terrorists will continue to ravage Western nations.

JRH 8/21/17
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Analysis of ISIS’s Claims of Responsibility for Terrorist Attacks Carried Out Abroad

Published August 20, 2017


Overview[1]

This study examines the forms of ISIS's claims of responsibility for terrorist attacks it carried out abroad (i.e., not in Iraq and Syria, its "core countries"). It covers 22 claims of responsibility for attacks carried out between June 2016 and June 2017. The study shows a close correlation between the form of the various claims and the types and locations of the attacks. The ITIC is of the opinion that the insights gained from the study can be a used as a methodological tool to examine ISIS claims of responsibility and assess their significance.

Ø Most of the attacks examined for this study were carried out by ISIS in Western countries (the United States and western Europe), some in Arab-Muslim countries (Egypt, Turkey Iran) and some in others (Israel, Russia, Kenya). In ITIC assessment, most of the attacks in the West were ISIS-inspired, that is, inspired by but not directed by ISIS, without its logistic support or the involvement of its external operational headquarters in choosing a target or reaching it. Some of the attacks (especially in Arab-Muslim countries) were planned by ISIS, and preceded by the methodical collection of intelligence, procuring weapons and training the operative or operatives who carried them out.

Ø A comparison of the various claims of responsibility indicates that three different patterns are used:

Ø The "short form:" The most frequently used type of claim of responsibility. It uses phrases and terms that repeat themselves in most of the announcements. In ITIC assessment the short form is relevant mostly for ISIS-inspired attacks carried out in the West. The announcements are composed after the attack and disseminated within a short time (usually the day after the attack). Apparently whoever composes the announcements prefers not to include unnecessary details because the full picture is not yet sufficiently clear and in order not to reveal the fact that the announcements were written after the attack and the terrorists who carried out the attack do not have an organizational link to ISIS.[2] Short-form announcements are similar to one another but not identical (with small, insignificant differences in terminology and style).

Ø The "long form:" Such claims of responsibility are long and detailed, and include information about the attack and explicit reasons for their having been carried out. They are issued mainly for attacks which were planned in advance and for which ISIS paid attention to the aspect of propaganda. They are most commonly used for attacks carried out in Arab-Muslim countries. They are regularly issued in Syria, Iran and other countries where there are branches of ISIS (e.g., the Sinai Peninsula). The attacks examined for this study revealed four such claims of responsibility: for the suicide bombing attack in the Coptic cathedral in Cairo (December 12, 2016); the shooting attack in the nightclub in the heart of Istanbul (January 1, 2017), and the combined suicide bombing and shooting attack in Tehran (June 7, 2017). The announcement issued after the suicide bombing attack in Manchester (May 22, 2017) also belongs to that category.[3]

Ø Claims of responsibility including videos: About one third of the short-form announcements issued after ISIS-inspired attacks included videos, in most cases published after the attack. In each instance the video was filmed at the initiative of the terrorists who carried out the attack. They photographed themselves before the attack and sent the pictures to ISIS, which were published by its Amaq news agency (or by other media). There were also several instances of attacks photographed and the pictures published in real time. The videos included threats against Western countries and oaths of allegiance to ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. The inclusion of videos increases the propaganda impact of the attacks. The attack in Tehran, which was well-planned, was photographed in real time as part of the overall the plan. In Syria and Iraq, and other Arab-Muslim countries where provinces of ISIS operate. It is very common for long-form claims of responsibility to be accompanied by videos prepared in advance (especially when suicide bombing attacks are carried out).



Larossi Abballa, who stabbed a French police officer and his partner to death in the residential commune of Magnanville, north-west of Paris. He photographed himself with his cell phone. As part of the video he recorded himself swearing allegiance to ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (Amaq, June 14, 2016).

