John R. Houk
© September 23, 2017
The Center for Security Policy (CSP) released an open
letter that was also sent to President Trump pertaining to Obama’s Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). For clarity’s sake, the JCPOA was not a
treaty confirmed by the U.S. Senate as the Constitution stipulates for binding international
agreements. Rather Obama chose to by-pass the Senate and made largely
Classified undisclosed agreement components (AIM – 9/8/16 and Fox News – 2/7/17) with
Iran allegedly to prevent militarization of nuclear power for – GET THIS – only
ten years.
Obama’s JCPOA is a classic 21st century version
of pre-WWII agreements between Britain’s Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and
Germany’s Fuehrer Adolf Hitler in 1938. Chamberlain declared he negotiated a
successful peace for our time. That
peace was delusional as Hitler was permitted to carve up Czechoslovakia
in the name of peace which emboldened Hitler to invade Poland which began WWII.
Bolton’s alternative to the JCPOA is not a renegotiation with
Iran, rather it’s a strategic alternative to check Iranian expansionism and
nuclear militarization.
Trump has been falling for the lie Iran has been complying to the JCPOA
and thus has recertified that idiotic agreement contrary to the campaign
promises. I pray the President listens to the signatories of this letter.
JRH 9/23/17
************
45 National Security Experts Urge
President Trump to Withdraw From Nuclear Deal with Iran Using the Bolton Plan
Email sent by Center for Security Policy
Email Contact Maya Carlin
Email Sent 9/21/2017 11:13 AM
(Washington, D.C.): Today 45 national security
experts, many of whom held senior positions in the nuclear weapons, arms control,
nonproliferation and intelligence fields, sent a letter to President Trump
urging him to withdraw the United States from the deeply flawed 2015 nuclear
agreement with Iran (the JCPOA) using a comprehensive plan drafted by former
U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations John Bolton.
The signatories believe President Trump was exactly right
during the campaign when he said the JCPOA is one of the worst agreements ever
negotiated. They believe this agreement is dangerous because it allows
Iran to continue its pursuit of nuclear weapons while the deal is in effect,
has extremely weak verification provisions, and ignores Iran’s increasingly
destabilizing behavior. Because of the enormous risks the JCPOA poses to
American and international security and the impossibility of convincing Iran to
amend the agreement, the signers believe the only option is for the United
States to withdraw and initiate a new, more comprehensive approach that
addresses all of the threats posed by Iran – including its missile program and
sponsorship of terrorism – with a broad alliance that includes Israel and
America’s Gulf State allies.
The signatories endorse Ambassador Bolton’s plan to
implement this approach by withdrawing from the JCPOA in coordination with
America’s allies. The signers believe the Bolton plan is the best way to
reverse the damage done by the reckless concessions that Obama officials made
to Iran to negotiate the JCPOA and to prevent the Iranian nuclear program from spinning
out of control as North Korea’s nuclear effort has.
Some of the eminent individuals who signed the letter
include:
§
Lt. Gen. William G.
Boykin, USA (Ret.), Former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence
§
Ambassador Henry F.
“Hank” Cooper, Former Chief U.S. Negotiator for Defense and Space and SDI
Director
§
Dr. Manfred Eimer,
Former Assistant Director for Verification and Intelligence, U.S. Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency
§
Mr. Douglas J. Feith,
Former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
§
Dr. William R. Graham,
Former Director of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy
§
Ambassador Robert G.
Joseph, Former Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International
Security
§
Ambassador C. Paul
Robinson, former President and Director of Sandia National Laboratories
§
Admiral James A. Lyons,
U.S. Navy (Ret.), Former Commander-in Chief, Pacific Fleet
The full text of the letter is below.
September 21, 2017
The Honorable Donald J. Trump
President of the United States
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, DC
Dear President Trump:
We are writing to you as national security experts, many who
worked in the nuclear weapons, arms control, nonproliferation and intelligence
fields, to express our strong opposition to the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran
(the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or JCPOA) and to ask that you withdraw
the United States from this dangerous agreement as soon as possible.
We also call on your administration to declare to Congress
next month that Iran has not been complying with this agreement and that it is
not in the national security interests of the United States.
