JRH 3/20/17
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PUTIN'S REAL SYRIA AGENDA [Summary/Intro]
Mar 20, 2017
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s primary objective in
Syria is to constrain U.S. freedom of action – not fight ISIS and al Qaeda.
Russia’s military deployments at current levels will not enable the
Iranian-penetrated Assad regime to secure Syria. Moscow’s deepening footprint
in Syria threatens America’s ability to defend its interests across the Middle
East and in the Mediterranean Sea. The next U.S. step in Syria must help regain
leverage over Russia rather than further encourage Putin’s expansionism.
The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) produced this report with the
Critical Threats Project (CTP).
The insights are part of an intensive multi-month exercise to frame, design,
and evaluate potential courses of action that the United States could pursue to
destroy the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and al Qaeda in Syria. The
ISW-CTP team recently released “America’s
Way Ahead in Syria,” which details the flaws in the current
U.S. approach in Iraq and Syria and proposes the first phase of a strategic
reset in the Middle East.
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Putin’s Real Syria Agenda
By Genevieve Casagrande and Kathleen Weinberger
March 2017
ISW – PDF
Russia’s intervention in Syria in September 2015 fundamentally
altered the balance of the Syrian Civil War.1 Russia re-established momentum
behind Syrian President Bashar al Assad and his Iranian allies at a moment when
major victories by ISIS and Syrian rebels threatened to force the regime to
contract into Syria’s central corridor.2 The capabilities Russia deployed were
not limited to the airframes, artillery, and personnel needed to conduct a
counter-terrorism or counterinsurgency mission, however. Russia deployed
advanced air defense and ballistic missile systems, naval units, air
superiority aircraft, and other capabilities in a display of major Russian
force projection in the region. Russian President Vladimir Putin is altering
the balance of power in Syria and the Eastern Mediterranean through sustained
Russian military operations and additional deployments of high-end
capabilities.
Russian Force Projection
Russia ultimately seeks to expand its permanent naval and
air bases on the Syrian coast in order to further project force into the
Mediterranean and Middle East. Russia’s establishment of an anti-access and
area denial (A2/AD) exclusion zone from its bases at Latakia and Tartous allows
Russia to create de-facto no fly zones in the Eastern Mediterranean as well as
over most of Syria. These A2/AD zones constrain U.S. freedom of movement and
ultimately raise the cost of U.S. involvement in Syria.3 Russia deployed the
naval version of the S-300 to protect the airspace over Latakia airbase in
Syria in November 2015.4 Russia also deployed the S-400 in late November 2015
shortly after the Turkish downing of a Russian jet.5 Russia has since deployed
an additional seven S-300 systems in an effort to build in redundancies,
advance the integration of its air defenses, and provide more comprehensive
coverage.6 The S-300 and S-400 systems are road mobile and interoperable,
increasing the difficulty of neutralizing the systems. [See Appendix I]
Putin wants to challenge the U.S. and its allies by
increasing Russian military and political influence in the Middle East. Russia
has rotated a wide range of naval vessels to participate in the conflict in
order to demonstrate the capabilities of these units and Russia’s willingness
to deploy them in the Mediterranean. Russia has deployed some of its most
advanced non-nuclear naval capabilities to the Eastern Mediterranean.7 Russian
subsurface and surface vessels successfully engaged ground targets in Syria
after launching Kalibr cruise missiles from the Mediterranean and Caspian
Seas.8 Russia has shown it can undertake precision strikes with the
nuclear-capable Kalibr cruise missile at significant distance.
Russia also maintains anti-ship capabilities in the
Mediterranean, including the Bastion-P coastal defense system. Russia
demonstrated the land attack capabilities of the Bastion in November 2016.9
Russia has also deployed battle cruisers that bring advanced anti-ship and air
defense capabilities off the Syrian coast. Russia’s deployment of its
much-ridiculed aircraft carrier the Admiral Kuznetsov nevertheless showcased
its force projection capabilities and intent to exhibit its naval presence in
the Mediterranean.10 [See Appendix II]
Putin has deployed air defense and anti-ship systems to
Syria in order to threaten the United States. Russia does not need these
systems to support the counter-terrorism campaign it claims it is waging against
anti-Assad opposition groups in Syria. Those groups do not operate aircraft or
naval vessels. Russia also deployed the nuclear capable SS-26 ‘Iskander’
ballistic missiles to Syria and used the systems to attack opposition held
terrain.11 The Iskander missiles provide no meaningful additional advantage
against the opposition. The only conceivable target for these advanced systems
is the U.S. and its allies. [See Appendix III]
Constrain U.S. Freedom of Action
Russia has used its deployment to constrain U.S. freedom of
action and limit American policy options in Syria. Russia deployed the S-300
and S-400 air defense systems to deter the U.S. from direct military action
against the Assad regime through the unilateral establishment of a no-fly zone.