Ø During the period studied, one instance of an ISIS-inspired attack was found for which ISIS did not claim responsibility. On June 8, 2016, two terrorist operatives carried out a shooting attack in the Sarona commercial and entertainment complex in the heart of Tel Aviv (four killed, seven wounded). The two attackers were inspired by ISIS; one of them had been influenced by ISIS ideology while studying in Jordan. They were assisted by a third operative, who provided them with weapons. ISIS did not claim responsibility for the attack despite the media capital it could have made from inspiring an attack in Tel Aviv. ISIS's motives for not claiming responsibility are unclear. It is possible that ISIS did not have sufficient information about the attack while it was being carried out to indicate the terrorists had been inspired by the organization.

Ø How reliable are ISIS's claims of responsibility? In ITIC assessment, most of the attacks for which ISIS claims responsibility were in fact carried out by its operatives (planned attacks), or by terrorists who were inspired by the organization (inspired attacks). However, those are exceptional cases. For example, through its Amaq news agency, ISIS claimed responsibility for the combined shooting and stabbing attack carried out near the Nablus Gate in the Old City of Jerusalem (June 16, 2017). According to the announcement, the attack was carried out by the "lions of the caliphate in the Palestine Province [of ISIS]." In ITIC assessment, the announcement was false, and reflected ISIS's desire to boast of a success in a symbolic location such as "Palestine," given the severe pressure exerted on the organization in Syria and Iraq.

In conclusion, an examination of the claims of responsibility revealed a connection between the pattern of announcement and the nature and location of the attack. Short-form announcements seem to indicate an ISIS-inspired attack, usually carried out in a Western country, primarily by Muslims or people who have converted to Islam, been radicalized, and identify with ISIS's ideology. Long-form announcements, on the other hand, seem to indicate a previously-planned ISIS attack. They are usually carried out in Syria, Iraq and Arab-Muslim countries, where ISIS has high operational capabilities.[4] Videos are included in claims of responsibility for both ISIS-inspired attacks and planned attacks. The difference between them is that in ISIS-inspired attacks the inclusion of a video is improvised and inserted on the initiative of the terrorists who carry them out, and then disseminated by ISIS's propaganda machine. In planned attacks, publishing videos is part of preparations for the attack and attention is given to the aspect of propaganda. ISIS uses many languages in its announcements, depending on the target audience (Arabic and English are popular languages for the videos).

Composition and style of ISIS's claims of responsibility

Short-form announcements

Ø The following are the various linguistic and content characteristics of claims of responsibility issued as short-form announcements:

v Headline: The headline includes the source of the announcement (usually ISIS's Amaq news agency), the date and the degree of urgency.

v Body of the announcement: The announcement is usually written in modern Arabic, short and succinct. In most cases the language is grammatically correct.

v Source: Information is often attributed to "a security source." In ITIC assessment, that creates the impression (not always accurate) that ISIS has access to "security sources" with knowledge about the attack in whatever country it occurred. Sometimes only a "source" is mentioned.

v Timing of releasing the announcement: In most instances, the announcement is issued the day after the attack. In exceptional instances, it is issued on the same day or two days later.

v Language: ISIS issues the announcements in Arabic, but obviously makes the attempt to issue them in the language of the country where the attack took place. For ISIS-inspired attacks, some of the announcements are also presented in English, to increase the impact of ISIS's message on Western audiences. The claim of responsibility for the attack at the night club in Istanbul also appeared in Turkish.

v Publisher: Most of the claims of responsibility for attacks in the West are issued by ISIS's Amaq news agency. It also issues claims of responsibility for attacks carried out in Syria, Lebanon and the Arab-Muslim world. Most of the announcements in the Middle East are issued by Haq, another ISIS news agency. In one instance (the attack in Manchester) Amaq issued a short announcement in Arabic and Haq issued two longer announcements, one in Arabic and one in English.

v Names of the operatives: Generally speaking, the names and pictures of the operatives who carried out attacks do not appear. On exceptional occasions the aka of the terrorist, which relates to his country of origin, does appear. The aka is not necessarily accurate: in one instance a terrorist was reported as "Abu Yusuf the Belgian," when in fact he came from Algeria.

