Intro Michel Wyss’ ‘The Ideology of ISIS’
Edited by John R.
Houk
Intro date: 6/24/16
I found a very interesting PDF written by Michel Wyss circa
2015 while he was attending the Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy & Strategy
located in Israel. I took it upon myself to convert the PDF into a Word
document in order to cross post Mr. Wyss’ analysis of ISIS.
Michel Wyss Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy
& Strategy photo
There is not much accessible info on Michel Wyss but what I
did find shows him to be a very interesting young man. Apparently his native
language is German yet proficiently speaks English and French. He claims to
have a lesser knowledge of Hebrew and Arabic but still uses the descriptive
word “proficiency” when adding them to his language skills. He has gone to
school in Europe, Israel and the USA to develop his expertise.
Wyss’ last entry at LinkedIn
(2015-16) shows has moved beyond student to an expert researcher:
Ragonis Scholarship for
2015/2016
Ragonis Foundation, International
Institute for Counterterrorism (ICT), and the Lauder School of Government,
Diplomacy and Strategy at the Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya (IDC)
July 2015
Recipient of an initial grant for a
research proposal on Iranian Proxy Warfare in the Middle East (research to be
conducted within a year).
"Promoting Research in Counter-Terrorism and Homeland Security
The International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) and the Lauder School
of Government, Diplomacy and Strategy at the Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya
(IDC), are pleased to announce an annual scholarships awarding to promote
research in counter-terrorism and homeland security.
The scholarships will be given in memory of Architect, Major Eyal Ragonis
z"l, for his military and civilian accomplishments. The scholarships' aim
is to promote research in counter-terrorism and homeland security by IDC
Herzliya students as well as IDF soldiers and officers."
Michel Wyss LinkedIn photo
Now I share this to demonstrate that Michel Wyss is well
qualified to make the insightful analysis he has made about ISIS.
I don’t know if this was Michel Wyss’ intention, but his
essay brings a bit of understanding how Multicultural Leftists seem to be way
more supportive of Islamic ideology than they should be.
Enjoy the read.
JRH 6/24/16
*********************
The Ideology of ISIS
By Michel Wyss
January 1, 2015
Introduction
This research paper examines the ideology of the
Salafi-Jihadist organization ISIS (also known as Islamic State, ISIL, Daesh).
It offers a brief description of the Salafi-Jihad doctrine and discusses the
four core functions of ideology and how they apply in the case of ISIS. It
further describes how the ideology of ISIS shares many similarities with modern
ideologies, in particular Marxism-Leninism, and examines what distinguishes it
from other ideologies, mainly its incorporation of religious motifs. Finally,
the paper concludes by arguing that the Salafi-jihad ideology of ISIS is a
synthesis of the characteristics of modern ideologies and a very particular
interpretation of Islam and discussing some of the ensuing counter-terror
policy implications.
Defining Salafi-jihad ideology
According to Drake, ideologies are “the beliefs, values,
principles, and objectives - however ill-defined or tenuous - by which a group
defines its distinctive political identity and aims” (Drake 1998, pp. 54-55).
More to the point, ideologies are “links between thoughts, beliefs and myths on
the one hand, and action on the other hand” (Moghadam, 2008, p. 14).
The ideology of ISIS can be described as “Salafi-Jihad” (cf.
Moghadam, 2008) or “jihadist-
Salafism”, the combination of “respect for the sacred texts
in their most literal form [with] an absolute commitment to jihad” (Kepel,
2002, p. 220). In its essence, Salafi-Jihad contends that the Muslim world is
suffering from a conspiracy by the West and as a response, it advocates the
return to the practices and beliefs of the first three generation of Muslims,
the salaf al-salih (pious ancestors), by means of violent jihad; the
latter characteristic distinguishing jihadists from non-violent
Salafists engaging in dawa (the call to Islam) which are essentially
non-violent proselytizing activities (cf. Moghadam, 2008/2009).