We strongly supported your statements during the 2016
presidential campaign that the JCPOA was one of the worst international
agreements ever negotiated and as president that you would either withdraw from
or renegotiate this deal. Your campaign statements accurately reflected
that the JCPOA is a fraud since it allows Iran to continue its nuclear weapons
program while the agreement is in effect by permitting it to enrich uranium,
operate and develop advanced uranium centrifuges and operate a heavy-water reactor.
Such limited restrictions as the deal actually imposes on Iran’s enrichment
program will expire in eight years. In addition, the JCPOA’s inspection
provisions are wholly inadequate.
We also note that a joint July 11, 2017 letter to Secretary
of State Rex Tillerson from Senators Cruz, Rubio, Cotton and Perdue outlined
significant violations of the JCPOA by Iran, the most important of which is
Iran’s refusal to permit IAEA inspections of military facilities.
In addition, although the JCPOA did not require Iran to halt
its belligerent and destabilizing behavior, President Obama and Secretary Kerry
repeatedly claimed it would lead to an improvement. This has not
happened. To the contrary, after the JCPOA, Iran’s behavior has significantly
worsened. Tehran stepped up its ballistic missile program and missile
launches. There was a 90% increase in Iran’s 2016-2017 military
budget. Iran has increased its support to terrorist groups and sent
troops into Syria. Harassment of shipping in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea
also increased, including missiles fired at U.S. and Gulf state ships by the
Houthi rebels, an Iranian proxy in Yemen.
Moreover, in light of major advances in North Korea’s
nuclear program, we are very concerned that North Korea and Iran are actively
sharing nuclear weapons technology and that Iran is providing funding for North
Korea’s nuclear weapons program. CIA Director Mike Pompeo suggested this
possibility during a September 11 Fox News interview.
We are unconvinced by doom-and-gloom predictions of the
consequences of a U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA. The sky did not fall
when you withdrew the United States from the Paris Climate Accord. Claims
that Iran will step up its nuclear program or engage in more belligerent
behavior must be considered against the backdrop of what Iran is allowed to do
under the JCPOA and its actual conduct since this “political understanding” was
announced.
Some Iran deal advocates argue that the United States should
remain in the JCPOA and instead try to amend it to fix its flaws over several
years. A few contend you could decertify the agreement to Congress, but
remain in the deal and then try to amend it. Since Iran has made it clear
it will not agree to changes to the JCPOA, we believe these proposals are
unrealistic. Continuing to legitimate the agreement is not conducive to
its renegotiation. The day will never come when the mullahs agree to
amend the sweetheart deal they got in the JCPOA.
Ambassador John Bolton has drawn up a plan to implement a
far more effective, comprehensive and multilateral approach to address the
threat from Iran. This approach includes strict new sanctions to bar
permanently the transfer of nuclear technology to Iran. He also calls for
new sanctions in response to Iran’s sponsorship of terrorism and efforts to
destabilize the Middle East, especially in Syria, Iraq and Yemen.
Unlike the JCPOA, which was negotiated with no input from
America’s allies in the Middle East, Ambassador Bolton outlines a multilateral
campaign to forge a new comprehensive approach to the threat from Iran that
includes the Gulf States and Israel to assure that their security interests are
taken into account.
We agree with Ambassador John Bolton that strong
international sanctions, a tough negotiating strategy and a decisive American
president who will not engage in appeasement is the best approach to rein in
Iran’s belligerent behavior and induce it to joining negotiations on a better
agreement.
As national security experts who understand the urgency of
addressing the growing threat from Iran, we urge you to implement the Bolton
plan, withdraw from the dangerous Iran nuclear deal and not certify Iranian
compliance to Congress next month. It is time to move beyond President
Obama’s appeasement of Iran and to begin work on a comprehensive new approach
that fully addresses the menace that the Iranian regime increasingly poses to
American and international security.
ATTACHMENT: “Abrogating The Iran
Deal: The Way Forward” By Ambassador John Bolton [Blog Editor: The “ATTACHMENT”
at the end of the signatures in this CSP email. But if you are impatient, here
is the National Review version by John Bolton]
Sincerely,
Winston Lewis Amselem
U.S. Foreign Service Officer, Minister-Counselor (Ret.)