v Description of the attack: Attacks are described as "attacks" or "operational actions". On rare occasions the term is "an armed attack". In ITIC assessment, there is no real difference between the terms. Another term used is "an act of self-sacrifice,” which describes a suicide bombing attack (which are fundamentally different from other types of attacks).

v Number of victims: Often the number of victims is not mentioned (possibly because of the lack of precise information). Sometimes the number is a combination of those killed and wounded. That is done to magnify the attack and make it seem like a greater "achievement."

v Terms for the coalition attacking ISIS: In most instances, the forces of the coalition attacking ISIS are referred to as "Crusaders." Sometimes the coalition is referred to as "international." However, the word "Christian" appears more than "Crusaders" to describe the people who are the targets of ISIS attacks. In ISIS's perception a religious war is being fought, Muslims against Christians, in which Muslims indiscriminately attack Christians.

v Reason for the attack: The most common reason for an attack comes in answer to ISIS's call to attack the countries of the coalition fighting ISIS in Syria and Iraq. The objective is to exert pressure on the citizens of the coalition countries, creating public opinion to stop the attacks on the Islamic State.




Analysis of long-form announcements

Ø Long-form announcement have several unique features:

v Pattern and language: The long-form announcements are written in classic literary Arabic, are clearly Islamic in style, and use religious terminology. For example, mushrikin (polytheist), fitna (civil war), amir al-mu'minin (ruler of the faithful), Salibyin (Crusaders), and khilafa(caliphate). Alongside such terms there are also worlds from modern Arabic.

v Description, location and manner of the attack: The attack is described at length and has details which do not appear in short-form announcements. For example, a suicide bomber with an explosive belt blew himself up in an [sic] suicide bombing attack targeting a gathering of local Christians [i.e., Copts] in the central cathedral in Cairo. The location of the attack is mentioned to stress the size of the attack and because it was centrally located and crowded. Other long-form announcements were issued for the attacks on the nightclub in Istanbul and the Manchester Arena to illustrate that they were carried out in crowded sites.

v Detailed description of the target using Islamic terminology: Long-form announcements include details about the targets. In Egypt, the Copts were called Crusaders (Salibyin) or "Christians in Egypt." The announcement also referred to Muslims who had allegedly abandoned Islam, calling them "infidels" and "abandoners of Islam." The announcement about the attack in the nightclub in Istanbul accused Turkey of being an Islamic country that had abandoned Islam, calling it "the defender of the cross" (i.e., as having left Islam).

Justification for the attacks

Ø The announcements chosen for examination indicate that the justification for carrying out terrorist attacks, including indiscriminate attacks, is based on religious arguments, at the center of which is the struggle of Muslims against Christians and "infidels," that is, people of other religions holding different beliefs. The terrorist who carries out the attack is called a "soldier" in the ranks of the Islamic State, who fights against its enemies under the direction of the "emir of the faithful,” that is, the caliph (ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi). Another justification for the attacks appearing in many announcements is revenge against the coalition countries and other enemies fighting ISIS, which it represents as enemies of Islam and Muslims. ISIS exerts pressure on their citizens by terrifying them (the announcements use the term irhab, which means to frighten or sow fear among people, and does not mean to carry out a terrorist attack).

The main message sent by the claims of responsibility and ISIS's primary objective as reflected in them is the following: ISIS continues to wage a holy war (jihad) against its many enemies, including Christians ("Crusaders"), Shi'ites (rejecters of Islam), Muslims who abandoned Islam, and anyone who is not monotheistic, according to ISIS's interpretation. ISIS's primary objective is to spread its version of Islam around the globe following its victory over the various "infidels." That is an overall goal when has no genuine chance of being achieved, but it turned a large number of states and population groups into enemies, which ISIS feels it has religious justification to kill.