The core functions of ideology
Modern ideologies fulfill four core functions: They raise
awareness, diagnose the situation, form identity, and formulate a remedy
(Moghadam, 2008). All of them can be applied to the ideology of ISIS: True to
its Salafi-Jihadi creed, the organization alleges that the Muslim world is in a
sorry state. ISIS statements cite Quranic verses that describe the pre-Islamic
Arabs as the "[most] miserable nation, [fewest] in numbers and [the most]
divided" (SITE Intelligence Group, 2014) and their propaganda videos refer
to the purported humiliation and suffering Muslims have to endure in the lands
of the “infidels” (kuffar) (cf. Eye of IS, 2014). According to the
leader of ISIS, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the reason for this predicament lies in a
conspiracy by the “Jews”, “Crusaders” and their Arab “apostate” allies (Van
Ostayen, 2014). Al-Baghdadi also praises its soldiers as “heroes of Jihad […]
who defy humiliation and injustice […] and will never abandon fighting”, even
if “only one soldier of them remained” (ibid.). Hence, ISIS attempts to instill
in its adherents a new identity that offers belonging to a supranational
entity, which can offer comfort and security, for recent converts who feel
experience an identity crisis, but also to those who feel disoriented by modernity
(Moghadam, 2008). Indeed, many Western foreign fighters of ISIS are often
recent converts (cf. Kohlmann/Alkhouri, 2014). Finally, Al-Baghdadi, the
self-declared caliph and “leader of the believers” (amir al-mu’minin),
rules that every Muslim has the obligation to wage violent jihad in order to
defeat the infidels (Van Ostayen, 2014). This obligation is known in the
Salafi-Jihad doctrine as fard ayn (individual duty) (Moghadam, 2008/09).
The modern roots of the ISIS doctrine
Even though ISIS advocates establishing a society mimicking
the times of Prophet Muhammad and that is based on a strictly literal
interpretation of Quran and Sunna purified from any religious innovation such
as the incorporation of rationality (Haykel, 2007), its Salafi-Jihad doctrine
is very much a product of modernity and shares many traits with other modern
ideologies, especially revolutionary socialist ones such as Marxism-Leninism
(Rabasa et al., 2006). Like Marxism-Leninism, Salafi-Jihad exhibits an
internationalist outlook with a complete disregard for the borders of countries
that are envisioned as part of the Islamic caliphate. ISIS’s breaching of the
border between Iraq and Syria, which was lauded by its propagandists as “the
end of Sykes-Picot”, exemplifies this (Black, 2014). Both Marxism-Leninism and
the Salafi-Jihad are essentially universal, with the establishment of the
caliphate, a goal shared by all Salafi-Jihad organizations (Byman, 2013), being
“the religious equivalent of Marx’s Communist utopia” as Steven Holmes puts it
(from Moghadam, 2008, p.
15). Both Marxism-Leninism and ISIS claim to be inspired by
a quest for “justice”, a theme that is regularly mentioned in ISIS statements,
for example calling its adherents as “fighting against injustice” (SITE
Intelligence Group, 2014; Van Ostayen, 2014).
More to the point, both ideologies divide the world into two
irreconcilable camps; capitalists and the proletariat in the case of
Marxism-Leninism, whereas Salafi-jihad insists on the dichotomy of Muslim
believers on one hand and infidels and Muslim apostates (which are not
considered “real” Muslims) on the other. Insisting on the unbridgeable
difference between the in- and the out-group is an important feature of
ideologies; the latter is perceived not only as different but also as opposed
and even hostile to the former and hence becomes a legitimate target (Drake,
1998; Moghadam, 2008). Baghdadi’s audio message from November 2014 serves as a
case in point. In it he sets forth a priority list of ISIS’s targets, beginning
with rafidah (a derogatory term for Shiites), followed by the
tawagith (the Arab “apostate” regimes) and finally the West (Van
Ostayen, 2014). He justifies violence against these enemies with their alleged
enmity against Islam, or rather what ISIS perceives to be Islamic (ibid.).
Ideological groups demand from their adherents a great
amount of commitment and loyalty (Moghadam, 2008). Individual members have to
submit completely to their doctrines. ISIS is
no exception in this regard. The group is said to have killed in less
than two months at least 120 foreign fighters who wanted leave to Syria/Iraq
and return home (Tufft, 2014).