Lt. Gen. William G. Boykin, USA (Ret.)
Former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
Ambassador Henry F. Cooper
Former Chief U.S. Negotiator for Defense and Space and SDI
Director
Stephen Coughlin
Former Joint Chiefs of Staff intelligence analyst
Jack David
Hudson Institute Senior Fellow and former Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction and Negotiations
Policy
Paula A. DeSutter
Former Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and
Compliance
Joseph E. diGenova
Former U.S. Attorney District of Columbia
Jessie Jane Duff
Gunnery Sergeant USMC (Ret.)
Senior Fellow London Center for Policy Research
Dr. Manfred Eimer
Former Assistant Director for Verification and Intelligence,
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Fritz Ermarth
Retired CIA officer. Former chairman of the National
Intelligence Council
Douglas J. Feith
Former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Frederick Fleitz
Former CIA analyst and Professional Staff Member, House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
Kevin D. Freeman, National Security Investment Counsel
Institute
Frank J. Gaffney, Jr.
Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Policy (Acting)
Daniel J. Gallington
Former General Counsel, U.S. Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence and Member, U.S. Delegation to the Nuclear & Space Talks
D. Scott George
Brigadier General, USAF (Ret.). President/CEO, IN-Cyber
Vision, Inc.
Dr. William R. Graham
Former Director of the White House Office of Science and
Technology Policy and Science Advisor to the President; NASA Administrator and
Chairman of the General Advisory Committee (GAC) on Arms Control and
Disarmament
Larry K. Grundhauser
Brigadier General, USAF Retired
Philip Haney
Department of Homeland Security founding staff member and
former U.S. Customs and Border Protection Officer
George William Heiser II
Former Director for Arms Control, Reagan National Security
Council Staff
Richard T. Higgins
Former Director for Strategic Planning, Trump National
Security Council
Peter Huessy
President, GeoStrategic Analysis, Former Special Assistant
to the Secretary of the Interior for International Energy Security
Ambassador Eric M. Javits
Former US Permanent Representative and Ambassador to the
Conference on Disarmament and to the Organization for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons
Ambassador Robert G. Joseph
Former Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and
International Security; Assistant to the President on Arms Control and
Nonproliferation; and Chairman of the ABM Treaty Standing Consultative
Commission
Morton A. Klein
Zionist Organization of America (ZOA) National President
Dr. Charles M. Kupperman
Former Special Assistant to President Ronald Reagan; former
Executive Director, General Advisory Committee to the President on Arms Control
and Disarmament
Herbert I. London
President, London Center for Policy Research
Robert L. Luaces
Foreign Service Officer (Ret.). Former Director, State
Department Office of Multilateral Nuclear and Security Affairs
Admiral James A. Lyons
U.S. Navy (Ret.). Former Commander-in Chief, Pacific
Fleet
Lt. Gen Thomas McInerney, US Air Force (Ret.)
Assistant Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force and Director
of the Defense Performance Review
Vice Admiral Robert R. Monroe, U.S. Navy (Ret.).
Former Director, Defense Nuclear Agency
Daniel Pollak
Co-Director of Government Relations, Zionist Organization of
America (ZOA)
Dr. Peter Vincent Pry
Executive Director, Task Force on National and Homeland
Security; Senior Staff on the Congressional EMP Commission, Congressional Strategic
Posture Commission, the House Armed Services Committee, and the CIA
George Rasley
Editor of ConservativeHQ and consultant
Major General Edward M. Reeder
U.S. Army (Ret.)
Ambassador C. Paul Robinson
Former President and Director of Sandia National
Laboratories. Head of the Nuclear Weapons and National Security programs
at Los Alamos National Laboratory. Chief Negotiator and Head of the U.S.
Delegation to the U.S./Soviet Union Nuclear Testing Talks
Nina Rosenwald
Founder and President, Gatestone Institute
Mark Schneider
Senior analyst, National Institute for Public Policy. Former
Senior Director for Forces Policy and Principal Director for Strategic Defense,
Space and Verification Policy, Office of the Secretary of Defense. Former
Senior Foreign Service Officer.