Representing terrorism as a religious war between Muslims and Christians. The cover of the July 2017 issue of ISIS's English-language magazine, Dabiq. In the picture an Islamic State "soldier" tears down a cross atop a church. The cover of the magazine reads, "Break the Cross" (Dabiq, issue #15, July 2016).


[1] The full English version of this bulletin will appear on the ITIC website. The full Hebrew version can be accessed on the ITIC website. ↑

[2] In the past ISIS did not customarily issue claims of responsibility for ISIS-inspired attacks. Apparently, during 2016, when they became a significant modus operandi in the West, a general announcement was composed that was relevant for ISIS-inspired attacks. ↑

[3] Other examples of attacks carried out in Europe, after which a long-form claim of responsibility was issued, were the attacks at the airport in Brussels and the attack near the headquarters of the EU (both on March 22, 2016). It was a well-planned attack and considerable attention was paid to the aspect of propaganda. ↑

[4] Attacks carried out by ISIS operatives in Syria and Iraq were not examined in this study. ↑
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About ITIC

The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center (ITIC) was established in 2002. It is part of the Israel Intelligence Heritage and Commemoration Center (IICC), a national site dedicated to the memory of fallen of the Israeli intelligence community. The ITIC is located near Gelilot, north of Tel Aviv, and is directed by (Col. Ret.) Dr. Reuven Erlich. The objective of the ITIC is to collect, study, and disseminate information mainly about terrorism and intelligence.

The main research topics in the field of terrorism:

Ø The Palestinian terrorist organizations, their ideology, activities and military capabilities, their political activity, and their international battle for hearts and minds.

Ø The Palestinian Authority and the de-facto Hamas administration in the Gaza Strip.

Ø The Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Ø Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Ø Global jihad organizations, mainly ISIS and Al-Qaeda.

Ø Funding and marketing terrorism.

Ø States which sponsor terrorism, mainly Iran and Syria.

Ø The campaign to delegitimize Israel.

Ø Anti-Semitism and incitement to terrorism and hatred directed against the State of Israel and the Jewish people.

Ø Iran and its policy toward terrorism and the State of Israel.

The Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center employs a staff of experts who research the various aspects of terrorism. They monitor the day-to-day events in the field of terrorism, collect the relevant information, process and analyze the data, and regularly issue information bulletins and in-depth studies about the ITIC’s fields of interest. The ITIC publications include periodic and in-depth studies on various issues.

The Institute for the Research of Intelligence and Policy operating as part of the ITIC is engaged in research on intelligence issues. Its main topics are … READ THE REST


Thursday, December 20, 2012

Hezbollah: Portrait of a Terrorist Organization

Sayyed Hasan Nasrallah caricature
Below is an outline of a 126 page pdf file on Shia-Islamic terrorist organization Hezbollah. This is an aid in understanding Islamic terrorism.

JRH 12/20/12

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Hezbollah: Portrait of a Terrorist Organization

Issued on: 29/11/2012 Type: Base document

Hezbollah has a 30-year history of terrorist activity in Lebanon, the Middle East and around the globe, directed against Israel, the Jewish people, the United States and the West, pro-Western Arab states and Hezbollah's enemies in Lebanon.

Overview

1. Since its establishment in Lebanon 30 years ago, Hezbollah has, without interruption, carried out or planned a variety of terrorist attacks around the globe, using different methods. Those terrorist attacks are part of Iranian policy, which uses Hezbollah as its main proxy through the Islamic Revolutionary Guards' Quds Force and other governmental institutions. The targets and emphases change from time to time according to Iranian and Hezbollah considerations and interests. The targets include Israel and the Jewish people, the United States and other Western countries, Hezbollah and Syria's opponents in Lebanon, and Arab regimes hostile to Iran and the "resistance camp" it leads.