The role of religion
While ISIS and the Salafi-Jihad doctrine in general share
many similarities with modern secular ideologies, they also exhibit certain
features that distinguish them from them, mainly through their incorporation of
religion. Salafi-Jihad refer to themselves and their enemies in religious
terms, they frame their strategies and goals as being religious in nature, and
they use their very particular interpretation of religious sources such as the
Quran and Sunna as a justification for acts of violence (Moghadam, 2008).
Baghdadi’s audio message may again serve as an example. He refers to ISIS
fighters repeatedly in religious terms, calling them
“heroes of Jihad”, “lions of tawhid”
(the oneness of god) or “people of wala w’al barah”
(allegiance and disavowal, the exemplification of
Salafi-Jihad’s “with us or against us”-mentality). Similarly, he labels ISIS’s
enemies as “Jews”, “Crusaders”, “infidels”, and “apostates” (Van Osstayen,
2014).
As mentioned above, the Salafi-Jihad doctrine frames waging
violent Jihad as fard ayn, and Baghdadi claims this to be the individual
duty of each and every Muslim (ibid.). According to him, this is the only way
to defy humiliation and suffering and to restore the glory of Islam. In
particular, and the Quranic ban on self-murder notwithstanding,
Salafi-jihadists promote suicide attacks as “martyrdom operations” (cf.
Moghadam, 2008/09), reframing them as permissible sacrifices for the sake of
Allah (fisabillah), and they believe that for this very reason, their
eventual victory is inevitable (Hafez, 2007). ISIS makes sure to praise its
suicide bombers and urges others to follow in their footsteps (Bell, 2014).
Some of its propaganda videos depict suicide attacks from multiple angles while
anasheeds (religious vocal chants) praise the attackers sacrifice for
Allah (ertyanna, 2014).
Finally, ISIS, like other Salafi-Jihadi groups, selectively
cites religious sources to justify their violence (SITE Intelligence Group,
2014; Van Ostayen, 2014). This justification is especially important when it
comes to violence against other Muslims. Salafi-Jihadists vindicate their violence
by declaring the targeted Muslims to be apostates, a process that is known as takfir.
Whereas Al Qaeda has used takfir to justify its fight
against the moderate Arab regimes but has refrained from the “most extreme takfiri
approach” (Byman, 2014, p. 458), ISIS has embraced it in a way that is
reminiscent of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) in Algeria (Zelin, 2014) and was
accused by a high-ranking Al Qaeda official – who was later assassinated,
allegedly by ISIS – of “too much takfir” (SITE Intelligence Group, 2014a).
Conclusion: The ISIS doctrine as a synthesis of modern
ideology and a particular
interpretation of Islam
As was shown above, the Salafi-Jihad doctrine of ISIS
exhibits the traits of any modern ideologies such as drawing a sharp
distinction between its adherents and those who oppose it (essentially everyone
who does not completely agree with it), but additionally incorporates a set of
religious themes based upon its distinct interpretation of Islam emphasizing
violent struggle against the “infidels”. Hence, it needs to be understood as a
religious ideology (Moghadam, 2008).
This entails certain counter-terror policy implications: On
one hand, combating ISIS and Salafi-Jihad in general has to be understood as
fighting against an ideology, and not a whole religion (ibid.). On the other
hand, taking into account the religious themes of this particular ideology demands
that security agencies not only have to deal with ISIS itself and its members
but also with organizations, in particular in the West, which disseminate the
same ideology without being violent themselves or breaking the law. Finally,
the fact that ISIS, like any other group adhering to ideologies, chooses to
ignore any information that contradicts its doctrine, should be used against
the organization. As Moghadam rightly argues, it needs to be pointed out that
groups like ISIS and other Salafi-Jihad adherents, who claim to defend
Muslims, first and foremost engage in killing Muslims
themselves (Moghadam, 2008).
Bibliography
Bell, S. (2014, June 16). Canadian ISIS member’s online
‘wake up call’ urges muslims to follow example of calgary suicide bomber. National
Post, Retrieved from
http://news.nationalpost.com/2014/06/16/canadian-isis-members-online-wake-up-call-urges-muslims-to-follow-example-of-calgary-suicide-bomber/
Byman, D. (2013). Fighting Salafi-jihadist Insurgencies: How
much does religion really matter? Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 36(5),
353-371.