Tony Shaffer, LTC (ret)
Vice President for Strategic Initiatives and Operations,
London Center for Policy Research. Former CIA-trained senior intelligence
operative
Sarah Stern
Founder and President, Endowment for Middle East Truth
(EMET)
Kenneth R. Timmerman
President and CEO, Foundation for Democracy in Iran
Victoria Toensing
Former Chief Counsel, Senate Intelligence Committee
Adam Turner
General Counsel and Legislative Affairs Director, Endowment
for Middle East Truth (EMET)
J. Michael Waller
Founding Editorial Board Member, NATO Defence Strategic Communications
David Wurmser
Former Senior Advisor to Vice President Dick Cheney
ABROGATING THE IRAN DEAL: THE WAY FORWARD
By Ambassador John Bolton
I. Background:
The Trump Administration is required to certify to Congress
every 90 days that Iran is complying with the July 2015 nuclear deal (the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action — JCPOA), and that this agreement is in the
national-security interest of the United States.1 While a
comprehensive Iranian policy review is currently underway, America’s Iran
policy should not be frozen. The JCPOA is a threat to U.S. national-security
interests, growing more serious by the day. If the President decides to
abrogate the JCPOA, a comprehensive plan must be developed and executed to
build domestic and international support for the new policy.
Under the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015, the
President must certify every 90 days that:
(i) Iran is transparently, verifiably, and fully
implementing the agreement, including all related technical or additional
agreements;
(ii) Iran has not committed a material breach with
respect to the agreement or, if Iran has committed a material breach, Iran has
cured the material breach;
(iii) Iran has not taken any action, including covert
activities, that could significantly advance its nuclear weapons program; and
(iv) Suspension of sanctions related to Iran pursuant
to the agreement is –
(I) appropriate and proportionate to the specific and
verifiable measures taken by Iran with respect to terminating its illicit
nuclear program; and
(II) vital to the national-security interests of the United
States.
U.S. leadership here is critical, especially through a
diplomatic and public education effort to explain a decision not to certify and
to abrogate the JCPOA. Like any global campaign, it must be persuasive,
thorough, and accurate. Opponents, particularly those who participated in
drafting and implementing the JCPOA, will argue strongly against such a
decision, contending that it is reckless, ill-advised, and will have negative
economic and security consequences.
Accordingly, we must explain the grave threat to the U.S.
and our allies, particularly Israel. The JCPOA’s vague and ambiguous wording;
its manifest imbalance in Iran’s direction; Iran’s significant violations; and
its continued, indeed, increasingly, unacceptable conduct at the strategic
level internationally demonstrate convincingly that the JCPOA is not in the
national-security interests of the United States. We can bolster the case for
abrogation by providing new, declassified information on Iran’s unacceptable
behavior around the world.
But as with prior Presidential decisions, such as
withdrawing from the 1972 ABM Treaty, a new “reality” will be created. We will
need to assure the international community that the U.S. decision will in fact
enhance international peace and security, unlike the JCPOA, the provisions of
which shield Iran’s ongoing efforts to develop deliverable nuclear weapons. The
Administration should announce that it is abrogating the JCPOA due to
significant Iranian violations, Iran’s unacceptable international conduct more
broadly, and because the JCPOA threatens American national-security interests.
The Administration’s explanation in a “white paper” should
stress the many dangerous concessions made to reach this deal, such as allowing
Iran to continue to enrich uranium; allowing Iran to operate a heavy-water
reactor; and allowing Iran to operate and develop advanced centrifuges while
the JCPOA is in effect. Utterly inadequate verification and enforcement
mechanisms and Iran’s refusal to allow inspections of military sites also
provide important reasons for the Administration’s decision.
Even the previous Administration knew the JCPOA was so
disadvantageous to the United States that it feared to submit the agreement for
Senate ratification. Moreover, key American allies in the Middle East directly
affected by this agreement, especially Israel and the Gulf states, did not have
their legitimate interests adequately taken into account. The explanation must
also demonstrate the linkage between Iran and North Korea.