2. In recent years Hezbollah has been involved in terrorist (an occasionally guerilla) activities in different arenas using various methods against its targets. At the same time, with Iranian and Syrian support, it has been upgrading its military-terrorist infrastructure in Lebanon, which far surpasses those of other terrorist organizations in the Middle East and beyond.

3. A short summary of Hezbollah's terrorist and guerilla activity and its military buildup follows.

1) In Lebanon Iran and Syria have enlarged and upgraded Hezbollah's military-terrorist infrastructure since the Second Lebanon War. Its main military asset is an arsenal of an estimated 60,000 rockets and missileswhich threaten Israel's civilians. Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah's leader, boasted that he had precise rockets and a bank of targets, and could turn the lives of hundreds of thousands of Israeli civilians into a living hell. Hezbollah also carries out personal terrorismagainst its opponents in Lebanon, mainly senior figures. The objective is to scare and deter Hezbollah's opponents, mainly after the erosion of its status following its support for the Syrian regime.

2) In the international arena, Hezbollah participates in the global terrorist campaign carried out by the Iranian Quds Force, whose main targets are Israeli diplomats and tourists. Hezbollah's most recent attack was on an Israeli tourist bus in Burgas, Bulgaria, considered successful (by Iran and Hezbollah), after a series of failed attacks abroad in previous years.

3) In the Palestinian arena, Hezbollah helped Iran upgrade the military-terrorist infrastructure of the terrorist organizations operating in the Gaza Strip after Operation Cast Lead, mainly Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. On the eve of Operation Pillar of Defense the terrorist organizations had many thousands of rockets, among them long-range Fajr-5 rockets manufactured in Iran (eight of which hit or were intercepted in the greater Tel Aviv area). In addition, Hezbollah encourages terrorist attacks against Israel from the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula. During the Palestinian terrorist campaign known as the second intifada, Iran and Hezbollah provided the Palestinian terrorist organizations with financial and military support and handled terrorist squads in the Palestinian territories.

4) Inside Israel Hezbollah carries out intelligence and subversive activities. Hezbollah, with Iranian aid, recently sent an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) to collect intelligence and to send Israel a deterrent message (UAVs could also be used for offensive purposes). Hezbollah also attempts to smuggle IEDs and weapons into for terrorist attacks (exploiting its ties to criminal networks) and to use Israeli Arabs for intelligence missions supporting its terrorist activities.

5) In Syria Hezbollah is part of the Iranian effort (led by the Quds Force) to prevent the topple of the Syrian regime, the central member of the so-called "resistance camp." Hezbollah provides the Assad regime with guidance, military training, intelligence and weapons, and hundreds of its operatives are present in Syria. In recent months several Hezbollah operatives died in the battles and others were taken prisoner by the rebels. However, Hezbollah does not admit to its military involvement in Syria and claimed that its operatives died while "fulfilling their commitment to jihad."

6) In the Arab states Iran uses Hezbollah for subversion, terrorism and guerilla activities: in Iraq Hezbollah operatives trained and handled the Shi'ite militias operated by the Quds Force against the United States and its allies (until America withdrew from Iraq at the end of 2011). In Yemen Hezbollah helped train the Iranian-supported Houthi rebels; and in Bahrain Hezbollah was recently publicly accused by Bahraini authorities of involvement in a series of explosions in the capital city of Manama. Its objective was to destabilize the Bahraini regime, against which Iran is waging a years-long campaign of terrorism and subversion. Hezbollah does not admit to involvement in terrorism and subversion in Arab countries.

The Structure of This Study

4. This study is the second part of comprehensive research into the terrorist and subversive activities Iran carries out around the globe directly, and though its main proxy, Hezbollah. The first part, which can be accessed on the Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center website,[1] deals with the Quds Force as spearheading Iran's global terrorism and subversion campaign during the last decade. Two additional parts, which will be issued in the future, will deal with the distribution (according to continent and country) of Iran's global terrorist activity and an analysis of the methods used by Iranian and terrorism and subversion.