Byman, D. (2014). Buddies or burdens? Understanding the Al
Qaeda relationship with its affiliate organizations. Security Studies, 23(3),
431-470.
Drake, C. J. M. (1998). The role of ideology in terrorists’
target selection. Terrorism and Political Violence, 10(2), 53-85.
ertyanna. (2014). Isis filmed two suicide attacks by car.
Retrieved December 31, 2014, from
http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=da6_1393495276&use_old_player=0
Eye of IS. (2014). Islamic state caliphate eid greetings
from the land of khilafah 720p.
Retrieved December 30, 2014, from
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VuZ7oGptwb8
Hafez, M. M. (2007). Martyrdom mythology in Iraq: How
jihadists frame suicide terrorism in videos and biographies. Terrorism and
Political Violence, 19(1), 95-115.
Haykel, B. (2009). On the nature of Salafi thought and
action. In R. Meijer (Ed.), Global Salafism: Islam's new religious
movement (pp. 33-57). Columbia: Columbia University Press.
Kepel, G. (2002). Jihad: The trail of political Islam.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Kohlmann, E. & Alkouri, L. (2014). Profiles of foreign
fighters in Syria & Iraq. CTC Sentinel, 7(9), 1-5.
Moghadam, A. (2008). The salafi-jihad as a religious
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Moghadam, A. (2008/09). Motives for martyrdom: Al qaeda,
salafi jihad, and the spread of suicide attacks. International Security, 33(3),
46-78.
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S.; Karasik, T. W.; et al. (2006).
Beyond Al-Waeda. Part 1. The Global Jihadist movement (No.
MG-429). Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.
SITE Intelligence Group. (2014). ISIS spokesman declares caliphate,
rebrands group as
“Islamic state”. Retrieved December 30, 2014, from
https://news.siteintelgroup.com/Jihadist-News/isis-spokesman-declares-caliphate-rebrands-group-as-islamic-state.html
SITE Intelligence Group. (2014a). Message attributed to
zawahiri's arbiter in syria gives advice to ISIL. Retrieved December
20, 2014, from
http://ent.siteintelgroup.com/Jihadist-News/message-attributed-to-zawahiri-s-arbiter-in-syria-gives-advice-to-isil.html
Tufft, B. (2014, December 29, 2014). Isis 'executes up to
200 fighters' for trying to flee jihad and return home. The Independent,
Retrieved from
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Van Ostayen, P. (2014, November 14, 2014). Audio message by
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi - even if the disbelievers despise such. Message posted to
https://pietervanostaeyen.wordpress.com/2014/11/14/audio-message-by-abu-bakr-al-baghdadi-even-if-the-disbelievers-despise-such/
________________________
Wikipedia has a bit more detail about IDC Herzliya located in Israel:
The Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya (Hebrew: המרכז הבינתחומי הרצליהHa-Merkaz ha-Bentehumi
Hertseliyya; abbreviated IDC
Herzliya) is a private, not-for-profit, and nonsectarian, research
university in Israel founded in
1994 by Uriel Reichman.[1] It is located at Herzliya, in the Tel Aviv District, and is
classified as an independent non-budgeted academic institution.[2]
IDC Herzliya has 8,000 students currently enrolled for
undergraduate and graduate degrees, including 2,000 international students from
86 countries around the world.
In 2014 the IDC Herzliya was ranked the most successful
academic start-up institution in Israel and outside of the United States,
ranking first in Israel and twenty one in the world.[3] In the same year IDC
law graduates achieved the highest passing rate at the national bar examination
of all Israeli academic institutions.[4] Moreover, the IDC
Herzliya has been ranked first of 66 Israeli academic institutions in terms of
student satisfaction for four consecutive years.[5] In addition, the IDC
Herzliya has been the only academic institution in the world who has won the
international Jean Pictet International
Humanitarian Law competition, organized by the International Committee of the Red Cross, in consecutive
years, winning it twice in 2010 and 2011.[6]
… READ THE
REST (Interdisciplinary Center
Herzliya; Wikipedia; page was last modified
on 8 June 2016, at 13:45.)