Russia has also forward deployed assets beyond its air and naval bases on the
coast in order to further complicate the personnel are primarily concentrated
in Latakia, Aleppo, and Tartous Provinces, but are also active in Hama, Homs,
Damascus, and Hasakah and include a wide range of units including air assault,
tank, medical, naval infantry, and special operations forces. [See Appendix IV]
Russia has intentionally removed potential U.S. partners
within the armed opposition from the battlefield in Syria. Russian airstrikes
from October 2015 to March 2017 have primarily targeted the mainstream Syrian
opposition – not ISIS – in order to ensure the opposition’s defeat through its
submission, destruction, or transformation. The Russian air campaign has driven
what remains of the mainstream opposition closer to Salafi-jihadi groups, which
are stronger and better able to defend against intensified pro-regime military
operations. Russia is also exacerbating radicalization through its deliberate,
illegal targeting of civilians. Russia has consistently targeted hospitals,
schools, and other critical civilian infrastructure throughout the sixteen
months of its air campaign.
Russian Testing Grounds
Russia has also used sustained use of transport aircraft in
Syria to exercise the Russian military’s overall combat readiness and force
projection capabilities. Expeditionary logistics and force projection is
difficult for militaries to exercise, in general. Russia is exercising expeditionary
logistics by air and sea in Syria.13 Russia is refining its ability to deploy
its military personnel and equipment rapidly at a large scale in order to
message its ability to threaten the U.S. and its NATO and European allies.
Russia announced its intent to prioritize the development of naval equipment
for troop transport on March 8 in order to increase the Russian Navy’s ability
to provide logistical support in Syria and in other coastal zones.14 Russia
also re-supplies and provides combat support for prospect of direct U.S.
strikes against the Syrian regime for fear of inadvertently hitting Russian
troops. Sources estimated that Russia maintains between 1,500 and 4,000
military personnel in Syria.12 These forces in Syria through frequent
deliveries from Russian Il-76 and An-124 transport aircraft. As of October
2016, these transport aircraft were making multiple trips to Syria each month
and it is likely that these aircraft continue to make regular trips to Syria.
[See Appendix V]
Limitations of Russian Capabilities
Putin faces a number of economic and military constraints
that limit the resources Russia can bring to bear in Syria. Russia’s economic
crisis has forced Russia to balance limited resources across key theaters like
Ukraine, the Baltics, the Middle East, and domestically in Russia. Putin has
opted to pursue multiple, mutually reinforcing lines of effort using a diverse
set of naval, air, missile, and ground capabilities in Syria. The overlap
allows Russia to extract significant benefits with minimal cost. The Russian
military has demonstrated its many shortcomings during its deployment to Syria,
including frequent friendly fire incidents, losses of Russian aircraft, a poor
performance by Russia’s aging aircraft carrier the Admiral Kuznetsov, and
reports of mechanical failure of Russian equipment.15
The Russian deployment, at current levels, will be
insufficient to grant Assad victory over the opposition, al Qaeda, or ISIS.
Russia, Iran, and the regime have been unable to sustain significant
simultaneous operations against ISIS and the Syrian opposition, despite
Russia’s considerable airframe deployments. Russian airframes were unable to
prevent ISIS’s recapture of Palmyra in December 2016 alongside a final
pro-regime push to defeat the opposition in Aleppo, for example.16 Russia has
instead used ‘cessation of hostilities’ agreements to drawdown its airstrikes
against the opposition and surge its air campaign against ISIS for limited
periods of time.17 Salafi-Jihadi groups have meanwhile begun to consolidate the
opposition under more effective command-and-control structures, increasing
rebels’ capabilities and resiliency.18 This dynamic will not only lead to a
protracted and bloody civil war for the foreseeable future, but it ultimately
raises the requirements for the U.S. to deal with the conflict.
Implications
Russia is both an unacceptable and ineffective partner
against jihadists in Syria. The Russian deployment is inconsistent with Putin’s
narrative that Russia intervened in Syria in order to combat terrorists. Many
of its capabilities have no utility in the anti-ISIS fight. Putin instead seeks
to use Russia’s deployment to subordinate U.S. military action and policies to
Russian objectives in Syria. Russia’s aggressive deployment to Syria intends to
deter the U.S. from intervening for fear of incurring significant costs. Russia
has largely pursued its objectives in Syria with impunity. It has deprived the
U.S. of freedom of maneuver, disrupted U.S. partnerships with key allies in the
region, and facilitated Russia’s emergence as a geopolitical force in the
region. Any potential partnership with Russia in Syria will further strengthen
jihadists and force the U.S. to capitulate to a Russian vision for the broader
Middle East that endangers America’s security interests.
Genevieve Casagrande is a Syria
Analyst at the Institute for the Study of War. Kathleen Weinberger is a
Russia and Ukraine Analyst at the Institute for the Study of War. Institute
for the Study of War Twitter: @TheStudyofWar Critical Threats Twitter:
@criticalthreats
[Blog Editor: From this point forward the rest of the
report are the Appendices (i.e. charts) and Notes. The last section is actually
longer than the report itself. To view the Appendices and Notes go to the PDF.]
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