5. The three appendices of this study providea chronological analysis of Hezbollah's most glaring terrorist activities in the 30 years since its founding, integral to Iran's overall policies.[2] In addition to terrorist attacks on civilians, Hezbollah has engaged in guerilla warfare in Lebanon and Iraq, against the IDF and against the United States and other Western armies. The targets have changed from time to time depending on Iranian policy, the constraints Hezbollah has had to deal with in Lebanon and the changing regional and international strategic circumstances during Hezbollah's 30 years of terrorist activity.

6. This study includes the following sections:

1) Hezbollah's place in the current global terrorist campaign against Israel.

2) Hezbollah's support for the Assad regime in Syria – update.

3) Summary of Hezbollah's record as a terrorist organization during the 30 years of its existence (1982-2012).

4) The issue of Hezbollah as a designated terrorist organization.

5)Three appendices dealing with the chronological distribution of Hezbollah's terrorist activities:

1) Appendix I: Hezbollah's terrorist activity, 2000-2012

A. Overview

B. The Lebanese arena

i) Building Hezbollah's rocket arsenal after the IDF left south Lebanon (2000-2006).

ii) Using the rocket arsenal to attack civilian targets in Israel during the Second Lebanon War.

iii) Updating the rocket arsenal after the Second Lebanon War (2006-2012)

iv) Employing terrorism and violence against Hezbollah's political opposition in Lebanon.

C. The Israeli arena

i) Overview.

ii) Sending a UAV into Israeli airspace.

iii) Using Israeli Arabs to collect intelligence.

iv) Using drug dealers to smuggle explosive devices into Israel territory.
           
D. The Palestinian arena

i) Iranian and Hezbollah (as a subcontractor) support for the Palestinian terrorist organizations operating in the Gaza Strip (2006-2012).

ii) Iranian and Hezbollah encouragement for Palestinian terrorism during the second intifada (2000-2005).

iii) Hezbollah's involvement in smuggling weapons from Iran for the Palestinian terrorist organizations during the second intifada.

E. The global arena

i) Hezbollah participation in the global wave of anti-Israel terrorism (2008-2012).

ii) Exposure of a Hezbollah network in Egypt which planned to carry out terrorist attacks (2008)
           
F. The Iraqi arena

i) The Quds Force's use of Hezbollah to support the Shi'ite militias against the United States and its allies (2006-2011)

ii) The affair of Ali Musa Daqduq

2) Appendix II: Hezbollah's terrorist activities during the 1990s

A. Overview

B. The global arena

i) Hezbollah's terrorist attacks in Argentina (1992, 1994).

ii) The failure of the attempted bombing of the Israeli embassy in Thailand (1994)

C. The Israeli arena

i) Terrorist attacks in Israel as well as in Gaza Strip, Judea and Samaria carried out through Europe.

ii) Terrorism and drugs: the abduction of Elhahan Tannenbaum (2000)

3)  Appendix III: Hezbollah's terrorist activities during the 1980s

A. Overview

B. The Lebanese arena

i) Bombing the American embassy and American and French military barracks in Beirut(1983).

ii) Severe blow to the Lebanese branch of the CIA.

iii) Abduction of Western nationals.

iv) Assassination of Western and Jewish figures.

v) Epilogue

C. The international arena

i) Attacks on the American and French diplomatic missions in Kuwait (1983).

ii) Attempted assassination of the Kuwaiti emir (1985)

iii) Hijacking planes

a) TWA (1985)

b) Kuwaiti airplanes (1984, 1988)

c) Air France (1987)

d) Air Afrique (1987)

iv) Iranian and Hezbollah involvement in the wave of killings in Paris (1986-1987)

v) Prevention of terrorist activity in Germany (1987, 1989)

vi) Hezbollah network exposed in Spain (1989)