We must also highlight Iran’s unacceptable behavior, such as
its role as the world’s central banker for international terrorism, including
its directions and control over Hezbollah and its actions in Iraq, Syria, and
Lebanon. The reasons Ronald Reagan named Iran as a state sponsor of terrorism
in 1984 remain fully applicable today.
II. Campaign Plan Components
There are four basic elements to the development and
implementation of the campaign plan to decertify and abrogate the Iran nuclear
deal:
1. Early, quiet consultations with key players such
as the U.K., France, Germany, Israel, and Saudi Arabia, to tell them we
are going to abrogate the deal based on outright violations and other
unacceptable Iranian behavior, and seek their input.
2. Prepare the documented strategic case for
withdrawal through a detailed white paper (including declassified
intelligence as appropriate) explaining why the deal is harmful to U.S.
national interests, how Iran has violated it, and why Iran’s behavior more
broadly has only worsened since the deal was agreed.
3. A greatly expanded diplomatic campaign should
immediately follow the announcement, especially in Europe and the Middle
East, and we should ensure continued emphasis on the Iran threat as a top
diplomatic and strategic priority.
4. Develop and execute Congressional and public
diplomacy efforts to build domestic and foreign support.
III. Execution Concepts and Tactics
1. Early, quiet consultations with key players
It is critical that a worldwide effort be initiated to
inform our allies, partners, and others about Iran’s unacceptable behavior.
While this effort could well leak to the press, it is nonetheless critical that
we inform and consult with our allies and partners at the earliest possible
moment, and, where appropriate, build into our effort their concerns and
suggestions.
This quiet effort will articulate the nature and details of
the violations and the type of relationship the U.S. foresees in the future,
thereby laying the foundation for imposing new sanctions barring the transfer
of nuclear and missile technology or dual use technology to Iran. With Israel
and selected others, we will discuss military options. With others in the Gulf
region, we can also discuss means to address their concerns from Iran’s
menacing behavior.
The advance consultations could begin with private calls by
the President, followed by more extensive discussions in capitals by senior
Administration envoys. Promptly elaborating a comprehensive tactical diplomatic
plan should be a high priority.
2. Prepare the documented strategic case
The White House, coordinating all other relevant Federal
agencies, must forcefully articulate the strong case regarding U.S.
national-security interests. The effort should produce a “white paper” that
will be the starting point for the diplomatic and domestic discussion of the
Administration decision to abrogate the JCPOA, and why Iran must be denied
access to nuclear technology indefinitely. The white paper should be an
unclassified, written statement of the Administration’s case, prepared
faultlessly, with scrupulous attention to accuracy and candor. It should not be
limited to the inadequacies of the JCPOA as written, or Iran’s violations, but
cover the entire range of Iran’s continuing unacceptable international
behavior.
Although the white paper will not be issued until the
announcement of the decision to abrogate the JCPOA, initiating work on drafting
the document is the highest priority, and its completion will dictate the
timing of the abrogation announcement.
A thorough review and declassification strategy, including
both U.S. and foreign intelligence in our possession should be initiated to
ensure that the public has as much information as possible about Iranian
behavior that is currently classified, consistent with protecting intelligence
sources and methods. We should be prepared to “name names” and expose the
underbelly of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard business activities and how they
are central to the efforts that undermine American and allied national
interests. In particular, we should consider declassifying information related
to activities such as the Iran-North Korea partnership, and how they undermine
fundamental interests of our allies and partners.
3. Greatly expanded diplomatic campaign
post-announcement
The Administration, through the NSC process, should develop
a tactical plan that uses all available diplomatic tools to build support for
our decision, including what actions we recommend other countries to take. But
America must provide the leadership. It will take substantial time and effort
and will require a “full court press” by U.S. embassies worldwide and officials
in Washington to drive the process forward. We should ensure that U.S.
officials fully understand the decision, and its finality, to help ensure the
most positive impact with their interlocutors.
Our embassies worldwide should demarche their host
governments with talking points (tailored as may be necessary) and data to
explain and justify abrogating JCPOA. We will need parallel efforts at the
United Nations and other appropriate multilateral organizations. Our embassies
should not limit themselves to delivering the demarche, however, but should
undertake extensive public diplomacy as well.