Hezbollah's Role in the Current Global Terrorist Campaign against Israel

7. For the past four years Hezbollah has participated actively in Iran's global terrorist campaign against Israel. The recent attack on an Israeli tourist bus in Burgas, Bulgaria, which killed five Israeli tourists and their local bus driver, was the first "successful" attack in the current terrorist campaign, after a series of attempted attacks were foiled. In the terrorist campaign conducted abroad, Hezbollah serves as an Iranian proxy handled by the Qods Force, an elite unit of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards (IRG), which spearheads Iran's foreign terrorism.[3] Even before the founding of the Qods Force, in the summer of 1982 the IRG established Hezbollah in Lebanon, and has provided it with massive military and financial support in the 30 years since.

8. Hezbollah's current targets for terrorist attacks are primarily Israeli diplomatic missions abroad and groups of Israelis on vacation throughout the Mediterranean basin and other tourist destinations. Some of the attacks and attempted attacks were carried out by Hezbollah, directed and supported by the Qods Force (Bulgaria, Cyprus, Azerbaijan and Turkey) and some were carried out by the Qods Force without Hezbollah involvement (Azerbaijan, India, Georgia, Thailand and Kenya).

9. The terrorist campaign, from the Iranian perspective, is a Iranian response to the "soft war"[4] being waged against Iran and the "resistance camp," and is also intended to strengthen Iran's strategic bargaining capabilitiesand show the United States, the West and Israel that it can harm their interests around the globe. As far as Iran and Hezbollah are concerned, the terrorist campaign is also a way of getting revenge for the death of senior Hezbollah commander Imad Mughniyeh and the killing of Iranian nuclear scientists (for both of which Iran and Hezbollah blame Israel), thus deterring Israel from taking other actions, especially in its war against terrorism and the Iranian nuclear program.[5]

10. During the past four years (2008-2012) Hezbollah attempted to carry out six terrorist attacks, some of them in Mediterranean countries popular with Israeli tourists. One proceeded according to Hezbollah's plans and the others were either prevented or failed. In our assessment, they were carried out by Hezbollah's foreign operations unit (See below). The attacks were the following:

1) Blowing up an Israeli tourist bus in Bulgaria (July 18, 2012): An IED weighing about 3 kilos, or about 6.6 lbs, blew up the back of a tourist bus about to take Israeli tourists from the airport to their hotel in the Black Sea resort of Burgas. According to the Bulgarian minister of the interior, the IED had been assembled in Bulgaria. The terrorist attack was carried out by a Hezbollah operativewho, according to information from the Bulgarian authorities, had a local supporter who has not yet been detained. The terrorist was killed by a technical fault which caused the IED to explode prematurely. The blast killed five Israeli tourists, the Bulgarian bus driver and the terrorist. In addition, 36 Israeli civilians were wounded, three of them seriously.

2) Attack targeting Israeli tourists in Cyprus, prevented (July 7, 2012): The local authorities in Limassol detained a 24-year old Lebanese Hezbollah operative who was collecting information about Israeli tourists arriving on the island by air; he was carrying a Swedish passport (the Hezbollah terrorist operative involved in the attack in Thailand also carried a Swedish passport; see below). In our assessment, he was collecting information in preparation for an attack on Israeli tourists visiting the island, possibly the same sort of attack carried out in Bulgaria.

3) A terrorist attack on Israelis at a tourist center in Bangkok, Thailand (middle of January, 2012): Hezbollah, instructed by the Qods Force, attempted to attack sites visited by Israelis using IEDs. A Lebanese Hezbollah terrorist operative named Hussein Atris, carrying a Swedish and Lebanese passports, was detained at the Bangkok airport.[6] Another Hezbollah operative, also carrying a Swedish passport, managed to escape. Hussein Atris' interrogation led the police to a commercial building in Bangkok where they found a large quantity of chemicals used in the manufacture of explosives (about 4,400 kilograms, or 4.85 tons, of nitrogen and about 40 liters, or 10.5 gallons, of ammonium nitrate). In our assessment, the presence of such a large stock of potentially dangerous chemicals indicates the existence of a long-standing, well-established Hezbollah network in Thailand. A month later, on February 14, 2012, the Qods Force attempted another attack in Bangkok, this time using a magnet to attach an IED to the car of an Israeli diplomat. The attempt, like the Qods Force attacks in India and Georgia in the former Soviet Union, was prevented by the local authorities.

4) On January 5, 2012, the Israeli media reported that Hezbollah was planning to carry out terrorist attacks on Israeli tourists in Europe, especially Bulgaria. The Bulgarian news agencies also reported concerns about attacks on Israeli and/or Jewish targets in Bulgaria or Greece. On January 8 the Israeli media reported that a suspicious object had been found on a bus that entered Bulgaria from Turkey and was going to be used to transport Israeli tourists.

5) An unsuccessful attempt to assassinate the Israeli consul in Istanbul using an IED (May 26, 2011): The blast injured eight Turkish citizens. In July 2011 the Italian Corriere della Sera reported that three Hezbollah operatives from Beirut had often followed the Israeli consul from his home to the consulate. According to Sky News (April 2012), the Qods Force's Unit 400, responsible for attacks beyond the borders of Iran, was behind the attack. The attack was preceded, in 2009, by a joint Iran-Hezbollah attack on an Israeli target, and in 2010 by an Iranian attempt to attack an Israeli target, indicating Turkey as a favored location for Iran and Hezbollah's terrorist campaign.

6) An attempted attack on the Israeli embassy in Baku, Azerbaijan (May 2008): The attack was carried out by Hezbollah, in our assessment with support from the Qods Force. The terrorist cell was composed of two Hezbollah operatives, Ali Karaki, from Hezbollah's foreign operations unit, and Ali Najem al-Din, an explosives expert. The two underwent training in Iran before they were sent to Baku. They carried Iranian passports, and the Iranians also furnished them with a translator. Preparations for the attack, which had almost reached the final stage, were exposed when the Azeri security forces stopped a car carrying the two Hezbollah operatives. In the car they found guns with silencers, explosives, cameras, binoculars and pictures of the Israeli embassy. The two Hezbollah operatives were tried, found guilty, and sentenced to 15 years in prison (October 2009). During the first half of 2012 an attempted Qods Force assassination of two prominent Jewish figures in Baku was prevented. The attack was planned to be carried out during the Eurovision, without Hezbollah participation.

11. It is therefore evident that in recent years Hezbollah has been a close partner in Iran's global terrorist campaign, accelerating since May 2011. The campaign directly threatens all tourism, but its main targets are groups of Israeli tourists and Israel's diplomatic representatives around the globe. In our assessment, it reflects Iran and Hezbollah's readiness to expose themselves to risks, even at the price of a possible escalation with Israel.


NOTES:


[2] This study deals with terrorist activities which our information clearly links to Hezbollah or Iran-Hezbollah joint attacks. Hezbollah has carried out other terrorist activities but its involvement in them is either unknown or about which we do not have solid information, and they are not included here. Terrorist activities carried out by Iran without Hezbollah involvement are also not included.

[3] For further information about the Qods Force, see the August 7, 2012 ITIC bulletin "The Qods Force, an elite unit of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, spearheads Iran's global terrorist campaign."

[4] According to Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, "today we are dealing with a different war, a soft war…and it is being waged by the United States, not only Israel (Al-Manar TV, Lebanon, July 25, 2012).

[5] Hassan Nasrallah publicly reiterated the threat of deterrence in his speeches. For example, on July 18, 2012, on the anniversary of the outbreak of the Second Lebanon War, he said that Hezbollah was deployed for a comprehensive war against Israel and that it would respond with a "great surprise" to any Israeli military strike.

[6] In the 1990s Hussein Atris married a Swedish woman and received a Swedish passport, which he used for his activities in Hezbollah's foreign operations unit.
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