After explaining and justifying the decision to abrogate the
deal, the next objective should be to recreate a new counter-proliferation
coalition to replace the one squandered by the previous Administration,
including our European allies, Israel, and the Gulf states. In that regard, we
should solicit suggestions for imposing new sanctions on Iran and other
measures in response to its nuclear and ballistic-missile programs, sponsorship
of terrorism, and generally belligerent behavior, including its meddling in
Iraq and Syria.
Russia and China obviously warrant careful attention in the
post-announcement campaign. They could be informed just prior to the public
announcement as a courtesy, but should not be part of the pre-announcement
diplomatic effort described above. We should welcome their full engagement to
eliminate these threats, but we will move ahead with or without them.
Iran is not likely to seek further negotiations once the
JCPOA is abrogated, but the Administration may wish to consider rhetorically
leaving that possibility open in order to demonstrate Iran’s actual underlying
intention to develop deliverable nuclear weapons, an intention that has never
flagged.
In preparation for the diplomatic campaign, the NSC
interagency process should review U.S. foreign-assistance programs as they
might assist our efforts. The DNI should prepare a comprehensive, worldwide
list of companies and activities that aid Iran’s terrorist activities.
4. Develop and execute Congressional and public
diplomacy efforts
The Administration should have a Capitol Hill plan to inform
members of Congress already concerned about Iran, and develop momentum for
imposing broad sanctions against Iran, far more comprehensive than the pinprick
sanctions favored under prior Administrations. Strong congressional support
will be critical. We should be prepared to link Iranian behavior around the
world, including its relationship with North Korea, and its terrorist
activities. And we should demonstrate the linkage between Iranian behavior and
missile proliferation as part of the overall effort that justifies a
national-security determination that U.S. interests would not be furthered with
the JCPOA.
Unilateral U.S. sanctions should be imposed outside the
framework of Security Council Resolution 2231 so that Iran’s defenders cannot
water them down; multilateral sanctions from others who support us can follow
quickly.
The Administration should also encourage discussions in
Congress and in public debate for further steps that might be taken to go
beyond the abrogation decision. These further steps, advanced for discussion
purposes and to stimulate debate, should collectively demonstrate our resolve
to limit Iran’s malicious activities and global adventurism. Some would relate
directly to Iran; others would protect our allies and partners more broadly
from the nuclear proliferation and terrorist threats, such as providing F-35s
to Israel or THAAD resources to Japan. Other actions could include:
§
End all landing and docking
rights for all Iranian aircraft and ships at key allied ports;
§
End all visas for Iranians,
including so called “scholarly,” student, sports, or other exchanges;
§
Demand payment with a set
deadline on outstanding U.S. federal-court judgments against Iran for
terrorism, including 9/11;
§
Announce U.S. support for
the democratic Iranian opposition;
§
Expedite delivery of
bunker-buster bombs;
§
Announce U.S. support for
Kurdish national aspirations, including Kurds in Iran, Iraq, and Syria;
§
Provide assistance to
Balochis, Khuzestan Arabs, Kurds, and others — also to internal resistance
among labor unions, students, and women’s groups;
§
Actively organize
opposition to Iranian political objectives in the U.N.
IV. Conclusion
This effort should be the Administration’s highest
diplomatic priority, commanding all necessary time, attention, and
resources. We can no longer wait to eliminate the threat posed by Iran. The
Administration’s justification of its decision will demonstrate to the world
that we understand the threat to our civilization; we must act and encourage others
to meet their responsibilities as well.
1. Although this paper will refer to “the JCPOA,” the
abrogation decision should also encompass the July 14, 2015, statement by the
Security Council’s five permanent members and Germany, attached as Annex B to
Security Council Resolution 2231. The JCPOA is attached as Annex A to
Resolution 2231.
______________
National Security Experts Exhort JCPOA Abrogation
John R. Houk
© September 23, 2017
______________
45 National Security Experts Urge President Trump to Withdraw From
Nuclear Deal with Iran Using the Bolton Plan
About The Center for Security Policy
The Center for Security Policy is a non-profit, non-partisan
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actions, and resource needs that are vital to American security and then
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